Appropriating (Sub)Urban Space: Inhabited Counter-Narratives as Resistant Spatial Intervention in Contemporary American and German Culture by Smith, Lacey N
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Appropriating (Sub)Urban Space: Inhabited Counter-Narratives as Resistant Spatial 
Intervention in Contemporary American and German Culture
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0j5197nq
Author
Smith, Lacey N
Publication Date
2018
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Santa Barbara 
 
 
Appropriating (Sub)Urban Space: Inhabited Counter-Narratives as Resistant Spatial 
Intervention in Contemporary American and German Culture 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
in Comparative Literature 
 
by 
 
Lacey Nicole Smith 
 
Committee in charge: 
Professor Maurizia Boscagli, Chair 
Professor Colin Gardner 
Professor Jocelyn Holland 
 
December 2018
The dissertation of Lacey Nicole Smith is approved. 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Jocelyn Holland 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Colin Gardner 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Maurizia Boscagli, Committee Chair 
 
September 2018
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appropriating (Sub)Urban Space: Inhabited Counter-Narratives as Resistant Spatial 
Intervention in Contemporary American and German Culture 
Copyright © 2018 
by 
Lacey Nicole Smith 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to the three pillars that got me through this process: 
Matthew Loewen, Jeffrey Bellomi, and Summer Myers. 
There are also a few people I would like to acknowledge for their assistance in helping 
me complete this work, including all of the members of my dissertation committee – 
Maurizia Boscagli, Colin Gardner, and Jocelyn Holland – as well as Dick Hebdige, Mark 
Leiderman, Thomas Mazanec, Sara Weld, Kira Lanier, Matt Parker, Kate and Don Loewen, 
and countless others who helped provide all manner of research or moral support during this 
process, including all of my friends and my family. 
A portion of Chapter One was adapted into an essay entitled “‘A nice home at the end of 
the cul-de-sac’: Hawkins as Infected Postmodern Suburbia.” The essay appeared in the 
anthology Uncovering Stranger Things: Essays on Eighties Nostalgia, Cynicism, and 
Innocence in the Series, which was published by McFarland and Company in June 2018 and 
edited by Kevin J. Wetmore.  
 
 v 
VITA OF LACEY NICOLE SMITH 
September 2018 
[FINISH] 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Bachelor of Arts in International Studies, Dickinson College, May 2008  
Master of Arts in Comparative Literature, University of Colorado, Boulder, May 2012 
Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature, University of California, Santa Barbara, 
December 2018 (expected) 
 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
2015-2018: Teaching Assistant, Department of Comparative Literature, University of 
California, Santa Barbara 
2012-2015: Teaching Assistant, Department of German, University of California, Santa 
Barbara 
2010-2012: Teaching Assistant, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University 
of Colorado, Boulder 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
“‘A nice home at the end of the cul-de-sac’: Hawkins as Infected Postmodern Suburbia,” 
adapted from “Chapter One: Infected Suburb, Perfected Suburbia” of the dissertation and 
published in “Uncovering Stranger Things: Essays on Eighties Nostalgia, Cynicism, and 
Innocence in the Series” by McFarland and Company, June 2018.  
 
AWARDS 
 
Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Department of Comparative Literature, 2016 
 
Max Kade Fellowship, 2014 
 
FIELDS OF STUDY 
 
Major Fields: Spatial Studies, Urban Studies 
 
Studies in Germanic Studies with Professors Jocelyn Holland and Sven Spieker 
 
Studies in American Suburban Studies with Professor Dick Hebdige 
 
Studies in Public Art with Professor Colin Gardner
 vi 
ABSTRACT 
 
Appropriating (Sub)Urban Space: Inhabited Counter-Narratives as Resistant Spatial 
Intervention in Contemporary American and German Culture 
 
by 
 
Lacey Nicole Smith 
 
This project is concerned with the concept of urban and suburban space as explored 
through mediated narratives in film, television, literature, art, and other visual or narrative 
media. Adopting spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre’s concepts of differential space and the 
right to the city, this project asserts that the hegemonic dominance of capitalist, neoliberal, 
and bourgeois ideologies in American and German culture extends to both the material and 
psychic production of space in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Concentrating on the way American urban and suburban spaces have been portrayed in the 
media, as well as how artists from a variety of media have critiqued or responded to 
hegemonic mediated narratives through narratives that center the experience of inhabitance, 
this project addresses the way space can be appropriated and mutated to potentiate the 
emergence of differential space, understood as space which differs from the hegemonic 
norms dictated by the dominated built environment. Using close readings of texts indicative 
of the kind of inhabited everyday resistance Lefebvre identifies as necessary for venturing 
the right to the city to all who inhabit space, this project considers the concept of spatial 
 vii 
appropriation along multiple planes of resistant spatial intervention. In the process, it 
articulates an interartistic, transnational, and interdisciplinary methodology for approaching 
broad spatial questions like that of the planetary right to the city and the way collective 
practices of spatial appropriation to potentiate the emergence of differential space. The 
theoretical framework borrows from Lefebvre as well as the likes of theorists like David 
Harvey, Dolores Hayden, Lynn Mie Itagaki, Tobias Morawski, Jean Baudrillard, and Fredric 
Jameson. Primary texts investigated in the project include Don DeLillo’s White Noise, the 
Duffer Brothers’ Stranger Things, Jordan Peele’s Get Out, the music of Vince Staples, 
David Wagner’s Mauer Park, Tanja Dücker’s Spielzone, the photo series Berlin Wonder 
Land, Stih & Schnock’s Orte des Erinnerns, the squatting actions of Refugee Tent Action in 
Kreuzberg, Berlin, the citizen campaign to maintain Berlin’s Tempelhofer Feld, and music 
videos by Emus Primus featuring Berlin’s ubiquitous graffitial images. The purposes of 
these and other investigations throughout the project is the illuminate how a collective, 
planetary form of spatial appropriation might be coupled with individual acts of spatial 
intervention to slowly mutate the built environment and create counter-narratives about 
urban and suburban space that potentiate the emergence of a space more conducive to the 
needs of all who inhabit. 
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND CONVENTIONS 
Throughout this work, I have capitalized the term Black wherever it denotes a racial 
identity, following the convention that a term should be capitalized when referring to “a 
culture, ethnicity, or group of people” and where Black is understood as a politicized 
identity representing people of the African diaspora. (Lori L. Tharps, “The Case for Black 
with a Capital B,” The New York Times, 18 November 2014). I have opted not to capitalize 
white both because the term does not have the same political import as Black when used as 
an identity designation and also in defiance of white supremacists, who capitalize the term 
precisely to politicize white identity. I have avoided substituting the term African American 
for Black in recognition of the fact that not all Black people living in the United States 
identify as African or American. Similarly, I follow the convention of using -x to de-gender 
terms like Latino (Latinx) and Chicano (Chicanx).  
Moreover, to avoid perpetuating the same rhetoric of anti-urban racial bias this project 
critiques, I have preferred the term “people/person of color” or variations thereof 
(inhabitants of color, populations of color) wherever possible when referring to groups of 
non-white people that include more than one ethnic or racial identity, rather than using terms 
like “minorities” or “non-white,” though I do use the latter term when referring specifically 
to the way white populations group all people of color together along racial lines. Where any 
of these terms appear in cited quotations, I have tended to leave them intact.  
For similar reasons, I avoid using the term “ghetto” when referring to impoverished 
urban neighborhoods predominantly inhabited by people of color, instead using “ghettoized” 
or “ghettoized neighborhood” so as to highlight that it is the intentional actions of state and 
economic actors (such as redlining, racially restrictive real estate covenants, and other forms 
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of segregation) that force certain ethnic and racial populations into restrictive parcels of 
space. Finally, whenever the N-word appears, including in quotes made by a Black person, I 
have opted to use asterisks to censor the term out of respect for the convention that white 
people should never speak this term or put it in print. The asterisks are intended not to 
censor the original speaker so much as to censor myself as a white academic who is utilizing 
the speaker’s sentiment in my own work. I recognize that many of these terms are fraught 
and that conventions about preferred terminology may change over time -- I welcome any 
criticism aimed at making the language in this work more humanizing and inclusive.
 1 
Introduction 
Towards Differential Space 
 
Henri Lefebvre opens “The Right to the City” (1968) with the observation that urban 
society has traditionally catered only to “individual needs” that serve “a bureaucratically 
managed society of consumption” without adequately addressing collective needs or 
individual anthropological needs that fall outside the logic of capitalist accumulation and 
bourgeois hegemony. (147) The problem with this sort of spatial organization is that it gears 
all social activity in urbanized society towards labor and consumption, despite the truth that 
“the human being has the need to accumulate energies and to spend them, even waste them 
in play” (147). From the perspective of capitalist society, play is a counter-productive use of 
one’s energy, so the logic of consumerism forces the working class into increasingly 
precarious forms of labor that bleed into everyday life, expending the laborer’s energies 
through consumption-based forms of entertainment meant to prevent their “wasting” 
energies through non-commodifiable forms of play or worse, active resistance to the 
hegemonic mode of production. In refusing to account for those needs that fall outside of 
existing “commercial and cultural infrastructures,” (Lefebvre, “The Right to the City” 147) 
urban space as traditionally conceived fails to serve all who inhabit it. Neither do suburban 
and rural space, once parceled off from a center city but now folded into the totalizing urban 
fabric Edward Soja described as a form of postmodern geography, account for the needs of 
all who inhabit space. In the half-century since Lefebvre conceived of the right to the city, 
the spatial politics of urbanized society have transformed alongside the concomitant 
ideological thrusts of globalized late capitalism and neoliberal austerity, creating a new 
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fragmented form of postmodern space that subjects inhabitants ever further while also 
potentiating the kind of resistant spatial mutations Lefebvre’s work theorizes. 
Because the postmodern urban fabric does not address all inhabitants’ need for play, 
creative activity, and imagination, Lefebvre suggests that contemporary urban spatial codes 
tend to ignore a fundamental human desire “of which play, sexuality, physical activities such 
as sport, creativity, art, and knowledge are particular expressions and moments,” which 
express how such pursuits “can more or less overcome the fragmentary division of tasks” 
(“Right to the City” 147) that characterizes capitalistic (abstract) space. Lefebvre argues that 
either through myopic focus on capital or through intentional devaluation of non-elite 
inhabitants’ needs, commercially conceived urban planning typically ignores the inhabitant 
altogether, opting instead to base development on an “interpretation of inhabiting” that is 
always determined by economic actors and institutions of power who serve their own 
interests before those of the inhabited urban collective. (“Right to the City” 152)  
As such, the logic of urban space invariably tends towards reinforcement of 
hegemonic power structures and thus towards oppression, segregation, dispossession, 
gentrification, and ultimately, the denial of basic rights to those portions of the population 
most overlooked by commercial interests, a disproportionate number of whom are people of 
color.  Out of this spatial violence arises “a cry and demand” that Lefebvre terms the right to 
the city, defined as a “transformed and renewed right to urban life” that “gathers the 
interests…of the whole society and firstly of all those who inhabit” the urban environment. 
(“Right to the City” 158)1 When he refers to inhabitants, he does not mean the bourgeoisie 
who “are everywhere and nowhere…[who] transcend everyday life, possess nature and 
                                                
1 Emphasis is Lefebvre’s. 
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leave it up to the cops to contrive culture” but rather to “the armies of workers with or 
without white collars, people from the provinces, the colonized and semi-colonized of all 
sorts, all those who endure a well-organized daily life” (“Right to the City” 159). Spanning a 
variety of cultural positions from the “suburban dweller” to the “people who stay in 
residential ghettos,” Lefebvre characterizes the urban inhabitant as anyone who wakes each 
morning and goes to work only “to return the same way in the evening and come home to 
recuperate enough to start the next day” (159). The inhabitant is thus defined by their 
relationship to a work-life routine that requires continued devotion to particular everyday 
patterns dictated by hegemonic spatial codes that dictate how bodies may navigate urban 
space. Lefebvre argues that while the bourgeoisie have wealth and luxury enough to relate to 
the city primarily as consumers, the working classes truly inhabit space through the routine 
practices of everyday life that shape urban society. 
In Rebel Cities: From The Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (2012), David 
Harvey updates Lefebvre’s concept, describing the right to the city as the collective right of 
inhabitants to access the city’s resources, to determine how the urban environment is 
produced, and to decide which kinds of social formations urban space ought to facilitate. He 
calls the right to the city a “collective rather than an individual right” (4) not only because it 
is expressed collectively but also because its articulation benefits the group over the 
individual. Harvey elaborates: 
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of 
what kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what 
relations to nature we cherish, what style of life we desire, what aesthetic values we 
hold. The right to the city is, therefore, far more than the right of individual or group 
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access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the 
city more after our heart’s desire. (4) 
The right to the city is a call to re-imagine and re-author the urban spatial environment in 
ways that produce social relations more conducive to collective equity. It is also the right for 
inhabitant to claim authority over space and craft counter-narratives and counter-images that 
challenge the dominant narratives expressed through mass-mediated bourgeois hegemony, It 
is a theoretical model intended to help develop a more equitable urban praxis planned and 
produced according to the needs of inhabitants rather than economic actors. Moreover, it is a 
strategy for intervention and appropriation of a built environment already attuned to 
hegemonic power hierarchies, a survival strategy often undertaken by disadvantaged groups 
even when where they do not actively intend to do so. Wherever inhabitants use urban 
space, especially public space, in ways that diverge from their normatively intended use, 
they tend to do so in order to address anthropological needs that by design, the urban 
environment refuses to fulfill. Because of this, much of the resistance that embodies the 
right to the city emerges spontaneously from collective need and is articulated across 
multiple social registers by a diverse array of social and artistic actors, all of whom 
appropriate space either materially or symbolically in order to potentiate the emergence of 
new, more democratically imagined social codes. Consequently, myriad forms of right to the 
city resistance are embedded in the everyday routines of those urban inhabitants whose 
claims to the city and its resources are most inhibited by commercial interests.  
In the twenty-first century, the revolutionary possibilities of right to the city 
resistance through collective spatial appropriation are nonetheless complicated by the sheer 
ubiquity of the transnational power structures that uphold globalized capitalism and 
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neoliberal ideology. Whereas Lefebvre initially conceived of a series of reformist 
interventions that might transform urban life, the possibility of intervention alone has since 
been cut off by the now-global dimensions of postmodern late capitalism. As Fredric 
Jameson explains, late capitalism2 is characterized by the expansion of globalism on a 
planetary scale3 as well as by a host of “more familiar social consequences, including the 
crisis of traditional labor, the emergence of yuppies, and gentrification on a now-global 
scale” (xix). All three of these social consequences show how the working classes are 
subjugated not just by increasingly alienated forms of labor but also by a globalized form of 
spatial dispossession and gentrification that aspires to the eventual displacement of all non-
bourgeois individuals from any commercially viable space. For this reason, late capitalism 
can be understood as a paradigm that seeks to use the power of capital to control space itself.  
Accompanying this unprecedented expansion of capitalist energies is the rising 
dominance of neoliberal ideology, which as Harvey explains posits that “the social good will 
be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions” and which 
“seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market” (Harvey, Neoliberalism 3). 
The twin forces of globalized capital and neoliberalism have helped create a global society 
in which the dispossession and displacement of working class populations is considered both 
natural and necessary for the continued growth of the global economy as a whole. In A Brief 
                                                
2 Lefebvre uses the term neocapitalism, but I have adopted Jameson’s definition and term.  
3 As to the changes effected by the global expansion of capital, Jameson cites “the new international division of 
labor, a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking and the stock exchanges...new forms of media 
interrelationship…computers and automation, [and] the flight of production to advanced Third World 
areas”  (xix). 
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Introduction to Neoliberalism (2005), Harvey suggests that since the late 1970s/early 1980s, 
when world leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher brought the ideals of 
neoliberalism to the global political and economic theatres, it has expanded to “become 
hegemonic as a mode of discourse” and “has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the 
point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, 
live in, and understand the world” (3). Neoliberal thinking supports the elimination of social 
support for the working classes through privatization of public services and deregulation, 
assuring that only those with enough power, influence, or economic advantage can 
participate in shaping society. This ensures that the working classes’ already miniscule share 
of socioeconomic power continually shrinks over time, inflaming the negative effects of 
social inequality on a planetary scale. What is more, since under neoliberalism, private 
economic actors are encouraged to seek capital gains at all costs, and since neoliberal state 
policies are designed to protect the free market at all costs, both politicians and economic 
actors are given little incentive to act in ways that benefit the greater social good, 
particularly as concerns the severely impoverished. Additionally, neoliberal effects like the 
privatization of education and the systematic weakening of labor protections have severely 
diminished the working classes’ traditional means to resist exploitation while strengthening 
the chokehold that forces of power and economic actors retain over the dissemination of 
culture and knowledge.  The net result is ever-increasing wealth inequality on a now-global 
scale, coupled with increasing constraint of avenues for proletarian resistance, especially as 
concerns access to space. 
Neoliberal privatization has also meant that mass media channels are less public than 
they once were, increasing the influence that economic actors and institutions of power exert 
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over news, politics, education, popular culture, and the general exchange of information in 
the public domain. This has made it that much easier for the mass media to use innocuous-
seeming appeals to the inherent value of free market enterprise as a coded way to deploy 
harmful ideologies like white supremacy, xenophobia, heteronormativity, and Judeo-
Christian patriarchy in ways that intentionally disadvantage people of color, the 
impoverished, and all manner of itinerant populations. Whereas the progressive changes of 
the 1960s civil rights era rendered it socially unacceptable to use more overt language to 
appeal to these base ideological impulses publicly, harmful dichotomous narratives about 
urban and suburban space offered a way to denigrate the impoverished and populations of 
color while seemingly only speaking of spatial differences. That is, by coding urban poverty 
as widespread individual failure to participate meaningfully in a free market enterprise that 
is popularly perceived as economically equalizing, the systemic disadvantages and racialized 
segregation that helped create ghettoized urban neighborhoods could be blamed on those 
who suffered most from them. To name but two examples, even affluent liberals who would 
undoubtedly oppose overt appeals to educational segregation or job discrimination might fail 
to recognize the racial and economic bias wrapped up in neoliberal reforms, such as the push 
to increase private school enrollment through education vouchers or calls to de-emphasize 
affirmative action hiring programs perceived as unfairly influencing free enterprise. Such 
capital-serving rhetorical manipulations are reinforced by mass-mediated narratives about 
urban and suburban space that suggest the former is chaotic and disordered and the latter is 
orderly and utopian, a tendency which is especially heightened in the United States.4  
                                                
4 I do not address rural space much in this work, if only because in the era of sprawl, rural space typically 
either gets folded into discussions of suburban space or gets included in a general discussion of the urban 
fabric as metropolitan regions + everything else outside them. However, at least a few theorists have argued 
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Over the past half century, mediated portrayals of urban and suburban space have 
habitually gestured to American liberty and the free market as equalizing forces in order to 
justify the idea that the economic disadvantages faced by working class populations in 
ghettoized urban neighborhoods are a natural consequence of their individual moral failures 
compared with bourgeois suburbanites, particularly as concerns the false perception that 
urban populations lack enough work ethic to get themselves out of poverty without state 
assistance. The proverbial boot-strap logic of American individualism within neoliberal 
capitalism is routinely deployed to render invisible the systemic violence of hegemony, 
creating a mythical narrative in which urban poverty is the result of inadequate 
entrepreneurial drive rather than a consequence of segregation, state violence, de-
industrialization, and wealth inequality. Once extrapolated to a now-global economy, the 
disadvantages of the global poor are viewed in a similar light, their poverty paraded as 
evidence of moral failure, natural ineptitude, or an evil necessary to ensure the continued 
economic comfort and security elites. Because neoliberalism helps advance the idea that the 
free market assures all inhabitants equal economic opportunity, the failure to actually 
achieve collective economic stability is rarely if ever attributed to the precarious economic 
conditions neoliberal late capitalism potentiates. In reducing collective disadvantage to 
individual moral failure, these narratives also tend to obscure the ways that segregation and 
displacement are built into hegemonic spatial production as standard operating procedure. 
Mediated narratives about urban and suburban space also tend to portray disparities 
between the two landscapes along racial lines, where suburbia is seen as the proper domain 
                                                                                                                                                 
that because sprawl typically eats up rural space, there is a simultaneous need to address “the right to the rural” 
alongside the need to address the right to the city. 
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of whiteness, affluence, and order and the urban is seen as a disordered, impoverished catch-
all space for everyone else. Such spatial narratives assure that implications of individual 
moral failure are all the more potently weaponized against people of color, especially those 
within economically disadvantaged or ghettoized urban neighborhoods, since these 
populations were intentionally excluded from the suburbanization process, restricting them 
to increasingly dense urban neighborhoods. Having been hegemonically authored as the 
domain of the corrupted, criminal Other, the urban environment is seen as morally corrupt in 
its own right. Mediated narratives about urban and suburban space are generally controlled 
by the same economic actors and forces of power that exert law-and-order control over the 
built material environment, meaning they are an extension of hegemony’s attempts to 
control space generally. Consequently, the fight for the right to the city is a fight to reclaim 
the right for all inhabitants to exist in and take up space. It is also a fight to restore authority 
to urban inhabitants’ so that they might author and re-author (sub)urban narratives in ways 
that reconstruct an inhabited history of the city, maintaining cultural memory of inhabited 
experience while exposing the falsity of dominant mediated narratives.   
Lefebvre correctly identified that it was the working class who are uniquely suited to 
take part in these resistant spatial interventions but he also conceived of the working class at 
a time prior to the totalizing neoliberal capitalism of today’s globalized society. As Harvey 
asserts, since the late twentieth century, “the important and ever-expanding labor of making 
and sustaining urban life is increasingly done by insecure, often part-time and disorganized 
low-paid labor” and as a result, “the so-called ‘precariat’ has displaced the traditional 
‘proletariat’” (Rebel xiv). Even more alienated from their labor than the factory workers 
who preceded them, members of the precariat find themselves in constant danger of 
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displacement by a gentrification-centric mode of urbanization that privileges capital over 
people. Harvey writes: 
In invoking the ‘working class’ as the agent of change…Lefebvre was tacitly 
suggesting that the revolutionary working class was constituted out of urban rather 
than exclusively factory workers. This, he later observed, is a very different kind of 
class formation—fragmented and divided, multiple in its aims and needs, more often 
itinerant, disorganized, and fluid rather than solidly implanted. (Harvey, Rebel Cities 
xiii) 
As neoliberalism widened the gap between the economically advantaged and disadvantaged, 
it also eroded the precariat’s ability to consolidate power through traditional, organized 
forms of opposition, such as labor unions and general strikes. Just as the precariat itself 
became more fragmented, fluid, and itinerant, so too did their means of resistance. What 
once may have been accomplished by a single, well-organized demonstration might now 
require a series of sustained discursive performances across a variety of spatial contexts 
(both physical and symbolic), generated from a variety of origins, and utilizing a multitude 
of media both tangible and intangible/digital. The precariat might thus be understood as the 
masses of urban inhabitants, for whom the collective right to the city can only by achieved 
through an explicitly anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist model of resistant spatial 
intervention. Precariat class consciousness must extend from a collective recognition that 
hegemony’s fragmentation of urban space is arbitrary, that the spatial codes that govern how 
and which bodies may move through certain spaces are often transgressable, and that urban 
space can be reimagined according to their own inhabited experiences. In short, precariat 
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revolution must come through nothing less than an intentional re-authoring of space to 
produce new spatial codes and in turn, new social formations. 
 In centering resistance with the precariat rather than with the working classes as 
more generally defined, Harvey emphasizes the fragmented nature of the kind of precariat 
resistance that will be required to potentiate the emergence of a new kind of urban space. 
The right to the city offers the potential for this sort of fragmentary resistance because it is 
an open concept dependent entirely upon the discursive explorations used to define it. 
Harvey writes: 
The right to the city is an empty signifier. Everything depends on who gets to fill it 
with meaning. The financiers and developers can claim it, and have every right to do 
so. But then so can the homeless and the sans-papiers. We inevitably have to 
confront the question of whose rights are being identified, while recognizing, as 
Marx puts it in Capital, that ‘between equal rights force decides.’ The definition of 
the right is itself an object of struggle, and that struggle has to proceed concomitantly 
with the struggle to materialize it. (xv) 
If the right to the city must proceed from a struggle to materialize new social conditions, and 
if force has been traditionally used to limit equal access to urban space, then the fight for the 
right to the city must also be a fight to produce a new kind of space less susceptible to forces 
of power. Yet as Lefebvre recognized in 1968, in the absence of a truly blank spatial slate, it 
would be difficult to imagine a new kind of space at all if one cannot first recognize how the 
existing built environment is produced to serve the needs of hegemonic power.  
In The Production of Space (1974), Lefebvre proposes that “(social) space is a 
(social) product” (26) and that, as with any product, space is produced, or built, according to 
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society’s dominant mode of production. He writes, “every society – and hence every mode 
of production with its subservients (i.e. all those societies which exemplify the general 
concept) – produces a space, its own space” which it “offers up…as an ‘object’ for analysis 
and overall theoretical explication” (31). Since society is defined according to the mode of 
production to which it adheres, in a globalized economy, national borders no longer 
distinguish one society from another in an economic sense. Of course, variations in culture, 
sovereign power, language, and other means of delineating between parcels of this global 
society have not been erased, but as neoliberal late capitalism has expanded, the power 
afforded any one of these variations to influence the economy or the built environment has 
increasingly diminished. Borrowing a Deleuzian term, global cities like Los Angeles and 
Berlin, the cities I focus on in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, respectively, are becoming a 
sort of any-city-whatever, producing the same social behaviors and patterns of everyday life 
regardless of local variations because they are built according to the same global mode of 
production, sustained by a global precariat. 
Accordingly, under late capitalism, the entire built environment has been rendered 
abstract space, a term denoting all space built according to the dominant mode of 
production. Abstract space is “the dominant form of space” linked with capital and wealth, 
which “endeavors to mold the spaces it dominates” as it “seeks, often by violent means, to 
reduce the obstacles and resistance it encounters there” (49). In practical terms, almost the 
entirety of the urban and suburban built environment can be categorized as abstract space, 
which perpetuates the dominance of the capitalist mode of production by dictating the forms 
social relations may take within space. Lefebvre argues that abstract space “transports and 
maintains specific social relations, dissolves others, and stands opposed to yet others” (50) 
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so that it doesn’t merely reflect existing social relations but actively produces and shapes 
them by generating, as all space does, spatial codes. These codes dictate which kind of users 
have access to which kinds of space, how space can be used and by whom, which explicit or 
implicit laws users of the space must adhere to and, perhaps most importantly, how space 
may be subdivided from its abstract form into the recognizable spaces and places of the built 
environment with their normative binary designations (public/private, inside/outside, 
sacred/secular, etc.). 
However, because social relations continuously evolve, so too must abstract space be 
produced and reproduced to adapt to these evolutions and so, in turn, are spatial codes 
generated and re-generated. Consequently, abstract space is not static; it transforms over 
time, and it does so through a process of reproduction that automatically generates 
incremental differences. Usually these differences are either conducive to the continued 
dominance of the existing mode of production or easily repressed, but the potential always 
remains that differences not conducive to hegemonic power could generate a new type of 
space less beholden to hegemony. If it were possible for forces of power to exert full control 
over space, they could distinguish potentially subversive differences from those necessary to 
renew abstract space, and those deviations would be annihilated. But since space can never 
completely be dominated, power continually reasserts itself through appeals to spatial law 
and order meant to prevent any non-conducive differences from emerging. Lefebvre 
explains, “as a product of violence and war, [abstract space] is political; instituted by a state, 
it is institutional. On first inspection it appears homogenous; and indeed it serves those 
forces which make a tabula rasa of whatever stands in their way, of whatever threatens 
them – in short, of differences” (285). Any seeming homogeneity within abstract space is 
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attributable to attempts by forces of power to exert more control over space. However, since 
hegemonic control over the social relations of space is actually far more tenuous, the 
possibility of producing a space that differentiates always already exists as a characteristic of 
abstract space itself. To this end, Lefebvre notes that abstract space “harbors specific 
contradictions” which “precipitate [its] downfall” (52). He clarifies: 
The reproduction of the social relations of production within this space inevitably 
obeys two tendencies: the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the 
generation of new relations on the other. Thus, despite – or rather because of – its 
negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall 
call that new space ‘differential space’, because, inasmuch as abstract space tends 
toward homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, 
a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences. (52) 
The reproduction of abstract space always threatens the continued dominance of the very 
same social and political forces it seeks to uphold, creating a precarious balance of power in 
which the dominant system could potentially find itself at an uncharacteristic disadvantage. 
That this precarity is thrust upon the urban masses through increasingly fragmented labor 
and state-sanctioned law-and-order violence is no surprise, for without such repression it 
would be easy for the precariat to recognize the revolutionary potential embedded in space 
itself. 
 All spatial interventions attuned to the right to the city might thus be understood as 
attempts to potentiate the emergence of differential space. Scholars like Tobias Morawski 
recognize this when they characterize the right to the city as a goal to be achieved through 
collective mutation of the city space by varied means of appropriation. As I expand at length 
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in Chapter Three, Morawski borrows from the “conceptual triad” (Lefebvre, Production of 
Space 33) of spatial concepts5 that Lefebvre articulates in his introduction to identify three 
planes upon which resistant interventions in abstract space can potentiate the emergence of 
differential space and thus, of the right to the city. Morawski’s tri-plane model advocates 
spatial mutation by a million pinpricks, metaphorically speaking, wherein no one 
intervention individually succeeds in transforming space but the collective effects of myriad 
interventions, on scales large and small, potentiates the emergence of a new urban spatial 
logic. This is why Morawski speaks of appropriating the city in collective terms, for it 
requires the collective simultaneous efforts of various types of resistant actors spread out 
across a Gegenöffentlichkeit, or counter-public. The combined efforts of resistant actors 
contribute to a collective re-authoring of (sub)urban space within which the potential for a 
new kind of social space is rendered through slow mutation and differentiation of existing 
spatial codes. 
 The various works on which I focus in the three chapters feature here might all be 
considered individual examples of a more broadly conceived collective tendency towards 
right to the city resistance and collective spatial appropriation across transnational, 
interartistic, and interdisciplinary lines. Moreover, each work capitalizes on the unique 
characteristics of its given medium to respond to a particular type of urban or suburban 
messaging that has become dominant in that medium over the past half century. Just as 
expanding hegemonic paradigms have re-shaped the urban landscape, resistance-minded 
writers, musicians, artists, and activists have challenged the dominance hegemony exerts 
                                                
5 Lefebvre mentions spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces as concepts 
necessary for understanding how space is produced--see section XV in the Introduction to The Production of 
Space for more details. Morawski adapts these three concepts in the titles for his three planes of spatial 
intervention. 
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over space in order to expose potential fissures in abstract space and express how the urban 
environment could be re-shaped differently. Even within commercialized popular culture, 
the counter-narratives and counter-images that resistant works generate help remind one of 
the necessity to integrate inhabited experience into our broader cultural narratives about 
urban space. In focusing on collective spatial intervention as a broad paradigm for 
evaluating how interdisciplinary approaches to the praxis of right to the city resistance are 
expressed across a variety of artistic and cultural practices, this work offers an explicitly 
humanist analysis of the way narratives about space shape the social interactions and norms 
produced within space. In so doing, it contributes to the push for an interdisciplinary 
understanding of Spatial Studies as a productive field of inquiry unto itself and in 
conjunction with the traditional fields of the arts, humanities, and social sciences. Speaking 
boldly, the present work represents the author’s attempt to demonstrate how broad, big-
picture thinking about space as a conceptual lens across transnational, interartistic, and 
interdisciplinary lines can help cinch together seemingly disparate inquiries about culture, 
art, and society that may prove productive for addressing the kind of systemic issues that no 
one field of inquiry can address. To that end, I have arranged the three chapters in this work 
in such an order as to move from an analysis of the hegemonic space of American suburbia 
in Chapter One to the contested urban fabric of Los Angeles in Chapter Two to the 
development of potential differential space in post-Wall Berlin in Chapter Three, all of 
which are grounded by close readings of works from a variety of popular media that express 
how counter-narratives about urban and suburban space can help potentiate the emergence 
of differential space and consequently, of the right to the city for all who inhabit.  
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 In Chapter One, I bring Lefebvre’s concepts of abstract space into conversation with 
the historical implications of the American suburbanization process as conceived since the 
end of World War II, suggesting that contemporary American suburban space exemplifies 
abstract space. Borrowing from Dolores Hayden’s comprehensive history of the 
suburbanization process in Building Suburbia (2003), I argue that all forms of 
suburbanization since the emergence of the postwar sitcom suburbs have been marked by an 
aesthetic and ideological fascination with mediated images of perfected suburban utopia that 
created what I term the suburbia simulacrum, following both Fredric Jameson’s and Jean 
Baudrillard’s conceptions of the simulacrum, particularly as relates to Baudrillard’s 
conception of simulation in postmodern space. The suburbia simulacrum is a mediated 
imaginary in which suburban space is idealized, perfected, rendered aesthetically 
homogenous, and anesthetized of disorder. It is paired with a discourse of urban crisis and 
disorder (to which I devote the second chapter) that helps reinforce the perceived security of 
suburban space. In mediated narratives from literature, film, television, and art, the suburbia 
simulacrum is frequently deployed as a stand-in for the utopian ideals of suburban 
hegemony, wherein only those with wealth and power enough to participate in mass 
consumerism are permitted to take part in suburban life. I argue that the ideals 
communicated through the suburbia simulacrum are explicitly attuned to the social norms of 
white affluence, intentionally obfuscating the segregation and racialized violence of the 
suburbanization process so as to render it invisible. The mass-mediated imaginary rendered 
by the suburbia simulacrum creates an aesthetic ideal by which material suburbs continue to 
be measured and developed, assuring that white supremacy and bourgeois suburban 
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hegemony continue to replicate in the reproduction of suburban space even as contemporary 
sprawl renders the formally clear boundaries of urban and suburban space moot. 
In order to evaluate how resistant actors across different cultural media have 
critiqued, challenged, or otherwise upended the suburbia simulacrum, I engage in close 
readings of three different exemplary American texts that approach suburban critique in 
unique ways: Don DeLillo’s 1985 novel White Noise (1985), the Duffer Brothers’ 2016 
television series Stranger Things, and Jordan Peele’s 2017 film Get Out. These three works 
are united by a common theme identifiable in many suburban counter-narratives surrounding 
infection and contamination as spectacular forms of crisis that help expose the false security 
engendered by suburban space. Namely, much like Baudrillard’s description of spectacle in 
Simulacra and Simulation (1981), infection and contamination help render visible the 
machinations of both law-and-order state power and mass mediated discourses of crisis 
which help keep suburbanites subjected to the hegemonic spatial codes of suburban abstract 
space. Though each takes up these themes in a different manner, the three works I analyze 
all replicate the traditional mediated deployment of the suburbia simulacrum in order to 
subvert it through the introduction of infectious or contaminating elements into the suburban 
landscape. White Noise offers the idea of simulated infection as a way to expose the 
simulated nature of suburban abstract space. Stranger Things considers suburban space and 
the suburbia simulacrum more generally as agents of contamination used to manipulate 
suburban subjects into compliance with hegemonic norms. And Get Out offers an inversion 
of the suburbia simulacrum’s tendency to present Black bodies as sources of suburban 
contamination, flipping this trope on its head to focus on the way suburbanites are 
themselves infected by hegemony’s drive towards violence and the dispossession of Black 
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bodies. All three works represent discursive attempts to re-author suburban space in ways 
the repressive hegemony that the suburbia simulacrum helps normalize. 
 In Chapter Two, I draw on Steve Macek’s concept of moral panic over the city and 
the discourse of urban crisis create narratives about racialized urban criminality and chaos 
that constitute the suburbia simulacrum’s antithesis, always portraying the urban 
environment in negative relation to suburban utopianism. Both Macek and Lynn Mie Itagaki 
expand on the ways both mass media and popular culture have helped create narratives of 
urban disorder and incivility that infiltrated rhetoric repeated by politicians, journalists, 
economic actors, and academics from the mid-1970s onward, persisting in varying forms to 
this day. These anti-urban narratives are often explicitly racialized, insisting that ghettoized 
urban neighborhoods predominantly inhabited by people of color became sites of urban 
crisis due to inhabitants’ innate failure to uphold the moral values of civilized society, where 
the notion of civility is hegemonically conceived and centered on white suburban affluence. 
In the discourse on urban crisis, these moral failures are considered inherent to both urban 
space and to the populations of color that inhabit it. Rather than using explicitly racial terms 
to express these biases, cultural actors who deploy anti-urban sentiment rely on coded 
language about urban and suburban space to demonize people of color and the impoverished 
while uplifting white suburbanites (coded as “the middle class”) and valorizing the order and 
security assumed endemic to suburban space. The right of anti-urban rhetoric throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century helped legitimate neoliberal divestment in urban social 
programs and justify the increasing and intentional inequality thrust upon urban populations, 
all while providing ideological support to ramp up law-and-order policing and further 
militarize police forces tasked with maintaining spatial security. Consequently, a direct line 
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can be traced between the rise of the discourse on urban crisis and the excessive police 
brutality that a number of high profile police shootings of Black men and women as well as 
the work of contemporary activists like Black Lives Matter have helped highlight in recent 
years.  
In order to explain the tangible consequences of decades of anti-urban crisis rhetoric 
being normalized in mass media, I compare testimonies by Officer Darren Wilson and 
Canfield Green resident Dorian Johnson surrounding the 2014 shooting death of Michael 
Brown, Jr., in Ferguson, MO. The disparities between Wilson’s and Johnson’s descriptions 
of the neighborhood in which the shooting took place, coupled with the Department of 
Justice’s investigations about racial bias within the Ferguson Police Department, offer a 
concrete, material example of the potential consequences of widespread cultural acceptance 
of both the suburbia simulacrum and a discourse of urban crisis. Similarly, the differences in 
the way Wilson and Johnson were respectively questioned during their testimonies reflect 
the way that hegemony attempts to prohibit actual urban inhabitants from shaping their own 
narratives about the neighborhoods they inhabit. Comparing protests in Ferguson in 2014 to 
the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion in South Central following the acquittal of the police 
officers that beat Rodney King, I consider the way anti-urban narratives dismiss Black anger 
as incivil and violent while tolerating the state violence used to control abstract space. With 
the parallels between Ferguson in 2014 and South Central three decades earlier in mind, I 
consider gangsta rap as a medium to create inhabited counter-narratives about the city’s 
urban spaces. While the earliest gangsta rap narratives from N.W.A. in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s established a resistant foundation for the genre, both a tendency to push for 
profit over discourse and over-reliance on an imaginary, exaggerated version of hip-hop Los 
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Angeles embodies in the concept of Compton led to the genre’s eventual commercialization. 
As a result of the genre’s popularity, proponents of urban crisis narratives instrumentalized 
gangsta rap’s exaggerated Compton narratives as primary sources thought to legitimate the 
basest suburban assumptions about Black criminality.  
However, following Michael Brown’s death, gangsta rap re-emerged as a resistant 
medium for a new generation of rappers who resuscitated the genre’s counter-hegemonic 
potential in order to advance potent critiques of problems faced by Black urban inhabitants 
including police brutality, the repressive violence of the American justice system, the 
contemporary prison-industrial complex, and the continued segregation of Black and brown 
bodies into ghettoized neighborhoods. Offering Compton and North Long Beach-based 
rapper Vince Staples as an exemplary model for this new era of gangsta rap, the latter half of 
the chapter contains a close analysis of Staples’ 2014 debut EP Hell Can Wait and the 
thematically linked 2015 LP Summertime ’06. On both records, Staples uses spatially-
bounded landmarks and gestures towards the mappable, local history of the two 
neighborhoods he calls home in order to craft counter-narratives about urban space based on 
his own experiences growing up as a member of a local gang. Staples’ work critiques both 
mediated panic over the city and the misleading Compton narratives of older gangsta rappers 
in order to forge a new discursive landscape through which gangsta rap can be as a 
documentarian art form to narrate the material reality of inhabited urban experience. By 
using his music to create a sense of place centered in the real-life neighborhoods of 
Compton and North Long Beach, Staples authors a new kind of narrative about life in the 
Los Angeles urban fabric, once that centers the Black urban inhabitant to challenge the 
racialized myth of urban chaos and suburban perfectibility tied up in the discourse of urban 
 22 
crisis. Moreover, since Staples utilizes the cross-racial commercial appeal of gangsta rap to 
sonically insert his narratives into white suburban ears, his albums can also be considered an 
appropriation of the channels of communication traditionally used to advance the anti-urban 
narratives he critiques, thus helping potentiate the emergence of differential space. 
In Chapter Three, I move away from the American context in order to offer Berlin in 
the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as a case study for the way urban and 
suburban counter-narratives and counter-images can be collectively rendered to potentiate 
the emergence of differential space. My choice of Berlin stems from the recognition that the 
unique conditions presented by the city’s reunification constituted a potential rupture in the 
city’s spatial codes that made it that much easier for the reunited city to imagine discursive 
alternative possibilities for how the urban environment could be reproduced. My analysis 
here begins with the various groups of squatters and artists who squatted abandoned 
buildings and engaged in other forms of resistant occupations in Berlin’s central 
neighborhoods surrounding Mitte in the days and months immediately following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, a period also know as the Wende. I draw on the photos and interviews from 
Wende squatters published in the 2014 photo series Berlin Wonder Land in order to consider 
how the group drew on influences from Berlin East and West to initiated a series of resistant 
spatial intervention strategies that helped create a resistant toolkit for future resistance 
within Berlin’s collective of resistant actors. Though the reunited city’s development 
follows a commercial image of the city as a cosmopolitan hub for commercial investment 
has hastened gentrification of the spaces the squatters once occupied, their contributions to a 
discursive current of spatially minded resistance helped make the New Berlin into a city 
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where precariat resistance continues to slowly mutate the spatial codes produced by the 
urban environment. 
Drawing on Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s concepts of right to the city and Morawski’s 
analysis of collective spatial intervention in the city, I assert that Berlin’s status as a global 
city with a unique contemporary history of spatial resistance makes it a useful starting point 
for imagining how the precariat can create a global counter-public through a collective 
tendency towards recurrent spatial intervention. Using Morawski’s Lefebvre-inspired three 
plane conception of collective spatial intervention strategies as a guiding framework, I 
consider six different artworks or political demonstrations that have contributed to collective 
spatial appropriation of Berlin’s cityspace on both the physical and symbolic planes, all of 
which expand upon the initial strategies of the Wende-era squatters. These six examples 
include political demonstrations (Refugee Tent Action’s squatting occupation in Kreuzberg 
in 2012-2014 and Demokratische Initiative 100% Tempelhofer Feld’s citizens’ referendum 
against development of Tempelhofer Feld in Neukölln in 2011), artistic works (Stih & 
Schnock’s 1992 memorial Orte Des Erinnerns and East Cross Project’s 2013 graffiti 
documentary/music video project Berlin Spricht Wände), and literary works (Tanja Dücker’s 
2000 novel Spielzone and David Wagner’s 2013 essay collection Mauer Park), all of which 
contribute their own counter-narratives that add up to a counter-image of Berlin that 
supplants the image of the city as commercially conceived. By examining the efforts of the 
Wende-era squatters in concert with these six works, one identifies how the collective 
activity of Berlin’s counter public (which Morawski calls a Gegenöffentlichkeit) makes 
spatial intervention continuously renewable and expandable in Berlin’s cityspace, offering a 
model that can help support the development of resistant spatial practices in other cities as 
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well. Through the slow mutation of its spatial codes wrought by collective spatial 
appropriation, Berlin has become a model for the kind of world city where precariat 
resistance remains possible even within the oppressive tendency towards global 
gentrification that marks the twenty-first century. 
The kinds of spatial questions this work takes up are big ones and much like the 
overlapping strategies required to potentiate differential space, answering them will require 
a far more concentrated effort from a far more diverse array of cultural and social 
perspectives than any one piece of research could provide. Yet by using the vast category of 
space as a conceptual point of entry to address questions that remain unsolved through more 
specific modes of inquiry, one may begin to see the lines of connection that help clarify 
seemingly opposed social tendencies. The academic approach to answering these questions 
is no more or less flawed and limiting than any other, so the author remains under no 
illusions that the work at hand constitutes anything more than a single contribution to a 
broader discursive drive toward searching for a way out of the totalizing and flattening 
hegemonic power structures that hem the vast majority of the world’s population into 
precarity. Yet as the arguments presented make clear, even one contribution to a wave of 
critical discourses about space can help potentiate the emergence of something different, 
something more equitable, something more attuned to the collective needs of all who take up 
space. May the findings of this work as a whole be considered such a contribution. 
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Chapter One 
Infected Suburb, Perfected Suburbia: 
The Suburbia Simulacrum and Counter-Narratives of Contamination 
 
 We bulldoze small and inconvenient fields of strawberries 
  or corn and replace them with the increasing complexity 
 of everyday life; promised lands, the right of “choice,” 
 boundaries, color-schemes, paper mills, etc. There are 
 golf courses, chain restaurants, six brand-new gated 
 communities, and, in the edge-towns to the north, there is 
 debate about public housing and how to shift responsibility 
 for the poor. The book calls it “suburbanizing the conventional 
 inner city,” and argues that it is “excessively conventional.” 
 But this place is a flat surface. This place is distinct from other 
 places and at the same time isn’t. This place is really convenient. 
 There are all sorts of differences that already exist. The book 
 tells us we resemble virtual neighborhoods and according to the 
 experts the virtual is “more compelling” than we are. 
     -Danielle Dutton, S P R A W L 
 
Introduction 
  
         Suburbia. The word alone an image--a collection of images, really--evoking the 
perfected built environment of late capitalism as made in the likeness of the American 
dream. A term indicative of both the urbanist turn of modernity that signaled the postmodern 
epoch and the late twentieth century ideological turn towards neoliberal capitalism, 
suburban space exists today in a form paradoxically resembling yet fundamentally differing 
from the form it took in the years following World War II. A type of space which is always 
produced, always planned, always ostensibly engineered to foster a sense of community that 
is itself premised on perpetual collective consumption within blissful domesticity, suburban 
space ensures its inhabitants operate on a social and cultural level according to patterns of 
everyday life dictated for them by the hegemonic demands of the dominant mode of 
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production. As Guy Debord suggests in Society of the Spectacle (1967), "Urbanism is the 
mode of appropriation of the natural and human environment by capitalism, which, true to 
its logical development toward absolute domination, can (and now must) refashion the 
totality of space into its own peculiar decor" (121). By this light, suburbia must be read as 
the mid-century modern ranch house inside of which this peculiar decor has been arranged. 
The overarching goal of this project is to evaluate and re-imagine the role that 
spatially-minded resistance can play in challenging neoliberal late capitalism and its 
dominance over space itself. A central concern of the work at end is the degree to which 
hegemonic narratives about urban and suburban spaces can be challenged, critiqued, or 
inverted in order to generate resistant counter-narratives. To that end, this chapter focuses on 
how images of suburbia since WWII came to dominate the American cultural imaginary, 
and how contemporary narratives of suburban infection challenge the forces of power and 
capital that rely on the continued prominence of suburbia as idealized image. Embedded in 
this analysis is consideration for how American suburbanization  since WWII contributed to 
economic and social conditions that helped cement neoliberal late capitalism as the globally 
dominant mode of production today, a topic to which I will return in subsequent chapters. 
Neoliberalism, as David Harvey defines it, is “a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade,” all of which is undergirded by 
state support for “an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (2). In effect, 
neoliberalization is characterized by a galvanization of the free market wherein it is seen as a 
self-correcting force that lends itself to progress, even as the more direct political project of 
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neoliberalization has been  “to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to 
restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey 19). Given the ubiquity of suburban sprawl in 
the contemporary American landscape, as well as the integral role played by the private 
housing market and private lenders in the economic crash of 2008, it is no stretch to suggest 
that both American consumerism and suburban sprawl are part and parcel of the long-term 
process of both American neoliberalization over the last half century.  
Similarly, given the degree to which today’s globalized markets are enmeshed with 
the creation of wealth in the American private sector, it follows that both the material and 
symbolic expansion of the wealth gap and other forms of socioeconomic inequality in 
today’s American landscape correspond with a similar expansion of inequity on a now-
global scale. Hegemonic bourgeois tendencies connected with the American suburban 
landscape are thus recognizable in today’s globalized expressions of wealth segregation, 
most notably global gentrification, making an investigation of American suburbia critical for 
understanding broader global trends of neoliberal spatial dispossession. Thus, while this first 
chapter leads with an investigation of the role that mediated images of suburbia have played 
in creating ideological support for American neoliberalization and anti-urbanism, it does so 
in order to consider the role that American ideals of wealth and whiteness vis a vis mediated 
imaginaries like suburbia play in the development of more globalized expressions of spatial 
dispossession. 
This chapter considers the various ways that contemporary American literary, 
television, and film texts respond to and critique a mediated imaginary commonly known as 
suburbia. I term this mediated imaginary the suburbia simulacrum following Jean 
Baudrillard’s definition of simulacrum as “a model of a real without origin or reality” (1) as 
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well as Fredric Jameson’s conception of simulacrum as an “identical copy for which no real 
has ever existed” (18). My theoretical approach draws extensively from both Baudrillard’s 
work on simulation and Henri LeFebvre’s work on the production of space, particularly the 
way Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space helps clarify how the built environment is 
produced to foster social interactions that benefit the existing mode of production. Both 
theorists conceive of material space as the product of complex interconnecting social 
customs and rules, which Lefebvre terms spatial codes, that dictate how material reality is 
perceived and understood, as well as who has access to which kinds of spaces and for what 
purposes. While Lefebvre illustrates how space is produced and reproduced according to 
spatial codes that inform social practice, Baudrillard demonstrates how such spatial codes 
rely upon a “simulated generation of differences” (3) that deter individuals from recognizing 
the contradictions inherent to space. This chapter also borrows further theoretical support 
from Dolores Hayden’s work on suburban architectural history, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer’s theory of pseudoindividuality, and Edward Soja’s theory of postmodern 
geography, among others, in order to clarify how the suburbia simulacrum functions as a 
tool for maintaining the hegemonic dominance of ideologies and values most commonly 
associated with white suburban affluence.  
Using an interartistic mode of analysis in order to consider contemporary suburban 
narratives from various types of media, I identify the recurring theme of suburban infection 
and/or contamination as a common way of subverting the primacy of the suburbia 
simulacrum and illuminating the contradictions of American suburban space. While 
inquiries into the social effects of suburban idealization are prevalent in the social sciences, 
my close inter-artistic analysis of texts here represents a uniquely humanist investigation of 
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the role the suburbia simulacrum plays in shaping social codes about suburban and urban 
space. To this end, this first chapter culminates in a close analysis of three contemporary 
texts that use infection or contamination of suburban space to critique the suburbia 
simulacrum: Don DeLillo’s novel White Noise (1985), which considers simulated suburban 
infection, the Duffer Brothers television series Stranger Things (2016-ongoing), which 
considers suburbia as the always-already infected, and finally, Jordan Peele’s film Get Out 
(2017), which subverts the suburbia simulacrum in order to expose it as a source of infection 
in its own right. All three of these texts make use of the unique types of suburban imagery 
and aesthetics traditonally used in their respective medium in order to subvert and critique 
the ideological assumptions implicit to such imagery. Considered in concert, these three 
texts offer a model by which the real, material spatial violence of suburbanization that is 
normally obfuscated by the suburbia simulacrum, such as segregation, displacement, and 
other forms of dispossession, can be recognized, critiqued, and ultimately resisted. As such, 
each text also offers a medium-specific model for the artistic appropriation of images of 
suburban space. As such, each text helps potentiate the emergence of what Lefebvre terms 
differential space, or, space that resists, rather than upholds, the existing hegemonic order. 
 
Abstract and Differential Space 
         One of Lefebvre’s central arguments in The Production of Space (1967) is that all 
produced space within the built environment can be called abstract space, that is, space built 
to uphold the dominance of the existing mode of production. In this sense, suburbia 
represents abstract space par excellence. Abstract space, which Lefebvre says is both 
dominant and where centers of wealth and power are concentrated, produces particular 
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social codes by which it “endeavours to mould the spaces it dominates (i.e. peripheral 
spaces), and it seeks, often by violent means, to reduce the obstacles and resistance it 
encounters there” (49). Critical to Lefebvre’s argument is the recognition that forces of 
power can only ever endeavor to control space since, like time and energy, space is an 
expression of material existence itself and thus can never totally be dominated. (Lefebvre 
12) Though forces of power continuously attempt to control it, abstract space nonetheless 
“harbors specific contradictions” which are “liable eventually to precipitate [its] downfall” 
(52). This is because reproduction of abstract space requires both the “dissolution of old 
relations” and the simultaneous “generation of new relations,” meaning that as it is 
reproduced, abstract space “carries within itself the seeds for a new kind of space,” 
whichLefebvre terms differential space. (52). While abstract space “tends towards 
homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities” (52), 
differential space emerges when peculiarities and differences are embraced. Thus, 
hegemonic dominance over abstract space requires regular systemic repression of any and 
all naturally occurring contradictions or differences that would potentiate the emergence of a 
differential space, with different spatial codes. As such, abstract spaces become sites of 
ideological manipulation and control, where inhabitants and users are shaped by spatial 
codes that help reproduce existing power hierarchies at the expense of potential change. 
Given the nature of abstract space, Lefebvre asks: “Why do [‘users’ of this space] 
allow themselves to be manipulated in ways so damaging to their spaces and their daily life 
without embarking on massive revolts?” (51) His question is important, for it points to some 
factor outside of basic social relations that carries undue influence on users of abstract space 
and diverts their collective attention away from their own manipulation. Lefebvre’s assertion 
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is that some part of abstract space “has been usurped by a part of that space endowed with 
an illusory special status--namely, that part which is concerned with writing and imagery, 
underpinned by the written text (journalism, literature), and broadcast by the media” (52). 
He suggests that the illusions which this special part of abstract space produces “[amount] to 
abstraction wielding awesome reductionistic force vis-a-vis ‘lived’ experience” (52). Here, 
Lefebvre describes exactly that which I have termed the suburbia simulacrum, since it is a 
mediated imaginary ideal that prevents subjects from recognizing both the “frightening 
capacity for violence” (52) inherent to suburban abstract space and the undue influence of 
those private market actors that benefit most from maintaining suburban space as it is. The 
suburbia simulacrum can thus be considered a tool deployed to reduce the likelihood that 
abstract space will be wrested from hegemonic control.  As a mediated illusion that is 
nonetheless taken as a reflection (albeit a flattering one) of material reality, the suburbia 
simulacrum obscures spatial contradictions, the recognition of which might otherwise 
compel subjects to resist the dominant social order.  
Hegemony requires that the dominant order of abstract space remain unchanged 
because, as Louis Althusser has also claimed in “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” (1969), a primary goal of the various ideological state apparatuses that order 
abstract space, such as the school and the nuclear family unit, is to reproduce the conditions 
of labor necessary for the continued success of the existing mode of production, including 
the reproduction of human labor capital. That is, if suburban children are to become 
suburban subjects and reproduce the labor of their parents, then both their capacity for 
resistance as well as their ability to recognize the contradictions of the space they inhabit 
must be dulled and repressed. Lefebvre similarly suggests that hegemonic control of abstract 
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space represses adolescents’ ability to “challenge either the dominant system’s imperious 
architecture or its deployment of signs” (50), thereby ensuring that abstract spaces produce 
adolescents who grow into productive adults and form their own equally productive family 
units. Thus, abstract spaces like the suburbs reproduce both the social order and the human 
labor capital necessary for the continued dominance of that order, thereby also ensuring the 
continued dominance of existing spatial codes and the mode of production they are designed 
to benefit.   
 Another contradiction of abstract space that Lefebvre highlights is “that between the 
appearance of security and the constant threat, and indeed the occasional eruption, of 
violence” (57).  This contradiction assumes particular importance within suburban space, 
since the contradiction between violence and the appearance of security points to some of 
the most potent material consequences of continued adherence to the suburbia simulacrum, 
such as the way that pretensions of suburban safety and order were used to justify violence 
against people of color in places like suburban St Louis (Ferguson, MO and the 2014 
shooting of Mike Brown) and suburban Orlando (Sanford, FL and the 2012 shooting of 
Treyvon Martin). As I will assert in Chapter Two, racially-charged suburban violence in the 
twenty-first century is a very real consequence of both the way the suburbia simulacrum 
influences how affluent white suburbanites understand the spatial codes of the suburban 
spaces they inhabit and also how anti-urban narratives are created in negative relation to the 
perceived order and security of suburban abstract space. As Lefebvre elaborates, abstract 
space creates a spatial economy that “valorizes certain relationships between people in 
particular places (shops, cafés, cinemas, etc.) and thus gives rise to connotative discourses 
concerning these places; these in turn generate ‘consensuses’ or conventions according to 
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which, for example, such and such a place is supposed to be trouble-free” (56). That is, the 
accepted convention that suburbia is primarily a space of white affluence directly impacts 
how suburbanites perceive non-affluent people and people of color who enter suburban 
spaces, namely, by making them appear to residents as potential threats.  
Thus, in the abstract space of the suburb, the façade of security requires a spatial 
consensus that upholds the existing order and hierarchy of power in order to maintain the 
illusion that the suburban landscape itself keeps the elite economic classes safe from outside 
threats. Of course, in maintaining suburban spatial codes, the safety of any body seen as 
Other to suburban space is never implied, and is in fact always threatened. “Naturally 
enough,” Lefebvre writes, “[spatial consensus’] response to class struggle, as to other forms 
of violence, amounts to a formal and categorical rejection” (57) but the inverse is also true; 
the repressive violence exerted against class struggle is, through social consensus, perceived 
as an acceptable and necessary maintenance of order rather than an unacceptable and 
unnecessary escalation of state violence. In this way, the assumed safety and order of 
suburban spaces is protected at the expense of those perceived as a threat to suburban 
hegemony. It is the same logic that undergirds state laws like the so-called castle doctrine, 
which allows one to use deadly force in defending one’s home, as well as stand-your-ground 
laws, which remove the requirement of exercising any possible safe retreat before deadly 
force in cases of self-defense.6 Both legal precedents are premised on the idea that suburban 
safety and order must be defended at all costs, and both contributed to a society in which a 
                                                
6 For further information, see Mark Randall and Hendrick DeBoer’s “The Castle Doctrine and Stand-Your-
Ground Laws” (2012). 
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suburban resident like George Zimmermann7 could stand in his suburban front lawn and 
shoot an unarmed person of color like Treyvon Martin with impunity.  
As an exemplary abstract space, the suburban environment thus derives its order 
from spatial consensus, but it is a consensus which is always dictated by those economic 
elites who exert the greatest control over the means of production. Forces of power in 
suburban spaces deploy apparatuses of both repressive and ideological force in order to 
maintain the myth of safety and seclusion to which narratives of infection and contamination 
act as a mocking and incisive counterpoint. Suburban infection narratives expose the 
suburbia simulacrum as a camouflage for the very real violence that buttresses all of abstract 
space, and which, in the case of suburbia, is often quite literally built into that space by 
material effects of law and order such as walls, gates, and surveillance. As a result of such 
widespread illusory processes, which are supported by the mediated repetition of simulacra 
like suburbia in popular culture, collective understanding of material reality in postmodern 
late capitalism is supplanted by the abstraction of the imaginary, gesturing toward Jean 
Baudrillard’s theories on simulation. 
 
The Suburbia Simulacrum 
Jean Baudrillard’s central assertion in Simulacra and Simulaton (1981) is that within 
late capitalism, simulation constitutes “the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal,” which he describes as “a map that precedes [and] engenders the 
territory” (1). He suggests that simulation has made the real indistinguishable from the 
                                                
7 As I mention in the second chapter, Zimmermann himself does not have a strictly Caucasian background. My 
assertion here thus relies on the recognition that even as a man with Afro-Peruvian dissident, Zimmermann’s 
attachment to his suburban gated community allowed him to internalize suburban hegemonic ideals that 
typically center whiteness by portraying people of color as a threat to suburban order. 
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hyperreal and, in turn, reality indistinguishable from the virtual. In the era of the postmodern 
hyperreal, Baudrillard argues, all of society has been rendered “not unreal, but a 
simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself, in an 
uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference” (6). The concept of suburbia as 
simulacrum thus reflects how the advent of television, the development of suburban mass 
production, and all the other attendant societal transformations that accompanied the 
postwar transition to both late capitalism and postmodernity contributed to a proliferation of 
mediated images of suburban space that coalesced into an imaginary ideal: suburbia.  These 
media images are continually reinforced through repetition, omnipresence, and a degree of 
consistency, particularly when they come from television, where images of a single 
suburban space are reproduced weekly in each episode of a series and where the same 
commercials offer the same domestic products (and consequently, the same model of 
consumption-based salvation) regardless of which programming one watches. In the era of 
the hyperreal, virtual suburban images form as much if not greater a part of one’s concept of 
suburbia as one’s own encounters with tangible suburban spaces. The far-reaching nature of 
mass media images ensures that all individuals who interact with the same types of media 
are treated to the same types of suburban images, solidifying a collective image shared by a 
given culture. It is for this reason that I can utter the word suburbia and be relatively certain 
that a room full of Americans will have roughly the same idea in mind (white picket fences, 
manicured green lawns, houses all in a row, kids playing safely in yards, picture windows), 
even if individual variations on that image may differ in negligible ways. 
As the suburbia ideal became dominant, the very tangible neighborhoods that 
sprouted up in the last remaining open spaces of the American expanse became paradigmatic 
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renderings of “generations of a model of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 1), 
developments built from maps that quite literally preceded their existence, formulated 
according to perfected models and ideals dictated and renewed through the suburbia 
simulacrum. The unreal nature of suburban development is reflected in Baudrillard’s 
depiction of Disneyland, and specifically the park’s Main Street USA, as a facsimile of 
suburban America. Baudrillard claims that “Disneyland exists in order to hide that it is the 
‘real’ country, all of ‘real’ America that is Disneyland...Disneyland is represented as 
imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and 
the America that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order and to the 
order of simulation” (12). While Main Street USA may provide the suggestion of a main 
street that could be in any town, anywhere in the United States, a sort of Deleuzian any-
Main Street-whatever,8 it is nonetheless a tangible imitation of an ideal image. Generic and 
non-distinct, it points to its own status as artifice, simply by suggesting that there is a real 
space upon which it is based. Where the reality principle is understood as the idea that there 
is a distinct material reality one can identify separate from simulation, Baudrillard continues, 
“it is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the 
fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle” (12-13). 
Baudrillard calls Disneyland and other simulacra  “[deterrence machines] set up in order to 
rejuvenate the fiction of the real” (13), which are necessary precisely because hyperreality 
threatens to expose the attendant non-reality of the existing order, and in turn the non-reality 
of the forces of power  that maintain and rely on that order. Though the suburbia simulacrum 
does not create a tangible false representation, as with Main Street USA, it nonetheless 
                                                
8 See Cinema I: The Movement Image (1983), in which Gilles Deleuze uses “any-space-whatever” to describe 
a space without certainty, that “loses its coordinates” and is reduced to pure affect (110). 
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performs the same function by using perfected aesthetics to gesture toward its own 
fabricated or fictional nature and reassure the reality principle of the material suburbs on 
which it is ostensibly based.  
Further, the suburbia simulacrum creates a spectacle of showing itself as a false and 
aesthetically perfected imaginary rendering of suburban utopia in order to conceal the false 
nature of the various spectacles of law and order used to maintain the illusion of safety in 
material suburban environments. In so doing, the suburbia simulacrum helps prevent 
suburban subjects from recognizing their own subjugation and deters any resistance that 
might otherwise result from recognition that suburban order is merely a facade. To this end, 
Baudrillard also discusses the concept of scandal as a type of simulacrum, citing it as an 
example of how forces of power reinforce the illusion of control. Here, spectacle and crisis 
can be understood as any catastrophe or newsworthy event that requires a responsive show 
of law and order and dominates a given news cycle, whether the crisis is man-made, as in 
reports on criminal violence, or occurs naturally, as in coverage about the aftermath of 
natural disasters. The media circus that surrounds scandals and crises offers forces of power 
space to respond and, in so doing, to re-establish order, since “denunciation of scandal is 
always an homage to the law” (Baudrillard 14). Such events introduce an element of chaos 
to which power is compelled to respond and demonstrate the necessity of its own continued 
existence, even when and where the media’s reporting overstates the degree of danger such 
spectacles pose. Just as the artifice of Disneyland gestures toward the supposed reality of the 
world around it, the emergence of chaos in the form of spectacle gestures toward the 
realness of forces of law and order used to control it.  
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Thus, the mass media helps continually perpetuate the idea that crisis and spectacle 
are omnipresent threats to the safety of abstract spaces so that forces of power might 
continuously establish and reestablish their necessity, reinforcing the reality principle that 
protects their position. Baudrillard writes:  
The only weapon of power, its only strategy against this defection, is to reinject the 
real and the referential everywhere, to persuade us of the reality of the social, of the 
gravity of the economy and the finalities of production. To this end it prefers the 
discourse of crisis, but also, why not? that of desire. ‘Take your desires for reality!’ 
can be understood as the ultimate slogan of power since in a non-referential world, 
even the confusion of the reality principle and the principle of desire is less 
dangerous than contagious hyperreality. (22) 
In calling hyperreality ‘contagious’, Baudrillard implies that the hyperreality engendered by 
simulation is tantamount to an infectious contamination of the reality principle, against 
which the dominant order seeks collective and continuous inoculation. It is in this 
compulsion to inoculate that society continues to expand the “production and reproduction 
of the real” in an attempt to “restore the real that escapes it” (Baudrillard 23). In highlighting 
the role desire plays in this discourse, Baudrillard gestures simultaneously to the continuous 
commodity consumption that upholds simulacra and to the utopian nature of expressions of 
simulacra, in which the fulfillment of desire is offered as a contrast to crisis. Thus, simulacra 
function simultaneously as models of artifice by which the illusion of the real can be 
maintained, and as aspirational models for producing a hallucinatory, utopian resemblance 
to the real. By constantly suggesting that their own perfected models reflect, rather than 
dictate, the material lived experience, simulacra produce controllable desires which supplant 
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any spontaneous impulse for change or resistance lying dormant within a society. In the 
specific case of the suburbia simulacrum, material suburban developments are modelled 
after a mediated suburban imaginary to which they can never measure up so that their 
inadequacies in that measuring can stand as proof positive of their own realness; the 
proverbial white picket fence never materializes, and the reality principle remains intact. So 
long as these spaces maintain an illusion of realness, they remain subject to the hegemonic 
forces of law and order employed in their maintenance, and any crisis of infection or 
contamination that challenges that law and order offers a new opportunity to reassert the 
illusion and squelch potentially revolutionary resistance. 
Here, Baudrillard finds consonance with Lefebvre, specifically Lefebvre’s theory of 
contradictory space. Lefebvre describes contradictory space as a liminal space between the 
abstract and differential, occuring at a moment in which the usually suppressed 
contradictions of abstract space somehow make themselves known. This occurs because in 
abstract space, Lefebvre asserts, “desire and needs are uncoupled, then crudely cobbled back 
together,” (Lefebvre 309) creating a “dialectical link between need and desire” which 
“generates fresh contradictions – notably that between liberation and repression” (Lefebvre 
353). Given abstract space’s tendency towards contradictions, Baudrillard’s assertion of 
“Take your desires for reality!” as the ultimate slogan of power reflects the degree to which 
forces of power exert violence and repress dissent through the manipulation of desires, 
recasting contradictory impulses as undesirable and non-normative. The middle-classes and 
economic elites, driven by consumption, becomes the locus of such dialectical processes, 
and simulacra like suburbia are used to manipulate their desires and hide the more or less 
constant introduction of new contradictions into abstract space. Since Lefebvre also notes 
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that “abstract space, which is the tool of domination, asphyxiates whatever is conceived 
within it and then strives to emerge” and since abstract space also “stands opposed to all 
difference, whether actual or potential” (370), contradictory space can be understood as 
abstract space within simulated hyperreality, abstract space controlled through to the forced 
elimination of difference and the inoculation of potentially infectious contradictions. 
Contradictory space, by these lights, might thus be understood as the simulated space of 
simulacra, and in particular, the suburbia simulacrum. 
Lefebvre’s discussion of contradictory space specifically takes aim at the 
contradictions of “urbanness” (386) and, consequently, of suburbanness. He writes: 
Illegitimate hybrids of country and city in no way escape the domination of space, as 
some people – particularly those who inhabit such spaces – seem to believe. On the 
contrary, these bastard forms degrade both urban and rural space. So far from   
transcending the two, they thrust both into a confusion which would be utterly 
without form were it not for the ‘structure’ imposed by the space of the 
state….Though seemingly secured against any violence, abstract space is in fact 
inherently violent. The same goes for all spaces promising similar security: 
residential suburbs, holiday homes, fake countrysides and imitations of nature.   
(387) 
For Lefebvre, the violence of dominated abstract spaces like the suburbs is precisely a 
product of their imitation of security, and their adherence to a sense of law and order that 
cannot readily be identified as simulated. Abstract spaces, especially contradictory abstract 
space, are thus spaces ordered by simulacra. They pacify those who inhabit them into 
believing they are secure so that inhabitants might become all the more susceptible to the 
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violence inflicted upon them, but they also reinforce adherence to the existing models of law 
and order which are purported to produce safety. Further, power protects itself from the 
exposure of its own contradictory non-reality by means of a discourse of crisis, for crisis 
produces fear and confusion and provides power an emergency to which it might respond 
and prove its own necessity. Thus, one can conceive of contradictory abstract space, like 
suburban space, as space which relies on an illusion of its own purity and security – a 
security that can only be maintained by the measured and periodic reintroduction of violence 
in the form of crisis. The violence of contemporary sprawl remains hidden by the 
shimmering chimera of the suburbia simulacrum, and it is for this reason that I consider how 
literary and artistic works use the theme of infection to challenge, problematize, or otherwise 
reconceive contemporary suburban space in ways that confront the primacy of the suburbia 
simulacrum. However, in order to better understand how the images that comprise the 
suburbia simulacrum became so dominant in the collective American cultural imagination, it 
is first necessary to backtrack a bit in order to consider the history of the American 
suburbanization process, and its role in shaping the suburbia simulacrum. 
 
Historicizing Suburbia 
In her comprehensive overview of the history of suburban expansion in the United 
States, Building Suburbia (2003), urban historian Dolores Hayden outlines seven patterns of 
urban development since the first American suburban developments emerged around 1820, 
including: (1) early 19th century movement from urban centers to city edges; (2) the planned 
and designed “picturesque enclaves” of the 1850s; (3) early 20th century development along 
streetcar lines; (4) pre-WWII mail-order and do-it-yourself house construction kits, which 
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allowed the average person to buy a suburban lot and build their own home; (5) mass-
produced post-WWII housing developments of nearly identical homes, typified in 1950s and 
1960s sitcoms; (6) the 1970s and 1980s emergence of “edge nodes” characterized by 
highway-adjacent outgrowths of commercial space serving a residential consumer base; and 
(7) current suburban sprawl towards any remaining “rural fringes” outside the reach of 
existing urban and suburban development. While aspects of all seven patterns contribute to a 
composite image of American suburban space, the last three patterns (post-WWII sitcom 
suburbs, 1970s/80s edge nodes, and contemporary sprawl) have historically been afforded 
aesthetic dominance in the development of the suburbia simulacrum, partially because they 
all followed the advent of film and television. The repetition of fabricated descriptions and 
images of suburban space in literature, film, television, and other media, as well as the 
tendency for architects and developers to build subdivisions according to imagined plans 
and grand community designs, all contribute to a hyperreal image of suburban space that 
formed the suburbia imaginary. Further, as Amy Maria Kenyon suggests in Dreaming 
Suburbia (2004), suburbanization was necessary for economic and social recovery 
immediately following WWII, but also became “an integral part of the postwar imaginary” 
in which “a white, middle-class suburban lifestyle was commodified and equated with 
‘America’ and with ‘American national identity’”(1). In part because they created a 
temporary economic boom that contributed to post-war recovery and in part because helped 
valorize the consumer capitalism perceived as America’s primary means to resist the 
influence of Soviet-style socialism, the suburbanization patterns that proliferated from the 
1950s onward were touted as integral parts of American identity in ways that previous 
suburban patterns had not been. The suburbia simulacrum, in being apprehended as a rose-
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tinted expression of what was nonetheless considered suburban reality, and in gesturing 
toward an imagined perfect living environment to which material suburban spaces might 
aspire but never quite measure up, thus helped obscure the segregation, spatial repression, 
and urban dispossession endemic to the postwar suburbanization process, all while recasting 
the glittering ideal image of suburbia as the normative landscape in American everyday life. 
When the discourse of urban crisis to which I devote the next chapter became concretized 
through mass media discourse in the 1980’s and 1990’s, this was possible only because 
suburbia had already come to be seen as the normative American landscape. 
            To speak of suburbia means to speak of the multivalent ideas of prosperity and 
happiness embedded within the so-called American dream, which Hayden characterizes as a 
longing for “house plus land plus community” (Hayden 8). Ideological maintenance of this 
dream demands the continued tractability of suburban residents as perpetual consumers who, 
through their consumption, continually renew and update the aesthetics of a specifically 
suburban model of American prosperity. As such, suburbia requires mass consumption for 
both its genesis and its continued renewal; the very consumption that created suburbia in 
turn continuously sustains it. Within suburbia, there is no need or desire that the market does 
not attempt to meet and, once met, no shortage of new needs it can create, ensuring cyclical 
consumption. Suburbia thus functions as both the default backdrop of American 
consumerism and as a mediated ideal in which happiness stems first and foremost from 
continuous commodity acquisition. It compels suburban subjects to establish visual proof of 
their prosperity and ambition in order to affirm their continued suburban belonging, lest that 
belonging be questioned, leading to their exclusion and an attendant loss of social power. 
Suburban inhabitants are compelled adhere to the consumption embedded in suburban 
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spatial codes because within its suburban spatial logic, only continuous acquisition can 
prove one’s normativity, happiness, and domestic contentment. In deploying the typically 
white, upper-middle class, patriarchal space of suburbia as the preferred milieu of the 
American dream, the suburbia simulacrum offers an ideal version of this dream that is 
implicitly, when not explicitly, tied to the hegemonic dominance of white supremacy, the 
patriarchal nuclear family, Judeo-christian heteronormativity, and the bourgeoisie that 
benefits from the continued idealization of all. 
Amplifying this effect is the degree to which private market capital interests were 
embedded in the postwar suburbanization process. As critics like Kenyon have noted, the 
private-market interests of realtors, housing manufacturers, banks, and others invested in 
suburban development were supported and protected by the federal government through 
laws, codes, and tax subsidies established to facilitate rapid suburbanization (Kenyon 25-
27). In Hayden’s estimation, “excessive private consumption was not inevitable” but was 
rather “the result of sustained pressure from real estate interests and their allies in 
government to marginalize the alternatives to unlimited private suburban growth” (18). 
While even the earliest forms of suburbanization tended to place profit ahead of the needs 
and interests of residents, earlier patterns at least attempted to build neighborhoods that 
might foster community.  Postwar suburbanization, by contrast, evolved to follow Fordist 
models of mass produced and far-flung housing developments overseen by central firms, de-
emphasizing models of self-built development like those that had typically benefitted the 
working class and populations of color at the beginning of the 20th century (Hayden 111). 
Profits, rather than community, became the central focus of mass-produced suburbs, so 
developers built as many homes as possible as quickly as possible while spending as little of 
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their own money as they could get away with on establishing the necessary infrastructural 
and municipal support for developments.  
While it is true that part of this housing boom correlated with an unprecedented need 
for new housing following the end of WWII,9 this motivation seems less potent when one 
considers how little was done in this period to address housing needs for impoverished 
people and people of color. For one, discriminatory practices like redlining and segregation 
precluded large swaths of the population from participating in suburban expansion. 
Redlining, a system of property appraisal which designated certain neighborhoods as 
“unsuited for public and private growth” (Lindstrom xxiii), was introduced with the creation 
of the Home Owners Loan Corporation in 1933 and endorsed by the Federal Housing 
Administration in 1934, where it remained standard practice until the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, though it continued thereafter in so-called soft forms, such as realtor steering. 
(Kenyon 26) The rating system was typically justified as a way to protect property values, 
but in practice meant the forced exclusion of people of color, single women, and the 
economically disadvantaged from the suburbanization process. This is evident in the FHA’s 
phrasing to describe neighborhoods designated red, or the slightly less harsh designation of 
yellow, where it characterized such neighborhoods by the “infiltration” of “lower grade” or 
“undesirable” populations, suggesting that such neighborhoods were less desirable because 
they “[lacked] homogeneity” (Madrigal). In addition to rendering these neighborhoods 
undesirable, redlining also made it impossible for those relegated to such neighborhoods to 
receive mortgage assistance from the federal government. 
                                                
9 As Hayden notes, “1945 was the sixteenth [year] in a row when new construction did not meet the demand 
for new housing” (131) and “demand for shelter was expected to grow as waves of demobilized veterans, 
wartime savings at the ready, married and formed new households” (132). 
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Under a policy of redlining, mere proximity to neighborhoods designated red or 
yellow was enough to lower perceived property values in surrounding areas, de-
incentivizing lenders’ desire to approve loans for residents in those neighborhoods. In some 
cases, lenders financned suburban development only after land was somehow separated 
from areas inhabited by people of color. For instance, when a developer wanted to create a 
community near the self-built African-American suburb of Eight Mile-Wyoming outside 
Detroit in the early 1940s, federal loans for the project were only approved after the 
construction of a concrete wall to separate the neighborhoods (Hayden 111-12). To this day, 
the practice continues in less direct forms, such as when banks disproportionately deny 
mortgage loans for qualified applicants in neighborhoods dominated by people of color. 
(Badger) But even where redlining has been eradicated, its effects continue to shape whether 
or not communities of color have been able to accrue as much wealth as their white 
counterparts. These effects are quantifiably measurable, as Ta-Nehisi Coates observes in his 
article “The Case for Reparations” from The Atlantic (June 2014): 
Black families, regardless of income, are significantly less wealthy than white 
families. The Pew Research Center estimates that white households are worth 
roughly 20 times as much as black households, and that whereas only 15 percent of 
whites have zero or negative wealth, more than a third of blacks do. Effectively, the 
black family in America is working without a safety net. When financial calamity 
strikes--a medical emergency, divorce, job loss--the fall is precipitous. 
The precarious financial fate to which communities of color have been relegated today can 
be directly traced to the practice of redlining decades before. The practice precluded Blacks 
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and other minorities from developing the kind of wealth equity that comes from 
homeownership, in turn limiting how much wealth could be passed down over generations. 
Owing in part to the fact that processes like redlining de-incentivized development in 
more densely populated urban neighborhoods, private-market, single-family based suburban 
development became more lucrative for private investors in the postwar years than did 
development of higher-density spaces, such as public housing. The 1944 GI Bill also 
incentivized private homeownership, since it provided just enough to make a single-family 
home in a mass-produced development affordable for the middle class. Consequently, 
postwar development of single-family homes skyrocketed even as the need for public 
housing to serve lower-income populations grew. Since the federal government effectively 
subsidized private market interests at the expense of community-minded development, and 
since the state made little effort to thwart processes like redlining, the government 
effectively guaranteed that the most dominant landscape of American culture became 
synonymous with white affluence. White flight was thus, in effect, a federally supported 
phenomenon meant to bolster the postwar economy. 
The example of Levittown helps illustrate the degree of ideological manipulation that 
economic actors exerted during the suburbanization process. In Crabgrass Frontier (1985), 
suburban historian Kenneth T. Jackson discusses how the developers Levitt and Sons made 
their eponymic housing development, Levittown, synonymous with postwar suburbia. The 
first Levittown was constructed between 1947 and 1951 on Long Island using a Fordist 
assembly line model.10 Through mass production, development moved at an unprecedented 
                                                
10 Jackson discusses the degree to which the building process was highly regimented to insure that houses were 
built quickly, having been “divided into twenty-seven distinct steps” (234). Jackson writes, “Crews were 
trained to do one job—one day the white-paint men, then the red-paint men, then the tile layers. Every possible 
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pace, with as many as thirty houses erected daily when production was at its best. (Jackson 
235) Levitt and Sons “built thousands of almost identical 800-square-foot houses, with a 
living room, kitchen, two bedrooms, one bath, and a driveway but no garage” (Hayden 134), 
creating a sparse but easily reproducable model for the suburban single-family dwelling. In 
so doing, they established an aesthetic of repetition and homogeneity that would become the 
standard by which a majority of future suburban spaces would be evaluated, for better or 
worse, since as Jackson writes, “this early Levitt house was as basic to post World War II 
suburban development as the Model T had been to the automobile” (Jackson 236). Ease of 
production, the low price point, and the housing demands of the post-WWII period insured 
that the Levitt model was outlandishly profitable. But perhaps even more importantly, the 
FHA’s preference for mass-market suburban developers like the Levitts, as well as their tacit 
subsidization of mass development by means of the GI Bill, insured that these developers 
appreciated greater access to concessionary loans, with little regard for the fact that the 
Levitts openly stated that their developments would serve Caucasian populations 
exclusively. (Lambert) Because of its profitability and despite its numerous infrastructural 
flaws,11 developers across the country rushed to mimic the Levitts’ model, including 
replicating the Levitts’ overt preference for white racial homogeneity. Over time, even as 
new developers established their own spins on the Levitts’ model, a standardized white 
suburban aesthetic emerged, replacing more diverse images associated with pre-WWII 
                                                                                                                                                 
part, and especially the most difficult ones, were preassembled in central shops, whereas most builders did it 
on site. Thus, the Levitts reduced the skilled component to 20-40 percent...Vertical integration also meant that 
the firm made its own concrete, grew its own timber, and cut its own lumber. It also bought all appliances from 
wholly owned subsidiaries.” (234-235) 
11 Hayden notes that the Levitts “found it convenient to have someone else pay for the infrastructure of the city 
they were creating” (136), offering one particularly illustrative example about how in Levittown, the Levitts 
“did not plan for urban-scale sewage disposal” and instead “used individual cesspools—not even septic 
tanks—attached to each house, rather than building sewers” (137) despite protests from the Nassau County 
Department of Health. 
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suburbanization patterns. Thus, Levittown became the base image of suburbia from the mid-
twentieth century onward, even as that image was grounded from the outset in white 
supremacy. 
            While critics like John Keats, in his 1957 novel The Crack in the Picture Window, 
drew attention to the diminished quality of life many suburbanites associated with postwar 
development living, such criticism did little to dam the mass exodus of white bodies out of 
urban spaces from the 1950s onward, in no small part because of the rapid expansion of the 
“baby boom” population. Moreover, the incredible financial burden placed on both local and 
state governments to fill in the gaps left by predatory developers, who had avoided building 
the infrastructure necessary to connect their developments to existing municipalities, 
diverted funds and resources away from the urban environment to the suburban 
environment. This tendency, combined with the necessity to establish new local 
governments to account for communities in what was previously undeveloped space, 
weakened the political potential of urban populations in the same breath that it robbed those 
same populations of the tax revenue necessary to assure the continued infrastructural 
strength and future economic prosperity of urban neighborhoods. When viewed in the 
context of the discriminatory practices used to prevent populations of color and the 
impoverished from participation, suburbanization must be read as an intentional and 
systematic redistribution of wealth and power away from more diverse urban populations to 
a fleeing white bourgeoisie who sought escape from an urban population they would later 
cast as violent, chaotic, and morally corrupt in order to retroactively justify their 
segregation. 
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The political prominence of the suburban voting bloc today is the result of a 
concretization of white (and predominantly male) political power following the proliferation 
of new suburban governing bodies during the suburbanization process, which effectively 
weakened the political power held by urban populations, especially underrepresented 
populations of color. For instance, in “Race and Suburban Sprawl” (2003), Ronald Hayduk 
notes that “suburbanization led to the creation of tens of thousands of new local 
governments,” (144) all primarily serving white populations, meaning “there are over 
90,000 governments across the country today, most of which are new suburban political 
jurisdictions that came into being only in the last fifty years” (153). Political fragmentation 
is the result, particularly because “many residents who formed such new local governments 
did so to segregate themselves from racial minorities as much as for economic reasons” 
resulting in “American public policy—at the federal, state, and local levels—[that] is biased 
against urban renters in favor of suburban homeowners, urban mass-transit users in favor of 
suburban car owners, and urban infrastructure of most kinds in favor of exurban and rural 
development projects” (Hayduk 157). Postwar suburbanization and later, suburban sprawl, 
insured that the concerns of white suburban residents achieved primacy and political support 
through targeted dilution of the political power of urban communities of color. This 
occurred concomittantly with the media’s attempts to devalue and demonize urban 
populations through a spectacular discourse of urban crisis. 
White affluence has thus always been both the cause for and the ideological engine 
that drives postwar suburbanization. Sprawl, which Hayden’s A Field Guide to Sprawl 
(2004) defines as “unregulated growth expressed as careless new use of land and other 
resources as well as abandonment of older built areas” (7), is a direct outgrowth of 
 51 
unchecked mass consumption and private market housing development from the postwar 
years onward. Though the expansion of suburbia certainly stems from the way the suburbia 
simulacrum has increased bourgeois demand for suburban housing, it has also sharpened the 
effects of white supremacy and bourgeois classism that have always been a part of 
suburbanization while making their effects seem more diffuse. As profit margins for 
developers increased, so too increased the power of the suburban middle class over 
American society, and sprawl proliferated. As sprawl proliferated, so too did the ideological 
models that upheld and supported suburban space. As Hayden writes, in becoming “the 
dominant American cultural landscape, the place where most households live and vote” 
(Building 3), suburban space and the hegemonic ideals of white, middle-class American 
society became normative components of American identity even as progressive social 
change from the Civil Rights era onward pushed the mass media, forces of power, and 
economic actors to disavow direct linguistic adherence to these ideals. The creation of the 
suburbia simulacrum and its inverse twin, the discourse of urban crisis, were thus both 
attempts to obscure white, bourgeois hegemonic ideology through more abstract narratives 
of suburban utopia and urban dystopia. Moreover, contemporary sprawl has diminished the 
borders between urban and suburban space enough to reverse the initial urban to suburban 
direction of white flight, increasing the influence of white affluent suburban interests in 
urban spaces. Suburban sprawl, and later, urban gentrification, thus further solidified the 
political, social, and economic dominance of predominantly white American suburban 
populations over the same urban populations from whence they once fled. Consequently, 
sprawl can be regarded as a “socially destructive” expansion of the suburbanization process 
to urban and rural space (Hayden, Field 11), albeit one which helps highlight how anti-urban 
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rhetorics have always primarily targeted the populations of color that suburbanites 
associated with urban space more than the urban landscape itself. 
 
Suburbia Televised 
While private development and commodity culture certainly helped shape 
Americans’ ideological attachment to suburbanization, it was mass-mediated narratives 
about suburban space that helped suburbia became the omnipresent American landscape. 
This effect was heightened all the more when television use became widespread during the 
1950s. As the economy boomed and more people could afford televisions, images of 
American suburban space were beamed into living rooms across the nation, becoming an 
integral aesthetic component of the very environments they depicted. The culture of mass 
consumption that television helped facilitate contributed to the proliferation of what critical 
theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer have called pseudoindividuality.  In The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception (1944),12 Adorno and Horkheimer 
describe pseudoindividuality as an illusion of individuality that masks the domination 
implicit in mass consumerism. It is a form of subjugation in which “the peculiarity of the 
self is a socially conditioned monopoly commodity misrepresented as natural” and within 
which “all such progress of individuation [occurs] at the expense of the individuality in 
whose name it [takes] place, leaving behind nothing except the individuals’ determination to 
pursue their own purposes alone” (125). Thus, one major contradiction of suburbia regards 
how it is a landscape produced explicitly to produce malleable subjects, hemming them into 
                                                
12 It is worth noting here that Adorno and Horkheimer based this chapter of the Dialectic of Enlightenment on 
their experiences in California during their period of American exile, and that the Hollywood entertainment 
industry informed much of their theory. No surprise then that the theory seems to adequately clarify the role 
played by consumerism and entertainment in solidifying postwar American late capitalism and mass culture. 
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the mass-produced and homogenizing consumer culture by which they are dominated while 
also gesturing toward a veneer of individual freedom in the form of a dizzying array of niche 
marketing interests, customizable personal styles, perpetually upgradeable commodities, and 
the mythos of self-determinism implied by homeownership. Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
vision of a consumer culture hypnotized into consumption by the pacifying effects of 
entertainment was thus realized precisely in the emergence of television, and especially in 
the advertising it helped disseminate in private, rather than public, spaces. 
Echoing Adorno and Horkheimer’s assertion that the moviegoer “perceives the street 
outside as a continuation of the film he just left” (99), suburban television images offered 
both an aspirational model for suburban living as well as reassurance that the existing built 
environment was both contiguous with and not quite as perfect as the ideal media image. As 
Lindstrom and Bartling note: 
Corporate interests carefully cultivated a consumerist identity that drew inspiration 
from and reinforced the suburban landscape. Media representations of American life 
began to be inundated with images of suburban families equipped with a plethora of 
consumer items. Television sitcoms such as Leave it to Beaver, Father Knows Best, 
and The Dick Van Dyke Show not only provided normalized versions of the 
American family but also contributed to the production of patterns of consumption 
whereby the production sets of network studios became templates for nationwide 
styles. (xix) 
Product placements, as well as the use of television stars as aspirational role models for 
idealized suburban character types, thus made sitcoms into arbiters of American tastes. What 
began with the 1950s suburban sitcoms evolved into the creation of the suburban family 
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sitcom as a genre unto itself, with a veritable trove of examples from the 1960s and 1970s 
(The Brady Bunch, My Three Sons, Eight is Enough, etc.) to the 1980s and 1990s (The 
Wonder Years, Growing Pains, Home Improvement, etc.) and well into the new millennium 
(Everybody Loves Raymond, The Middle, Suburgatory, etc). By and large, sitcom suburbs 
have remained aspirational, in that they tend to portray versions of suburbia in which 
affluence and community belonging are givens. Further, though the premises and 
approaches of suburban sitcoms have varied and evolved over time, the aesthetics of the 
recognizable suburban setting, particularly the suburban home interior, have remained more 
or less unchanged throughout, as has the tendency to keep the nuclear family at the center of 
an array of suburban supplementary characters including extended family, neighbors, 
coworkers, and schoolmates. Characters orbiting around a central nuclear family thus fulfill 
a vision of the American dream as home + land + community, where the family is at the 
center of the home and neighbors are at the center of the community. (Hayden, Building 8) 
Variations in the content of suburban programming over time have done little to change the 
tendency to focus on the nuclear family suburbanization model.13 
It is of course true that there have been many sitcoms that present a more diverse 
version of the suburban model either in economic terms (Roseanne, Married with Children, 
etc.) or ethnic/racial terms (Family Matters, The George Lopez Show, Fresh Off the Boat, 
Black-ish etc.). Undoubtedly, such shows meaningfully contribute to more widespread 
                                                
13 As if to bolster the universal appeal both of the nuclear family and of the suburban landscape, even 
supernatural families (The Munsters, Sabrina the Teenage Witch), anthropomorphic animal families or families 
blended with anthropomorphic creatures (Dinosaurs, Alf), cartoon families (The Simpsons, Family Guy, 
Daria), and other variations have been integrated into the nuclear family + suburban setting sitcom template. 
An entire subgenre of suburban sitcoms is of particular interest because it is premised around aliens 
masquerading as humans (Mork and Mindy, 3rd Rock from the Sun, The Neighbors). Here, the alien or alien 
family adopts the suburban lifestyle precisely because it is the most readily available way to blend in as 
humans, implying that living in this way is simply what all humans do. 
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representation of people of color and the working class in television and an investigation of 
how such shows create suburban counter-narratives would be a worthy expansion of the 
current research. Aesthetically and thematically, however, many of these more diverse 
shows are still constrained by the necessity to portray their characters as blending in with or 
adapting to a suburban setting conceived in the normativized image of the white upper-
middle class. Thus, they still may rely on and perpetuate the suburbia simulacrum, even 
when and where they critique or satirize it. Moreover, since these sitcoms expand the 
mediated suburban imaginary to visually include those who have historically been barred 
from suburbanization without necessarily challenging the dominance of white suburban 
spatial codes, they may inadvertently give the illusion that suburban space has already been 
de-segregated and become more diverse, a fact that doesn’t hold up to quantifiable evidence. 
For instance, Lorrie Frasure-Yokley notes in Racial and Ethnic Politics in American 
Suburbs (2015) that while racial and ethnic populations have been steadily increasing in the 
suburbs since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is also true that whites still make 
up the largest proportion of suburban residents. In fact, Frasure-Yokley observes that “the 
contemporary rise in minority representation in U.S. suburbs has not yielded substantial 
declines in residential segregation” and in some cases has even paradoxically contributed to 
“increasing minority segregation and isolation rather than racial/ethnic diversity” (5). It 
seems that even when integrating into the suburbs, white portions of the suburban 
population still tend to remain separate from suburban populations of color, with white 
residents even going as far as to re-segregate themselves when they sense processes of 
integration underway. The proliferation of sitcoms in which families of color successfully 
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integrate with their white suburban neighbors is thus an extension of the suburbia 
simulacrum’s tendency to portray an aspirational ideal rather than a material reality. 
The reality of contemporary suburban re-segregation is especially true when it comes 
to schools. As Jeff Chang points out in We Gon’ Be Alright: Notes on Race and 
Resegregation (2016), suburban schools have steadily been resegregating since 
desegregation reached a peak in 1989. White spatial isolation thus continues to inform urban 
and suburban spatial politics alike even as mediated portrayals of suburban life gesture 
towards greater diversity. Chang writes: 
Only 8 percent of white students attend high-poverty schools, while 18 percent of 
Asians and 48 percent of Black and Latino students do. Eighty percent of Latino and 
74 percent of Black K-12 students attend majority-nonwhite schools. But whites 
remain the most segregated racial group of all. The average white student attends a 
public school that is 75 percent white. That fact mirrors another: the average white 
lives in a neighborhood that is 77 percent white--a rate of racial isolation that is at 
least twice that of all other racial groups. (70-71) 
The conclusion that must be drawn is that while populations traditionally barred from 
suburban life are increasingly finding themselves integrated into the political economy of 
sprawl, the assumption of increased diversity and suburban integration that such statistics 
ought to point to has not as of yet been met with an attendant alteration in the ideological 
and social tendencies that undergird suburban white supremacy. The difference now is that 
mechanisms of segregation which once relied on exclusion of outsiders from suburban space 
have morphed into a spatial economy in which affluent whites remove themselves from 
diversifying neighborhoods and move to economically segregated spaces of affluence, 
 57 
regardless of the urban or suburban designation. Thus, while representation of people of 
color in suburban television programming may indeed reflect the increased number of 
people of color living in suburban space, this increased representation is not necessarily 
indicative of any real alteration in the whiteness and classism associated with the suburbia 
simulacrum. Regarding Modern Family (2009-ongoing), one of the most popular examples 
of a contemporary suburban sitcom, Chang observes that it presents “middle-class people of 
color who [are] just like middle-class white people, except for the color of their skin” since 
the show merely “[augments] the stock white nuclear family with an extended clan that 
[features] a gay couple with an adopted Asian American child, and a patriarch with a 
gorgeous Latina wife and child” (55). To the extent that Modern Family can be considered 
indicative of the contemporary suburbia simulacrum, diverse characters in contemporary 
suburban sitcoms often act as little more than token gestures to de-emphasize the 
prominence of liberal, elite Whiteness, and do little to challenge the dominance of the 
suburbia simulacrum. 
Even beyond the dominant role that television narratives14 play in perpetuating the 
suburbia simulacrum, the influence of these mediated stories arguably remains ancillary to 
that of television advertising. Commercials and product placements have always been a part 
of American television, introducing consumers to the various commodities necessary for a 
satisfactory suburban life and echoing the promise of the culture industry to produce “a 
cycle of manipulation and retroactive need” (95) that perpetuates consumption. In fact, since 
commercials repeat the exact same images and occur even during programming unrelated to 
                                                
14 For all the tendencies of suburban sitcoms I have noted, the reader can surely identify a number of examples 
I have not included, demonstrating the ubiquity of the suburban imaginary. This is all the more true when 
considering that for sake of space I have intentionally limited myself to sitcoms, without even considering the 
numerous examples of television dramas, documentaries, soap operas, game shows, reality programming, etc. 
that would reinforce the point.  
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a suburban setting, they offer a greater degree of reinforcement (and hence, normalization) 
of the suburbia simulacrum. Historically, they have also reinforced oppressive suburban 
gender roles by making a specific target of the feminine body and its natural biological 
functions while also promoting beautification, maternal excellence, and domestic 
homemaking as necessary for women’s participation in a normative suburban lifestyle. As 
such, the advertised feminine ideal reflects and reinforces the patriarchal nuclear family 
model that is central to the suburbia simulacrum.  
As television viewing increased over time, so expanded the ideological manipulation 
of advertising to include a variety of nuanced market niches, assuring that “something is 
provided for everyone so that no one can escape” (Adorno and Horkheimer 97). Further, 
since programming and commercials alike center the patriarchal nuclear family, both 
programming and advertisements portray the act of television viewing as a normative and 
beneficial family pastime, increasing the likelihood of continued viewing. Television has 
played an active role in shaping the values of American society, and in so doing has assured 
that the American economic model marrying consumerism to suburbanization has continued 
apace without significant opposition from the very subjects it manipulates. Television 
helped brand suburbia as the ideal setting for everyday American life, the preferred 
landscape in which to situate the various commodities required for happiness. As soon as 
television and advertising rendered it standardized, recognizable, aspirational, and most 
importantly, purchasable, the idea of the suburb quickly coalesced into the suburbia 
simulacrum, translating consumer demand for new suburban housing into the concretization 
of the American landscape as suburban sprawl in the image of suburbia.  
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Sprawl and the Ideology of Suburbia 
         To the extent that television and mass consumerism helped contribute to the 
proliferation of sprawl, they also helped contribute to the kind of consumerism associated 
with a turn towards postmodernity that occurred over the course of the late twentieth 
century. In relation to this alteration, and perhaps reflecting Fredric Jameson’s assertion that 
the spatial logic of the simulacrum has altered concepts of time to produce a sort of 
postmodern nostalgia he calls historicism (18), narratives of suburban life still tend towards 
nostalgic aesthetic markers associated with the post-WWII sitcom suburbs. One conclusion 
that might be drawn is that the aesthetics of sitcom suburbia are associated with a simpler 
time, a sort of new american pastoral, prior to the globalizing effects of postmodern late 
capitalism. An unintentional effect of this privileging of prior eras is a nostalgic longing for 
the ideologies that upheld suburbia in that form, colored by the contradictions of suburban 
space that finally started to become apparent by the end of the twentieth century. Perhaps as 
a result of these unearther contradictions, but more likely as a response to socioeconomic 
and technological changes, suburban narratives since the beginnning of the twenty-first 
century onward have increasingly been integrating nostalgia for the 1970s and 1980s, most 
notably those years immediately prior to the end of the Cold War, into the aesthetics of the 
suburbia simulacrum, even as suburbia’s base mediated aesthetics remain firmly rooted in 
the postwar era.  
In SuburbiaNation (2004), Robert Beuka suggests that the continued prominence of 
postwar suburban ideology even in the face of cultural change may derive from the way that 
suburban space acts as the “material counterpart to specific drives and tendencies in 
American culture apparent from the postwar years onward,” which he identifies as “a 
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massive expansion of the middle class, a heightened valorization of the nuclear family and 
consequent reification of gender identities, a trend -- both utopian and exclusionary in nature 
-- toward cultural homogenization, and a collapsing of the distinction between public and 
private space” (2). Whether the suburbia simulacrum established these cultural tendencies or 
if the tendencies themselves contributed to the emergence of the suburbia simulacrum, in 
either case, they cannot be unburdened from their relationship to material suburbs, for it is in 
the suburbs and through the suburbs that they acquire their specificity. That the suburbia 
simulacrum is now evolving to account for later eras is less an evolution in suburban ideals 
themselves so much as an evolution in the decor of America’s collective cultural nostalgia, 
reflecting a culture that can no longer remember the sitcom suburbs as well as it can 
remember the 1970s and 1980s suburban sprawl that was made in their image.  
The suburbia simulacrum thus evolves over time without ever escaping its role as a 
continuation of a prior pastoral ideal,which Lindstrom and Bartling suggest is connected to 
“the notion of North America as a space of uncharted settlement that serves as the antidote 
to the corrupting nature of urbanized civilization,” which “with the closing of the frontier in 
the 1890s…was reenvisioned in suburbia” (xx). When postwar suburbanization evolved into 
contemporary sprawl, it retained this pastoral characterization, even as the typical 
geographic distinctions that once defined the suburb in locational relationship to an urban 
center have disappeared in favor of what can best be described as a regional and totalizing 
urban fabric15 of interlinked metropolitan areas that have subsumed prior urban/suburban 
borders. Further, Lindstrom and Bartling observe, the pastoral ideal was only ever employed 
as a marketing tool to sell suburbia, creating a discontinuity marked both by “rampant 
                                                
15 To borrow a term from Andy Merrifield’s The New Urban Question (2014). 
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development” and the “[widening] gulf between the ideal and suburban reality” (xxi). The 
result is what spatial theorist Edward Soja has called postmodern geography, a term 
indicative of the expanded urban fabric in which distinctions between the urban, suburban, 
and rural become blurred, or disappear entirely. 
Using Los Angeles as an illustrative example in Postmodern Geographies (1989), 
Soja writes, “for at least fifty years, Los Angeles has been defying conventional categorical 
description of the urban, of what is city and what is suburb, of what can be identified as 
community or neighborhood, of what copresence means in the elastic urban context” (245). 
Soja goes on to reiterate how “underneath this semiotic blanket there remains an economic 
order, an instrumental nodal structure, an essentially exploitative spatial division of labor” 
that has been “increasingly obscured from view” so as to conceal the dissolution of 
geographic borders once considered distinct and which lend the appearance of order to the 
urban environment. (246) He argues that “when all that is seen is so fragmented and filled 
with whimsy and pastiche, the hard edges of the capitalist, racist, and patriarchal landscape 
seem to disappear, melt into air” (246), an idea reflected in the increasingly coded way white 
hegemony penetrates urban and suburban narratives. Here, Soja’s observations on Los 
Angeles and postmodern geography can be extrapolated to account for the entire American 
landscape as re-imagined through suburban sprawl. Soja’s concepts reveal the degree to 
which mediated spatial imaginaries like the suburbia simulacrum conceal the spatial 
violence of segregation and dispossession inherent to the suburbanization process. The 
continued valorization of suburban ideals tmakes it difficult for seemingly wholesome and 
American values like the nuclear family and “boot-strap” work ethics to be recognized as 
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indicators of the continued stratification of American society along racial and 
socioeconomic lines, and within a patriarchal and heteronormative social hierarchy. 
 Within the postmodern geography of the American twenty-first century, where 
distinctions such as urban/suburban/rural have lost relevance, the suburbia simulacrum 
nonetheless remains, ensuring that the illusion of these distinctions stays intact. This is 
because, as Baudrillard would suggest, the hegemonic powers that most benefit from the 
continued valorization of the suburbia simulacrum rely on the continued belief in spatial 
delineation between urban chaos and suburban order to assure suburban elites that they can 
remain safely removed from dangers perceived as inherently urban. Simultaneously, the 
expansion of suburbia to the entire urban fabric by means of sprawl has allowed white 
bourgeois suburbanites and their ideals to penetrate predominantly urban spaces through 
processes like gentrification, further blurring the social distinction between urban and 
suburban space without dimishing racial tensions or contributing in meaningful ways to 
socioeconomic integration. In the postmodern geography of the American twenty-first 
century, only the suburbia simulacrum remains as a means to define suburban space, but it 
also remains as a foundational component of white American identity, with vast real-world 
consequences. As Chang saliently argues: 
Cities are becoming wealthier and whiter. Aging suburbs are becoming poorer and 
darker. Those suburbs are being abandoned, policed, and contained the way that 
communities of color in inner cities were for the past century. And all of these 
problems are interconnected: the fate of Sanford, Florida, where Treyvon Martin was 
killed, tells us about the fate of San Francisco; the fate of Brooklyn tells us about the 
fate of Ferguson. (72) 
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Given this stark reality, it becomes all the more necessary to consider the theoretical 
implications of the suburbia simulacrum in relationship to the social codes it reinforces, the 
types of resistance it attempts to preclude, and ultimately, the illusion of a contained and 
impenetrable suburban space it offers in order to solidify the continued adherence of white 
suburban subjects to suburban spatial codes and the segregation on which they are based. 
It is clear that while the material practices of suburbanization remain objectively 
repressive and unequal, the persistence of the suburbia simulacrum offers suburban residents 
an illusion that absolves them of their participation in and reproduction of that repression. So 
long as the lived environment of suburban space appears to reflect a now-diversified ideal, 
residents can assume that the potential pitfalls of a segregated, fragmented metropolitan 
environment remain fundamentally elsewhere to their own lived space, and that their own 
actions do not contribute to racial and socioeconomic repression. It is an illusion which has 
contributed to the processes of resegregation that have been intensifying since 1989, a 
process which Chang argues “relies on the restoration of racial innocence, which absolved 
generations of their responsibility while allowing inequality to evolve and intensify” (26). 
By gesturing toward the inherent spatial contradictions and oppressions suburban space 
continues to uphold and exacerbate, cultural narratives which critique or subvert the 
suburbia simulacrum play a crucial role in challenging the dominance of white, affluent 
suburban ideals. To do so, such narratives frequently rely on themes of infection and 
contamination as forms of crisis which, in their general lack of controllability, directly 
challenge the assumed safety, order, and perfectability of suburban space, revealing the 
contradictions of the suburbia simulacrum and the myth of suburban safety it uses to 
obfuscate systemic racism and classism. 
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Crisis, Infection, Contamination 
         If stretched to include a variety of potential permutations, the dual themes of 
infection and contamination can be identified in part or whole within a vast swath of critical 
suburban narratives. This is partially attributable to the way the suburbia simulacrum has 
focused on making suburban space seem fundamentally safe and secluded, existing in a 
space both geographically and ideologically removed from the potential threats endemic to 
the urban environment. Recasting the urban and its diverse population as a threat to 
suburban safety, rhetorical gestures toward the safety of suburbia reveal a thinly veiled 
preference for adherence to racial purity in what has always been a predominantly white 
space. Suburban spatial codes and the social practices they produce thus reinforce bourgeois 
hegemony while simultaneously insuring ideological consensus among the white and 
affluent. That is, at least from the sitcom suburbs onward, the intentional self-sequestration 
of the affluent white population from the more racially, economically, and culturally diverse 
urban core assured the reproduction of later generations of white suburban inhabitants who 
not only tended to adhere to their parents’ ideologies but also remained mostly unexposed to 
alternative social practices outside suburban environments. This rendered it virtually 
impossible for even the most revolutionary among suburban inhabitants to meaningfully 
challenge suburban hegemony. 
If the initial intention of suburbanization was to facilitate white flight and to create 
enclaves of white affluence that could insure the impoverished, non-white, and otherwise 
non-normative Other was held at a distance from the assumed safety of suburban space, then 
in the era of neoliberal sprawl, the end result of suburbanization has been the spatial 
domination of the entire metropolitan landscape by white supremacy. Narratives of infection 
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and contamination are thus explicitly or implicitly a way of indicting both neoliberal late 
capitalism and patriarchal white supremacy by attempting to illuminate how the suburbia 
simulcarum creates a myth of suburban spatial purity that masks the violence of 
suburbanization. While examples of these tendencies are abundant in contemporary 
suburban narratives, the three texts highlighted here -- Don DeLillo’s novel White Noise 
(1985), the Duffer Brother’s TV series Stranger Things (2016-ongoing), and Jordan Peele’s 
film Get Out (2017) -- offer unique perspectives that, taken together, help clarify gow 
suburban infection narratives challenge the primacy of the suburbia simulacrum.  
Though I focus here on only three illustrative texts, observant readers will recognize 
these tendencies in any number of contemporary suburban narratives spanning a variety of 
media, ranging from Todd Haynes’ 1995 film Safe to the haunting suburban landscapes in 
the photography of Gregory Crewdson or Todd Hido, to the black metal band Deafheaven 
singing of “[coughing] ceaselessly into the night” in “scorching reimagined suburbia” on the 
song “Luna” (2015). That these themes seem to repeat across a variety of literary and artistic 
media and have become more prominent throughout the past few decades is indicative of 
how increasingly recognizable the myth of suburban order has become. These and other 
suburban infection narratives perform the dual work of clarifying how suburban space tends 
to prevent subjects from being exposed to the contradictions of abstract space (thus 
preventing the possibly of their resisting their own subjugation) while at the same time 
reinforcing the need to adhere to existing modes of law and order as protection from crises 
borne of those same contradictions. If the suburbia simulacrum allows one to believe that 
suburban space is controlled, protected, and safe, then narratives of infection expose 
 66 
suburban space as a site of false security, mediated illusion, and violent hegemonic 
dominance by means of a simulated spatial unity.  
            Suburban narratives of infection and contamination support critiques of this sort 
primarily because infection always has the connotation of being simultaneously temporary 
and permanent and therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable. In suburbia, the spectre of 
infection represents an uncontrollable anomaly in a space built precisely to facillitate 
hegemonic control over abstract space. If a virus can be contained, there is the potential that 
it can be eradicated, but if it cannot be contained, it is likely to spread, to contaminate, and 
to multiply in strength. If something becomes contaminated, there is the potential that it can 
be purified and returned to its original state (or at least close to it), but there is also the 
potential that it will be forever tainted. Thus, the degree of uncertainty and lack of control 
implied by infection and contamination signifies the suburban subjects’ fear and doubt that 
suburban space is not as safe as it seems and that forces of law and order do not have as 
much control over the space as they claim. Because of the way infection and contamination 
expose the vulnerability of suburban space, subjects within suburban infection narratives 
often begin to actively look for or recognize heretofore hidden contradictions in the spaces 
they inhabit, and in response, begin to rebel against the ideologies embedded in suburban 
spatial codes. 
         Many suburban infection narratives are part of a genre that literary critic Bernice M. 
Murphy has referred to as the suburban gothic. In The Suburban Gothic in American 
Popular Culture (2009), Murphy explicitly ties the sub-genre to narratives which investigate 
the contradictions of suburban space, which she characterizes as the tension between the 
suburban dream and the suburban nightmare. She connects this suburban dream/nightmare 
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dichotomy to the discomfort created by multiple suburban binary tensions such as that 
between the suburb as “a place insulated from the dangers of the outside world” and “a place 
in which the most dangerous threats come from within, not from without” or the opposition 
between the suburb as “a safe place for children” and as “a hunting ground for pedophiles 
and child murderers” (Murphy 3). Such narratives proliferate in part because they expose 
underlying doubts about the safety promised by the suburbia simulacrum. Whether 
discussing a zombie apocalypse, as in George Romero’s film Night of the Living Dead 
(1968), or a monstrous sexually transmitted infection, as in David Robert Mitchell’s film It 
Follows (2014), suburban gothic infection narratives challenge the implied safety of 
suburbia by presenting it as a space in which danger is always already potentiated by the 
environment itself, thus “playing upon the lingering suspicion that even the most ordinary-
looking neighborhood...is only ever a moment away from dramatic (and generally sinister) 
incident” (Murphy 2). The suburban gothic focuses predominantly on the horror of living in 
an environment which can only ever gesture towards its own insulated safety, making 
infection and contamination a dominant theme throughout the sub-genre. 
         While more literal infection narratives such as zombie stories are common in the 
suburban gothic, these same tendencies are also recognizable in texts which focus on a more 
psychological conception of infection. One such example, Jeffrey Eugenides’ novel The 
Virgin Suicides (1993), portrays a suburban neighborhood in which a teenage girl’s suicide 
is regarded as a potential threat to the community, since neighbors fear that their own 
children will be compelled to commit suicide, too. In this novel, the theme of infection is 
metaphorically reinforced by a series of scenes focusing on a plague against Elm trees in the 
neighborhood, all of which must be cut down to prevent the disease from spreading. In Sofia 
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Coppola’s 1999 film adaptation of the novel, one shot features a line of trees running the 
entire length of the street, all tagged for removal, suggesting there won’t be any trees left to 
catch the disease in the end. Here, contamination is preventable only by preemptive 
destruction of any elements that could eventually be contaminated. Aptly, the demolition of 
the trees as protection from future infection is repeated in the eventual suicides of the 
remaining Lisbon sisters, whose deaths serve as a form of collective inoculation against the 
hazards of the presumed suicide epidemic. Ironically, the remaining sisters’ suicides are 
preceded by multiple months of quarantine-like sequestration within their suburban home by 
their traumatized and fearful parents, and it is this containment that actually infects them 
with the depressive state that leads to their coordinated suicides. In this case, then, one might 
argue that it is the suburb that infected them, not the other way around. 
 However, some of the most successful texts that critique the suburbia simulacrum are 
those that effectively combine literal and psychological concepts of infection, thus 
highlighting the anxiety that comes with a lack of certainty surrounding one’s spatial safety 
when faced with infection. Suburban infection narratives that blend literal and psychological 
concepts of infection often do so in order to critique the suburbia simulacrum along three 
key axes: (1) by exposing the simulated nature of crisis and infection, as in Don DeLillo’s 
novel White Noise;  (2) by suggesting that both suburban infection and the suburbia 
simulacrum that it masks permanently coexist in suburban space, as in the Duffer Brothers’ 
television series Stranger Things; and, (3) by subverting the suburbia simulacrum in order to 
expose it as a source of infection in and of itself, as in Jordan Peele’s film Get Out. A 
common feature of all three of these approaches is their reliance on the aesthetic 
commonality of the suburbia simulacrum. Each situates their story squarely within 
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suburbia’s familiar aesthetics only to then challenge and re-imagine those aesthetic markers 
as indicative of a sinister superficiality that only those who inadequately conform to 
suburbia’s ideals can recognize as false. But while White Noise critiques the veneer of 
suburbia in light of the impending end of the Cold War, the latter two texts, Stranger Things 
and Get Out, reflect a critical moment in the present American zeitgeist corresponding with 
the decade immediately following the 2008 economic collapse and the suburban sub-prime 
mortgage crisis that accompanied it. In each case, these texts critique the suburbia 
simulacrum in the context of a potential and impending/ongoing social, political, and 
economic rupture in our concepts of and interaction with American ideology and the spaces 
that inform it. They thus use infection narratives as a lens through which to consider how the 
suburbia simulacrum has helped poison and contaminate American society with the dual 
infections of white supremacy and bourgeois hegemony. 
 
Simulated Infection: Don DeLillo’s White Noise 
        Don DeLillo’s 1985 novel White Noise takes place in an unnamed town comprised of 
non-descript suburban markers. The town surrounds the ambiguously named College-On-
The-Hill, where the novel’s protagonist, Jack Gladney, works in Hitler Studies, a field of his 
own design and a satirical nod to the sort of privilege afforded him as a white man in 
academia. The novel’s setting is an unspecific yet undeniably suburban environment that in 
its non-specific recognizability represents the suburbia simulacrum itself. DeLillo portrays it 
as a socially sequestered community of affluence and implied racial homogeneity, 
surrounded by other such communities, within a highway’s commute to major metropolitan 
areas. The events of the plot center primarily on the home, the school, the highway, and the 
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supermarket as focal points of social interaction. Even the novel’s title, White Noise, points 
to the suburbanness of the unnamed community by evoking both the whiteness of the space 
and the way that the mediated images of the suburbia simulacrum create a form of static 
interference preventing the injection of outside voices. 
         Towards the beginning of the novel, the safety of this any-suburb-whatever is 
challenged by the sudden appearance of a large, black, smokey mass in the sky, later dubbed 
the Airborne Toxic Event. Confident in the infallibility and safety of his town, Jack is at first 
unconcerned, responding to his daughter Steffie’s fears about their safety with the remark, 
“These things happen to poor people who live in exposed areas. Society is set up in such a 
way that it’s the poor and the uneducated who suffer the main impact of natural and man-
made disasters…We live in a neat and pleasant town near a college with a quaint name. 
These things don’t happen [here]” (114). As in Murphy’s assertion that the suburban gothic 
concerns the idea that “things like that...simply shouldn’t happen in places like this,” 
(Murphy 1) Jack’s lack of concern reflects his deep-seated assumptions about the safety he 
enjoys as a white man in a suburban environment. He believes that suburban belonging 
precludes the possibility of a threat, going so far as to suggest that the weather will 
inevitably change and blow the event in a direction opposite their town. 
         Meanwhile, as in Baudrillard’s evaluation of power’s response to crisis, the 
government’s response to the event plays out like a circus spectacle. Jack describes planes 
and helicopters throwing floodlights across the black cloud, circling it, testing it for toxic 
substances, with an attendant cacophony of sirens and emergency warnings. Having 
identified that the cloud is composed of a chemical called Nyodene D, but not yet aware of 
the effects of human contact with the chemical, the government assumes it is a potentially 
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lethal threat. Workers appear in biohazard suits, signaling to residents their own need to 
panic. The potential crisis that the event poses is thus extended to its most spectacular form, 
allowing forces of power opportunity to present an equally spectacular display of their 
ability to create order from chaos. In White Noise, the potential for a real threat and the 
certainty of a real threat become indistinguishable from one another, given that both are 
addressed in the exact same way.  
The role of simulation in facilitating crises that reinforce law and order is embodied 
in Jack’s encounters with SIMUVAC, the state program tasked with simulating evacuations 
for natural disasters. While a SIMUVAC worker checks Jack for signs of Nyodene 
contamination, they engage in the following exchange: 
- “What does SIMUVAC mean? Sounds important.” 
- “Short for simulated evacuation. A new state program they’re still battling 
over funds for.” 
- “But this evacuation isn’t simulated. It’s real.” 
- “We know that. But we thought we could use it as a model.” (139) 
The SIMUVAC worker goes on to suggest that the real event is actually not an ideal 
simulation, noting, “You have to make allowances for the fact that everything we see tonight 
is real. There’s a lot of polishing we still have to do” (139). Later in the novel, SIMUVAC 
will recruit townspeople to participate in a variety of crisis simulations, citing that “the more 
we rehearse disaster, the safer we’ll be from the real thing” (205). The absurdity of the 
simulations is that they are taken more seriously than the real disaster that preceded them. 
During one, a man with a megaphone tells participants, “We learned a lot during the night of 
the billowing cloud. But there is no substitute for a planned simulation. If reality intrudes in 
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the form of a car crash or a victim falling off a stretcher, it is important to remember that we 
are not here to mend broken bones or put out real fires. We are here to simulate” (206). 
Here, the unpredictability of so-called real life is considered a threat to the perfectability of 
simulation. SIMUVAC serves as a dynamic metaphor for the spectacle of law and order that 
power employs in its own self-defense. 
            Later, when Jack finds out that his brief exposure to Nyodene D during the 
evacuation could have lethally contaminated him, he becomes obsessed with the idea that 
death has entered his body and infected him. It does not matter to him that the SIMUVAC 
worker estimates the arrival of his impending death at 15-30 years down the line, or that the 
consequence of contamination could just as easily be no death at all. Confronted with the 
possibility of death, even a far off death, Jack is unable to distinguish between simulated 
infection and real infection, thus forcing him to consider the estimation a certainty. For Jack, 
death is an infection that has entered his body to lie in wait, but it is a non-real death, for it 
offers no tangible proof of its own reality and it cannot be mitigated by any simulated 
expression of law and order; no spectacle exists to allow him to exert control over death. As 
such, the assumed order of Jack’s inhabited suburban environment heightens the contrast 
between the implied perfectability of the space he occupies and his own imperfect mind and 
body. What makes this narrative interesting from a suburban perspective is the degree to 
which all of the events of crisis are contrasted with illustrations of Jack’s suburban 
surroundings that illuminate the high degree of order imposed upon them. The violence of 
the Airborne Toxic Event and Jack’s (and his family’s) attendant psychological crises is 
contrasted with the high degree of predictability and control exhibited in the rest of the 
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space, as if to prove just how ineffective that suburban order actually was in preventing the 
family’s psychological contamination. 
The most telling example of this suburban order is the supermarket, where the 
Gladney family frequently goes to restore routine to their lives. In the supermarket, 
everything has a place and a label, and the abundance of consumer capitalism is exhibited 
through the sheer variety and quantity of available commodities. In White Noise, the 
supermarket acts as a metaphor for the comfort that consumption offers within spaces 
produced to facilitate and reproduce it. In a suburban environment where order and 
happiness is premised on consumption, it is only in the supermarket that one evades the fear 
of death. Early on, Jack writes: 
It seemed to me that Babette and I, in the mass and variety of our purchases, in the 
sheer plenitude those crowded bags suggested, the weight and size and number, the 
familiar package designs and vivid lettering, the giant sizes, the family bargain packs 
with Day-Glo sale stickers, in the sense of replenishment we felt, the sense of well-
being, the security and contentment these products brought to some snug home in 
our souls—it seemed we had achieved a fullness of being that is not known to people 
who need less, expect less, who plan their lives around lonely walks in the evening. 
(20) 
The supermarket thus becomes a simulacrum in its own right, reflecting a glittering ideal 
back at Jack in order to distract him from his own imperfections. Later, after the Airborne 
Toxic Event, the supermarket is the only reassurance Jack has that things will return to 
normal, for its predictable aesthetic order mirrors that of his lived environment in general. 
As an expression of the suburbia simulacrum, the supermarket offers him an ideal space in 
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which to slip comfortably back into the illusion of safety and order that he had previously 
enjoyed, even if only for the brief time he is there. “The supermarket did not change, except 
for the better. It was well-stocked, musical and bright. This was the key, it seemed to us. 
Everything was fine, would continue to be fine, would eventually get even better so long as 
the supermarket did not slip” (170). Contrasted with the unpredictability of the Airborne 
Toxic Event as a crisis of contamination, the supermarket signifies the entirety of the 
produced space of suburbia and the false sense of security it offers, bolstered by repetition 
and consistency, offering contentment and safety in the form of perpetual consumption, 
providing the goods necessary to stave off lurking death. In White Noise, the supermarket 
and the consumption it represents are the spaces where the suburbia simulacrum is most 
concentrated, and it is only through re-acceptance of the ideals they represent that the 
persistent fear of death can be silenced. Hence White Noise as a suburban infection narrative 
that exposes both crisis and infection themselves as simulation, tricks played on the mind to 
force oneself back into passive consumption and blind faith in the restorative control of 
suburban law and order.  
 
Infected Suburbia: Stranger Things16 
            Whereas White Noise considers the simulated infection of suburban space, Stranger 
Things does the opposite by showing an always-already infected suburb that is perceived as 
uninfected to those whose minds are already contaminated by the suburbia simulacrum. The 
first two seasons of the series, which at the time of writing was in production on a third 
                                                
16Author’s Note: Portions of this section were expanded and adapted into an essay entitled “A nice home at the 
end of the cul-de-sac: Hawkins as Infected Postmodern Suburbia,” which was published in the anthology 
Uncovering Stranger Things: Essays on Eighties Nostalgia, Cynicism, and Innocence in the Series by 
McFarland Books in June 2018.  
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season, surround the suburban town of Hawkins, Indiana in the early 1980s. While Stranger 
Things premiered in 2016, its setting is a nostalgic mirror of the decade in which White 
Noise is set, creating a parallel between the uncertainty of the late Cold War era and the 
precarity of the current moment. In season one, the plot centers mostly around the 
disappearance of a boy named Will Byers, whose close friends and family believe he has 
been captured by an interdimensional monster they call the Demogorgon, named for a 
character in Dungeons and Dragons. The protagonists, who are mostly comprised of Will’s 
friends and family, believe the Demogorgon entered Hawkins through a portal to another 
dimension that they call the Upside Down, a dark otherworldly reflection of Hawkins itself. 
Throughout season one, a government lab conducting experiments on children with psionic 
abilities appears mysteriously connected to the opening of the interdimensional gate and 
spends majority of the time attempting to thwart Will’s friends from discovering the truth 
about it. After encountering Eleven, a young girl who escaped her imprisonment as an 
experiment in the government lab, Will’s friends and family use her psionic abilities to re-
establish contact with Will and navigate the Upside Down in order to bring him back to their 
world. The second season thus concerns the fallout from season one, Will’s and Eleven’s 
interactions with the Upside Down, the widening of the interdimensional portal, the spatial 
expansion of the Upside Down as inverse of Hawkins, and ultimately, the government’s 
complicity in keeping the truth from a seemingly brainwashed suburban community. The 
series thus uses its large cast of misfit protagonists to illuminate the vast gulf between those 
who can recognize the contradictions in Hawkins’ abstract suburban spaces and see the 
Upside Down, and those who are too inculcated by the illusion of Hawkin’s suburban safety 
to recognize the sinister reality beneath their very feet. Hawkins thus acts as a potent 
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metaphor for a suburbia ideal that is already infected with the monstrous ideologies that 
threaten the safety of those who do not conform. 
In the first few minutes of episode one of Stranger Things, after opening the series 
with an ambiguous, terror-inducing hint at the horror unfolding at Hawkins Laboratory, the 
scene immediately smash cuts to a shot of lawn sprinklers in front of a suburban home (ST 
1.1).17 The sprinklers’ ticking sound mimics the uncanny clicking of a veiled monster from 
the shot before, later revealed to be the Demogorgon.18 As the camera lingers on the 
Wheelers’ suburban home, Will’s friend and one of the series’ many protagonists, Mike 
Wheeler, can be heard explaining, “Something is coming—something hungry for blood.” 
Notes for the pilot script’s expanded vision of the opening read “We are now in a 1980s 
SUBURBAN CUL-DE-SAC. Quiet. Calm. A row of uniformed houses wind up the tree-
lined street; station wagons and other family cars fill driveways; TV sets flicker behind 
curtains; a few dogs bark” (Duffer Brothers, “Montauk” 2). In both versions, the Duffers 
establish the town of Hawkins as a typical expression of the suburbia simulacrum, 
positioning the Wheelers’ suburban home in comforting contrast to the brutality and danger 
shown before. It’s location at the end of the cul-de-sac is a nod to the highly regimented 
spatial arrangement of suburban neighborhoods into intricately parcelled streets of similar 
homes, the postmodern labyrinth created by suburban development. When the shot of this 
nice suburban home appears opposite from the danger seen before, it is supposed to reassure 
                                                
17 For this and all subsequent episodes mentioned, I cite first the season and then episode number, i.e. ST 1.1 = 
Stranger Things, Season 1, Episode 1. 
18 In the pilot script, the lab scene was supposed to end with fire sprinklers and smash cut to the lawn 
sprinklers, suggesting that this other form of overlapping sounds in the final edit was a similarly intentional 
choice. Moreover, this technique repeats throughout the series, as moments of horror frequently smash cut to 
typical suburban scenes such as popcorn popping on a stove (2.1) or the dinging of the general store cash 
register (2.3). 
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viewers that danger remains at a remove, at least for now, and that Mike’s ominous warning 
need only be considered child’s play.  
For the remainder19 of the series, Stranger Things will repeatedly invoke the implicit 
safety of suburbia in order to turn it on its head, revealing its quite literal Upside Down. 
Through its portrayal of both Hawkins and its shadowy inverse, Stranger Things offers  a 
critique not only of the dominant ideologies associated with the suburbia simulacrum but 
also of our collective cultural connection to and nostalgia for the mediated suburban images 
that continue to sustain it. The series paints the suburban town of Hawkins as simultaneously 
perfected and infected, simultaneously utopia and dystopia, but in a way that always 
gestures toward the fallability of its surface perfection and the potency of its dark 
underbelly. The series uses the Upside Down to present Hawkins as it truly is—an already-
infected relic of a prior nostalgic suburban ideal, a mirage of normality hiding a sinister and 
dark reality that is always already present within it.  
For instance, in the first episode of season one, Will’s disappearance occurs within 
minutes of him reaching his home, meaning that the monster captures him in the very space 
he is supposed to consider most safe. Having somehow figured out how to communicate 
through radio waves and telephone lines, Will manages to intimate to his mother Joyce that 
he is effectively trapped inside their house. Joyce, a single mother, significant primarily 
because of how it automatically designates her as an outsider to suburban norms, 
immediately trusts her intuitions that her son is trapped in another dimension, despite the 
entire community’s general willingness to dismiss her as crazy. Soon after, as if to confirm 
                                                
19 The author notes that at the time of writing, only two season of Stranger Things had premiered, though a 
third is slated for release in summer 2019. Given the subtlety of the parallelism between Hawkins and the 
Upside Down in Season One compared with more obvious gestures toward the interwoven nature of the two 
spaces in Season Two, it is likely that as the series continues, these tendencies will only intensify, though this 
reading makes no claims beyond the first two seasons. 
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her suspicions, a monstrous hand attempts to push itself out of the wall in her house. As she 
watches the walls of her home shift and flex with the danger of the Upside Down, it is the 
suburban home itself that threatens Joyce, just as it is the suburban home in which Will 
remains trapped.  
Though the danger of the Upside Down is presented as a literal spatial infection of 
Hawkins’ suburbia, it is by no means the only source of danger in Hawkins. Threats from 
the Upside Down run directly parallel to cruelty, abuse, or neglect inflicted on the show’s 
various protagonists by bullies, exes, parents, neighbors, and the government itself. 
Similarly, the mysterious government lab at the center of the rift between the two 
dimensions is presented as a source of danger not just to creatures of the shadow realm but 
also to those living on the surface world of Hawkins. The case of Will Byers is particularly 
indicative of the parallels between dangers in the two spaces. After spending the entire first 
season trapped in the Upside Down, in the second season, Will is unable to stop having 
episodes in which various places in Hawkins turn into the Upside Down before his eyes. 
When he is trick-or-treating and gets accosted by bullies, his stunned fear triggers his 
immediate propulsion back into the Upside Down, though he clearly remains on the same 
suburban street in which he was seen before. In the shadow realm, a dark figure that Will 
later names the Shadow Monster locates him and possesses him, but it is Will’s encounter 
with danger in Hawkins when faced with his bullies, not the Shadow Monster and the 
Upside Down, that triggers this dimensional shift. (ST 2.2) Later, Joyce also sees the 
monster flicker onto the screen immediately following Will’s video-taped encounter with the 
bullies, offering visual proof of the monster’s material reality while also thematically 
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attaching the monster’s appearance to the normative-enforcing bullying Will receives from 
peers. (ST 2.3)  
In this sense, the various monsters that protect the Upside Down, such as the dog-
like Demogorgon creatures and their hive mind leader, the Shadow Monster, become a 
visual metaphor for threats that already exist in suburban space. Further, the threats these 
interdimensional monsters reflect are threats borne of the suburbia simulacrum itself, for 
they coincide with other suburban inhabitants’ determination to enforce, even if by violent 
means, social rules about normative behavior. Both the bully that threatens Mike with a 
switchblade in season one, and the “Demodogs” that pursue Will’s friends in season two, 
present a mortal threat, suggesting that the monstrousness of one is parallel to 
monstrousness of the other. Like suburban bullies, the Upside Down’s monsters pluck 
victims directly from seemingly safe suburban spaces (the family home, the pool in the 
backyard, the arcade, the well-lit street) while simultaneously refashioning these spaces into 
sites of fear and imprisonment, thus reflecting their true nature.  
The various outcasts and misfits who comprise the series’ protagonists represent 
those whose view of Hawkins is already attuned to the social ills associated with collective 
adherence to norms championed by the suburbia simulacrum. While Will’s experiences give 
him direct recognition of the fallibility of Hawkins’ illusion of suburban safety, it is the 
other protagonists’ designation as freaks and outsiders that allows them to recognize and 
trust the truth of Will’s experience where others remain skeptical. Will’s best friends, Mike, 
Lucas, Dustin, and in season two, Max, are all social outcasts whose support for one another 
offers them a buttress against the normativity-enforcing bullying they regularly endure. Both 
Jonathan Byers (Will’s older brother) and Nancy Wheeler (Mike’s older sister) also 
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experience bullying and pressure to conform, in Nancy’s case from her own boyfriend, 
Steve, who is also Jonathan’s tormenter in season one. While Steve is later transformed into 
another series protagonist in season two, this transformation only occurs after he himself 
becomes the target of bullying from the new kid in town, Billy, who also bullies his 
stepsister Max, thus making her a fitting addition to Will’s group as well.  
Tellingly, Billy’s role as bullying suburban antagonist is also inverted during a 
harrowing scene in which his father beats him and calls him a faggot, claiming he does so to 
teach Billy “respect and responsibility” and to ensure he becomes a “good, kind, respecting 
brother” (ST 2.8). This scene offers a glimpse into the violence that upholds patriarchal 
suburban ideological values, forcing the viewer to reconsider Billy’s own cruel behaviors, 
such as his violently toxic masculine aggression and his implied racial biases, in light of the 
ideologically-motivated violence modelled for him within the patriarchal suburban family 
home. Having internalized the lessons of his father, the violence Billy reproduces towards 
other is thus a reflection of his being a successful reproduction of the suburban patriarch. In 
Stranger Things, the characters who conform most closely to the ideals of suburban social 
belonging are those most likely to exert their power in ways that jeopardize the safety of the 
show’s protagonists, such as when Mr. Wheeler unknowingly sends corrupt government 
agents after his son because of an unquestioned belief that the government is always right. 
(ST 1.7) In this way, Stranger Things re-imagines cultural adherence to the suburbia 
simulacrum as itself a source of danger, a way of contaminating the mind and leaving it 
susceptible to further infection by even more sinister powers.  
In this context, Nancy Wheeler’s target practice monologue in the fifth episode of 
season one offers a fulcrum around which the rest of the show’s narratives turn. In this 
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scene, Nancy and Jonathan are practicing shooting a gun in anticipation of an encounter with 
the Demogorgon. After watching Jonathan try (and fail) to hit an aluminum can, Nancy 
takes the gun and points straight ahead, imagining the monster before her. They converse: 
- NANCY: I don’t think my parents ever loved each other. 
- JONATHAN: They must’ve married for some reason. 
- NANCY: My mom was young. My dad was older, but he had a cushy job, 
money, came from a good family. So, they bought a nice house at the end of 
the cul-de-   sac, and started their nuclear family. 
- JONATHAN: Screw that. 
- NANCY: Yeah…screw that. (ST 1.5) 
With this pronouncement, Nancy fires and hits her target on the first try. Tellingly, Nancy’s 
speech invokes the same description of her home as that used in the pilot script’s opening 
scene, when her home is directly contrasted with the Demogorgon. All along, the fight 
against the Upside Down can be understood on some level as a fight against suburban space, 
our distrust for the ideologies and forces of power that attempt to control it, and ultimately 
our fear that the cultural changes accompanying postmodernity have warped and changed 
the spaces we inhabit in ways that render us incapable of navigating them. The misfit 
protagonists at the center of the series can only fight the existential threat the Upside Down 
poses after they have rejected the illusion of suburban safety that it renders moot. Nancy 
sees her parents’ adherence to suburban ideologies as an infection of complacency, which 
she rejects by refusing to adhere to her proscribed social place. Her speech reveals the 
metaphorical suburban danger that the festering expansion of the Upside Down represents, 
mirrored all the more by the Shadow Monster’s later efforts at both spatial sprawl and 
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asserting domination as a “master race” (ST 2.8). As the Upside Down is enmeshed with 
Hawkins as its right-side-up obverse, the suburbia simulacrum that maintains the illusion of 
safety in the surface realm is presented as a hindrance to one’s ability to recognize and resist 
the danger below. Only those characters able to see past the simulacrum’s illusions and 
recognize Hawkins as an already infected space have a chance of escaping contamination by 
it. 
An important component of the series’ larger critique of the suburbia simulacrum is 
the way it incorporates the aesthetics of the 1980s, re-furnishing the prior 1950s sitcom 
suburb ideal with constant nostalgic references to popular ‘80s cultural artifacts ranging 
from E.T. to Dig Dug to Eggo Waffles. It updates the simulacrum to more properly reflect a 
new twenty-first century suburban nostalgia embedded in a collective longing for a prior era 
of technological innovation. In Stranger Things, the vast world-altering technologies of the 
twenty-first century are reduced to their more simplistic ‘80s counterparts—the ham radio 
rather than the internet, the walkie talkie rather than cellular phones, and analog cameras in 
place of digital image-making. Moreover, all technology in Stranger Things appears to be 
connected to the Upside Down, as evidenced by the flickering lights and other electrical 
anomalies that precede the appearance of inter-dimensional monsters, the way Will uses 
technologies to communicate with the outside world when he is trapped, and the way Eleven 
is able to traverse dimensions through radio waves. The result is that even the relatively 
simplistic technologies of the 1980s appear as potentially sinister harbingers of some other 
dimension that is outside of human comprehension, excepting for those posthuman figures, 
Eleven, and in a different manner, Will, who have learned to navigate it. In this way, the 
show echoes Jameson’s warning that postmodernity will require us to “grow new organs, to 
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expand our sensorium and our body to some new, yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately 
impossible, dimensions” (38-39)  in order to navigate spaces which have warped, expanded, 
and reproduced beyond our human capacities to make sense of them. 
If older suburban texts recalled the sitcom suburbs as a way to examine fears 
surrounding the social changes that accompanied widespread suburban sprawl and the rapid 
growth of mass-market consumerism under late capitalism, then newer suburban gothic texts 
like Stranger Things seemingly resituate this nostalgia in the 1980s in recognition of the 
changes wrought by postmodernity and post Cold War technological innovation. In doing 
so, the series identifies the mid-‘80s as the moment in which the ruptures that led to our 
current situation first became evident, but it also points to the fallacy of the simulated threats 
of the period. For instance, in Hawkins in the early ‘80s, the Soviet threat remains persistent, 
distracting from and offering a foil for the more malevolent reality behind the experiments at 
Hawkins laboratory, as well as a convenient excuse for the government to demand silence 
from those who become suspicious of events at the lab. Such a parallel forces one to 
reconsider the degree to which ambiguous ideas like the Soviet threat might also have been 
deployed to mask the reality of more subtly violent changes like suburban segregation and 
urban divestment. 
The postmodern theoretical frame for the series is further indicated by the extensive 
use of ‘80s nostalgia as a form of pastiche, which Jameson defines as “a neutral practice of 
[parody’s] mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satirical 
impulse” (Jameson 17). Jameson asserts that pastiche occurs because in postmodernity, 
“producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past” to satisfy “consumers’ appetite 
for a world transformed into sheer images of itself” (17-18). As a type of pastiche, the 
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suburbia simulacrum often reflects a historicism that relies on nostalgic longing for a 
simpler time in order to cast doubt on the viability of social changes in the present, often by 
making social progress appear less satisfying than tradition. While the Duffer Brothers 
certainly use Stranger Things to create a pastiche of 1980s nostalgia, they seemingly do so 
less to invoke nostalgic longing than to render a new, postmodern suburban image that 
invites a self-reflective critique of the way that nostalgic, mediated images like those in their 
own series so easily become fodder for the perpetuation of the suburbia simulacrum. 
The Duffers’ ‘80s-infused adherence to the aesthetics of the suburbia simulacrum is 
thus not only a commentary on the decade as a new collectively idealized past, but also a 
self-reflexive indictment of the suburbia simulacrum’s tendency to invoke golden-age 
nostalgia as justification for the continued renewal of antiquated ideologies. As pastiche, 
Hawkins is not merely a suburb but a representation of suburban-ness, meshed with small 
town-ness, and Midwest-ness, and other simulacra that coalesce under the guise of a 
coherent visualization of an ideal American recent past. The series employs pastiche to 
highlight the constructed nature of the suburban ideals that have always been endemic to the 
suburbia simulacrum’s deployment within American popular culture. Depicting suburbia as 
a monstrous horror in and of itself20 is thus a central theme of the series, with the creatures 
of the Upside Down appearing, much like suburbanites, as mere products of their 
environment, characterized by their incessant and insatiable consumption as well as their 
unquestioned drive to conquer all available space in their own image and at the expense of 
anyone else who might wish to occupy that space. 
                                                
20 Though I avoid diverging here, it bears mentioning that this theme seems itself to be a pastiche of ideas 
borrowed from existing suburban gothic narratives, such as the Silent Hill video game series (1999-2014) and 
Mark Danielewski’s novel House of Leaves (2000). 
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The brainwashed suburbanite thus finds its antithesis in the figure of Eleven. Though 
Eleven’s psionic abilities are her primary weapon, she becomes the series’ hero less for her 
abilities than for her extreme outsider status, as her unconventional upbringing makes her 
immune to the suburban ideologies that hinder the others. Though both she and Will can be 
seen as posthuman figures, Will’s relative inability to navigate another dimension outside of 
guidance from his Shadow Monster host is contrasted by Eleven’s seemingly nuanced and 
human control over her interdimensional abilities. In this respect, it is only Eleven who 
represents a posthuman mutation along the lines of Jameson’s body that grows new organs, 
for she possesses new navigational devices that exceed the capacities of her human 
companions. That Eleven utilizes technologies like television and radio waves in order to 
access her psionic abilities further emphasizes her status as a mutant, in postmodern theorist 
Katherine Hayles’ sense, as she represents “a coupling with intelligent machines…so intense 
and multifaceted that it is no longer possible to distinguish meaningfully between the 
biological organism and the informational circuits in which the organism is enmeshed” (35). 
As proof of her continued humanity, Eleven’s nose bleeds whenever she uses her powers, 
but her humanity is contrasted by both her telegraphic speech patterns and her telekinetic 
powers, machine-like qualities reflected in her frequent dehumanizing characterization as 
either a weapon or a monster. Though her psionic abilities enable her positioning as hero, it 
is only through her designation as a mutant freak that she is able to recognize her 
capabilities and wield them accordingly. 
By the end of Season Two, having proven her devotion to Hawkins by helping to 
close the gate to the Upside Down, Eleven is rewarded with the symbolic restoration of her 
humanity through her faux-familial relationship with a surrogate father (the detective, 
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Hopper), her receipt of a proper birth certificate, and her chance to participate in a typical 
suburban rite of passage by attending the middle school dance. Were Stranger Things a 
traditional suburban narrative, Eleven’s restoration as a normative suburban teenager would 
signal an effective resolution of the danger of the Upside Down. Of course, the final shot of 
Hawkins Middle School in the last scene of Season Two prevents the possibility of such a 
seamless ending, as the camera slowly flips 180 degrees to reveal the intact Upside Down 
version of the school. (ST 2.9) This final shot immediately calls into question the twee, 
almost saccharine nature of the school dance scene before, in part because it is a scene that 
maps so closely to the disingenuous nostalgia embedded in the suburbia simulacrum. The 
ending of Season Two thus makes clear what the series as a whole has writ large, which is 
that the Upside Down and Hawkins are two sides of the same coin. Thus, Stranger Things 
raises the possibility that Hawkins must be read not only as an already-infected relic of a 
prior suburban ideal, but also as proof that the danger of adhering to the ideological 
imperatives of suburban life is the unending expansion of a poisonous suburban sprawl to all 
available space. In presenting suburbia as the infectious monstrosity that it is, Stranger 
Things challenges ideals of suburban space as utopian and idyllic, prompting re-
consideration of both the latent violence and cruelty that underpins the continued dominance 
of American suburban space and the nostalgic mediated images that support and justify it.  
 
Suburbia As Contamination: Get Out 
         Whereas Stranger Things critiques the ideologies of suburbia in a more broad 
manner, Get Out uses an infection narrative to critique a specific ideological consequence of 
the suburbia simulacrum, namely the continued dominance of implicit white supremacy in 
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suburban imagery and the continued lack of Black voices in popular narratives about 
suburban space. When Get Out was released in 2017, critics rushed to call it an instant 
classic, a deft commentary on contemporary race issues that also stayed true to classic horror 
tropes borrowed from older horror films like Rosemary’s Baby (1968) and the intrinsically 
suburban The Stepford Wives (1975). Set primarily on a sprawling suburban estate indicative 
of the earliest and wealthiest suburbanization models, the first half of the film primarily 
follows its Black protagonist, Chris, through his experiences with his white girlfriend, Rose 
Armitage, while visiting her parents, Dean and Missy, and her brother, Jeremy, during the 
weekend of an annual garden party at the Armitages’ suburban home. Tellingly, the 
Armitages are initially portrayed as mostly open-minded albeit awkward on the issue of 
race, repeatedly invoking their support for Barack Obama and their recognition of racial 
issues as attempted proof of their own lack of racism. However, over the course the film, a 
series of plot twists reveals that the Armitages are primarily interested in capturing Chris 
and using his body for a sinister brain-swapping operation they’ve been conducting for 
suburban clients for years. As such, the garden party is merely a front for auctioning off 
their latest acquisition to the highest suburban bidder. The latter half of the film thus follows 
Chris through his journey of realization about why he was brought to the suburbs and his 
eventual escape from the Armitage home. 
The film’s adherence to the visual hallmarks of the suburbia simulacrum is 
impeccable throughout, but by centering the narrative around the perspective of a Black 
man, Peele assures that these aesthetics are never regarded as anything but a mirage for the 
violence of liberal, elite white affluence. That is, where suburbia’s aesthetics have most 
often been deployed to depict suburban space as intrinsically safe and utopian, suburbia was 
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always ever only a utopia for white people. From the very first shot of Get Out onward, 
these same aesthetic markers are used to instead give suburbia the appearance of being 
ominous, unsafe, and intentionally labyrinthine. Where the film differs from most suburban 
gothic narratives, however, is that the danger Peele’s suburb presents is not a danger for the 
suburbanites who inhabit but for those Black urban dwellers (a nod to the coded cultural 
equation of urbanness with blackness) who find themselves entangled in suburbia’s web. In 
Get Out, suburbia can be viewed through the eyes of those considered Other to suburban 
space, for whom the landscape itself poses the danger of contamination by white ideologies 
and power structures and for whom the suburban environment always poses a threat. 
         Get Out opens on a shot of a suburban street at night, sidewalk extending up the 
center of the screen, paralleled on the right by a row of dimly lit street lamps and on the left 
by a line of neatly trimmed hedges and a white picket fence. The camera lingers on this shot 
for a few beats, just long enough to establish the familiarity of the setting and signal a 
suburban sense of place; it is essentially a shot of suburbia as simulacrum. However, when a 
Black man, Andre, enters the scene, his very first line upends the utopia associated with this 
scenery. Talking on the phone to his girlfriend, he jokes “What kind of sick individual 
names a street Edgewood Way and puts it half a block from a street named Edgewood 
Lane?,” soon after referring to his location as a “creepy, confusing-ass suburb,” making his 
discomfort within the space immediately apparent. Andre also establishes himself as an 
outsider, saying that he “sticks out like a sore thumb.” But unlike majority of suburban 
narratives in which Black bodies are portrayed as Other to suburban space, here, it is the 
suburb which seems dangerous and Other to Andre. Both the shadowy lighting of the scene 
and the focus on Andre’s discomfort forces a perspective shift that re-paints utopian 
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suburban aesthetics to make them visual indicators of potential danger for Black bodies. In 
this way, Get Out opens with an explicit subversion of the white suburban ideal,21 forcing 
the audience see the space through Andre’s (and later Chris’) eyes.  
When a white car appears and ominously pulls up alongside Andre, there is no 
question that it poses a threat and Andre’s logical response is to turn around and walk the 
other way, remarking “Not today. Not me. You know how they like to do to motherfuckers 
out here, man.” Andre’s suspicions are confirmed moments later when the car’s masked 
driver attacks him and drags his limp body into the trunk of the vehicle. Throughout, the car 
stereo plays a refrain from the Flanagan and Allen song “Run, Rabbit, Run” (1939): “Run 
rabbit! Run rabbit! Run! Run! Run!/Don’t give the farmer his fun fun fun,” a nod to how 
Andre is undoubtedly being treated as his assailant’s prey. Between an early scene in which 
Rose hits a doe with her vehicle and Dean Armitage’s later discussions of his disdain for 
how the deer seem like a suburban infestation, the song parallels a motif mirrored in the 
film’s frequent use of deer as an analog for hunted Black bodies. This first scene is one of 
the most critical in the film because it places the Black perspective front and center in the 
narrative, while also firmly outfitting the scenery with established hallmarks of the suburbia 
simulacrum. As such, the film de-centers the experience of whiteness from the narrative arc 
without de-centering outward aesthetics of whiteness qua the suburbia simulacrum, allowing 
Peele to tease out the various ways mediated images of suburban perfection tend to veil the 
violence of white supremacy, even among otherwise liberal-seeming white elites. 
 One early indication of the Armitages’ desire to assert power over Chris is there 
frequent obsessions with his body, and with Black athleticism generally. Whereas Dean 
                                                
21 In the director’s commentary for the film, Jordan Peele says as much explicitly, stating: “So this first scene, I 
kind of started with the idea of Halloween, right? [And] subverting the idea of the perfect white suburb.” 
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regales Chris with stories about how his father never got over losing in the Olympic Trials to 
Jesse Owens and a garden party guest attempts to bond with Chris by referencing a personal 
relationship with Tiger Woods, it is Jeremy who is most explicit in objectifying Chris, 
remarking that his “genetic makeup” would lend him advantage in fighting. In other scenes, 
Rose chastises Chris for smoking, as do Missy and Dean later, even going so far as to insist 
that he not smoke around Rose so as to avoid contaminating her with the habit. Even without 
the later reveal that these concerns about Chris’ physique stem from their desire to farm his 
body, they read as explicit attempts to use white ideals to exert control and power over 
Chris’ bodily autonomy.  
In one particularly odd encounter, after catching Chris sneaking a cigarette at night, 
Missy, who works as a hypnotherapist, uses a silver spoon and a white porcelain teacup to 
deceptively lull Chris into a state of hypnosis, claiming she does so to cure him of his 
impulse to smoke. During this process, Mindy’s suggestion that Chris “sink into the floor” 
propels him to a state of mind she terms the Sunken Place, visually depicted as a free fall 
into a sea of darkness where he is unable to interact with Missy except as if from a bottom of 
a well, looking up, unable to speak. Waking the next day from the encounter, Chris cannot 
shake the feeling that Missy has somehow contaminated his mind with the hypnosis, making 
him feel as if he is somehow at odds with his own body. After the film’s release, critics 
wasted no time in drawing parallels between the Sunken Place and the experience of being 
Black in America, and Peele himself has been clear about the metaphor he imagined it 
represented, saying in one tweet on March 16th, 2017: “The Sunken Place means we’re 
marginalized. No matter how hard we scream, the system silences us” (@JordanPeele). The 
Sunken Place is thus explicitly related to the imprisonment of Black bodies, both literal in 
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the case of the prison-industrial complex and figurative in the sense of suburban segregation, 
within a system that places the ideals of white suburban elites above the interests of those 
who are subjugated by that system and denied representation within it. Moreover, as a 
metaphor for marginalization, the implication of being sunken beneath the surface reflects 
the tendency of white supremacy to marginalize through continued insistence on idealized 
spatial narratives that prevent any other voices from coming to the discursive surface. That 
the hypnotic auditory trigger which propels Chris back into the Sunken Place is a silver 
spoon clinking against white porcelain is a further metaphor for how his subjugation comes 
from the continued power of elite bourgeois white suburbia, for both objects are 
representative of bourgeois whiteness and elite consumerism. 
Chris also has multiple uncomfortable encounters with the Armitages’ Black house 
servants, Georgina and Walter, who Dean claims were only brought to the home to help with 
his ailing parents, explaining, “When they died, I just couldn’t bear to let them go.” Both 
Georgina, who works primarily indoors, and Walter, who works the grounds, behave in 
ways that strike Chris as distinctly odd compared with other Black people, mainly because 
they are uncannily distant and robotic when speaking with Chris, as if hiding secrets they are 
unwilling to voice. In one scene, having snuck away from the garden party, Chris confides 
to Georgina “All I know is, if there’s too many white people, I get nervous, you know?” At 
this moment, aided by a nuanced non-verbal performance by actress Betty Gabriel, 
Georgina’s expression slowly changes from a forced smile to a frightened blank stare, 
before a trembling gasp in which she starts to speak but stops. Georgina then forces another 
smile, and responds “Oh no. No no. No no no no no no no!,” insisting “the Armitages treat 
us like family.” However, even as she reassures Chris, her body betrays her words, and a 
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single tear rolls down her cheek. Though this moment is meant to foreshadow the later 
reveal that Georgina has also been the victim of a brain-swapping operation, it nonetheless 
expresses the negotiation of self-presentation required by Black bodies when passing in 
white spaces. Georgina’s silence as a Black women in a white space thus reflects the way 
suburban whiteness robs women and people of color of space to express themselves and 
voice their truths authentically. 
Shortly thereafter, at the garden party, Chris experiences similar discomfort when 
interacting with a man named Logan, recognizable to the audience as Andre from the first 
scene, whom Chris also finds disconcerting because of his stereotypically white behavior 
and unwillingness to connect over their shared racial identity. When Chris sneaks a picture 
of Logan and the flash on his phone goes off, a spark of recognition comes over Logan’s 
eyes and his nose begins to bleed. He then lunges at Chris, imploring him to “Get out! Get 
out! Get the fuck out!” Of course, by this point, the audience is keenly aware that Andre has 
been brainwashed in some capacity, just as it is clear that something similar is going on with 
Georgina and Walter, though Chris remains at a loss. These two scenes, which are more or 
less back to back, thus mark a crucial turning point that sets up the film’s remaining twists, 
with the latter half of the film following Chris’ struggle to fulfill Andre’s call to get out of 
his would-be suburban prison. But these scenes also perform the important task of re-
attuning the audience’s suspicions, recasting Georgina’s, Walter’s, and Logan’s earlier 
sinister behaviors in light of the victimization they must have experienced at the hands of the 
Armitage family, recentering suburban whiteness as the source of the film’s real horrors. 
While these odd encounters certainly help build the tension necessary to aid the 
film’s later twists, they also help show how stilted the normative social behaviors of white 
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elites seem when thrust upon other bodies, thus exposing how unnatural these same 
behaviors are in their normative white suburban contexts as well. Georgina, Walter, and 
Logan all seem odd to Chris because they strike him as foreign to his experience of 
Blackness, but it is specifically their unnatural repetition of white suburban social norms that 
make them seem sinister. All three embody different aspects of the forced social niceties 
expected of suburban elites, behaviors thus primarily endemic to the historical oppressors of 
Black bodies. Chris echoes this sentiment when he comments to his best friend Rod that all 
the black people he has encountered in the suburbs seem to have “missed the movement.” 
Even before the hypnosis reveal, their inclusion in elite suburban spaces seems to require the 
dissolution of all markers of their prior Black American identity, such as familiar gestures 
(as when Andre responds to Chris’ fist bump with a handshake) and ways of speaking (as 
when Georgina does not understand the word “snitch” and offers “tattletale” as an 
alternative) that Chris associates with Black belonging. After it becomes clear that the 
Armitages are running what is essentially a human trafficking scheme, the stunned and 
trance-like behaviors of Georgina, Walter, and Logan can be retroactively regarded as 
evidence of the contamination of their bodies and minds by already-infected, brainwashed 
white suburbanites. 
One of the film’s major reveals concerns how the Armitages’ garden party is actually 
an auction of Chris’ body, a clear nod to the auctioning off of Black bodies during the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade. After this turning point, the Armitages turn on Chris one by one, 
with the final reveal being that Rose has been aligned with her family’s plan all along. When 
Chris attempts to physically resist his entrapment, Missy invokes his prior hypnosis trigger 
(the spoon and teacup) to immobilize him before Dean and Jeremy drag him to the 
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basement. The basement itself is a stereotypical amalgamation of images associated with the 
suburban den or game room, complete with the mounted head of a buck, repeating the 
parallels between the deer and Black bodies as hunted game. As Chris sits strapped to a 
chair, a bullseye dartboard directly above his head, an old film explaining the Armitages’ 
process pops onto the stationary tube television in front of him. Through what they call the 
Coagula procedure, the film clarifies, Black victims become host bodies for wealthy 
suburbanites wishing to extend their lives by acquiring a new body. The procedure involves 
first hypnotic acclimation to the Sunken Place, then preparatory mental torture and further 
hypnosis in the basement, and finally a transplantation of the client’s brain into the body of a 
Black host, for whom only their spinal cord and vital connections will remain intact. As Jim, 
the blind art dealer who has purchased Chris’ body for his “eye” intimates to Chris through a 
teleconference on the old television: “You won’t be gone, not completely. A sliver of you 
will still be in there, limited consciousness. You’ll be able to see and hear what your body is 
doing, but your existence will be as a passenger. An audience. You’ll live in the Sunken 
Place.” After the procedure, the soul and mind of the Black host body is not entirely snuffed 
out, but rather, victims become the unwitting prisoners of their own bodies. The Coagula 
procedure is thus nothing less than the total consumption of Black existence by white 
suburban ideals, an infection of Black bodies that contaminates them with the thoughts and 
desires of whiteness through a literal act of Black dispossession. 
Hence, Andre’s identity as Logan, the husband of an older white woman, and 
Georgina and Walter’s hypnotic occupation by the assumed-deceased Armitage 
grandparents. Further, Georgina and Andre’s respective previous outbursts are immediately 
rendered proof positive of the struggle that remains between the imprisoned victims and the 
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body-occupying suburbanites, for it is precisely in the moments when the imprisoned people 
are able to somehow emit communication from the Sunken Place that these characters seems 
to act out. This theory is later confirmed by three important moments: first, by Chris’ 
discovery of a box of photos featuring Rose with a series of black romantic partners, 
including Georgina and Walter; second, by Jim’s comment that “Jeremy’s wrangling 
method sounds way less pleasant,” identifying him as Andre’s captor in the first scene, later 
verified when Chris steals Jeremy’s car and it is the same as that in the opening shot; and 
third, upon the audience’s recognition that in Dean’s previous comment about not being able 
to “bear letting them go,” the “them” he was referring to was his parents, not Georgina and 
Walter. In Get Out, the horror of body invasion and mind contamination references various 
ways in which the survival of white suburban ideals depends first and foremost on the 
continued denial of Black bodily autonomy and the spatial dispossession of Black bodies, 
including through violence. Whether the brain-swapping is viewed as a metaphor for the 
way gentrification attempts to eliminate people of color in order to make room for white 
elites, or for the continued subjugation of Black bodies to forced labor for the benefit of 
bourgeois wealth, as in the prison-industrial complex, or even for the way Black bodies are 
objectified and glorified for their physicality and athleticism while their intellectual 
contributions are dismissed, all potential analogies that can be drawn from the body-
swapping device point to a fundamental power dynamic by which white social power 
remains possible only through violent subjugation of people of color. That the Sunken Place 
is a space of silence suggests a fundamental voicelessness brutally thrust upon Black people 
during the discourses that helped shape American space, though Georgina and Logan’s 
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respective interjections show the perseverance of Black people to voice their opposition in 
spite of the violence done to them. 
Crucially, the role infection and contamination play in this narrative works in two 
directions simultaneously. In one sense, the brain-swapping constitutes an infection of the 
Black body and a contamination of Black identity by white suburban ideals. But it is also the 
white people who themselves appear infected and brainwashed, pointing to the suburbia 
simulacrum and suburban values as their own source of infection, as evidenced by the 
familial way the Armitages pass their racism from parent to child. Consequently, Get Out 
also repeatedly gestures to the superficiality of the suburbia simulacrum as a hypnotic 
illusion that hides a structure of social reproduction already contaminated by racism, 
classism, and other forms of systemic violence. As Peele notes in a Q&A included in the 
film’s special features, Get Out was originally written in the Obama era to address what he 
calls the “post-racial lie,” or the idea that the election of a Black president was proof that 
liberal whiteness had already been drained of its racial issues. In critiquing this post-racial 
lie, Peele identifies the perfection of white suburbia as but one part of the smoke and mirrors 
required to believe that liberal tendencies among white elites are proof of their having 
conquered their racist demons. His characterization of the Armitages mimics the white 
tendency to hide racism behind claims of colorblindness and reverance for Black cultural 
contributions, as in Dean Armitage’s repeated insistence “I would have voted for Barack 
Obama a third time if I could” while literally profiting from the trafficking of Black bodies. 
As Peele remarks, “Racism is very much alive, and it’s this monster that was kind of 
simmering beneath the surface of the country for awhile” (Peele, Q&A), meaning that the 
 97 
facade of normalcy offered by the suburbia simulacrum is effectively the primary monster 
driving the horror in Get Out.  
In commentary for the film’s alternative ending, Peele also recalls how the 2016 
election of Donald Trump reshaped his vision and inspired him to fashion his protagonist 
Chris into more of a hero than a martyr. In the film’s original ending, Chris is found by 
white cops crouching over Rose’s lifeless body and is immediately arrested for murdering 
the Armitage family. In the final moments of the film, his Black best friend Rod visits him 
in prison and Chris intimates that he does not anticipate being exonerated. However, in the 
theatrical release, the ending has been altered so that Chris is rescued by Rod just before he 
can choke Rose to death. In the film’s commentary, Peele argues that his original ending 
more accurately reflects the reality of what would truly happen to a Black man if discovered 
in a white suburb next to the body of a dead white woman -- his guilt would have been 
assumed, he would have been considered the dangerous element disturbing the suburban 
peace, and if he was not killed instantaneously, he undoubtedly would have been imprisoned 
indefinitely. While the new ending offers an alternative vision for the future that in Peele’s 
estimation is more appropriate to the ways Trumpism has brought previously veiled 
American racism to the surface, it is tellingly less realistic than the initial ending. Instead, 
Peele creates an ending in which the film’s greatest twist comes at the very second that the 
red and blue police lights flash on Chris, and he raises his arms in subservience to their 
power, only to reveal an urban savior (Rod, in his TSA vehicle) rather than a could-be 
suburban executioner (the suburban police officer). The relief at Rod’s appearance forces 
viewers to consider the import of the conclusions one might otherwise draw about Chris’ 
fate had it been the police who arrived, meaning that in the end, the greatest danger Chris 
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faces is a danger that is never actually portrayed on screen. The new ending is thus a sharper 
indictment of the existing, material effects of the suburbia simulacrum, for it portrays a 
fantastical ending that strays from the far more likely scenario of our current social reality. 
Get Out exposes suburbia as a “dream” only to those Americans for whom suburbia is not a 
space of danger, dispossession, state brutality, and uncertainty, illustrating how for Black 
Americans, suburbia has been infected from the start. 
 
Conclusion 
These three suburban infection narratives together have a common focus on the body 
and the corporal as an expression of the space that individuals take up. In their own way, all 
three texts consider the very real ways that our material bodies interact with our conscious 
experiences, and how both are influenced by the spaces in which they are located. Infection 
narratives are also always implicitly narratives of the body, and more obliquely, of human 
mortality, for they consider safety in terms of both which bodies are entitled to access a 
space and which bodies are offered safety and protection in that space. They question the 
way abstract space itself dictates or reinforces social codes that designate some bodies safe 
and some bodies dangerous, some bodies normal and some bodies diseased, some bodies 
desirable and some bodies undesirable, and in so doing, also gesture towards the dominant 
power structures that prevent resistance to those spatial codes. Infection thus becomes a 
locus for a variety of interconnected social critiques concerning suburban space, particularly 
since the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008 revealed the shaky foundation on which 
suburban development flourished and signalled the futility of continued allegiance to 
suburban models of growth. Insofar as a recent uptick in white urban gentrification arguably 
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stems directly from the recognition that suburbia has exhausted its use value, many 
recognize that such corrections do little more than reverse the tides of an already broken 
spatial economy within an increasingly blended postmodern geography. What is needed 
instead is no less than a complete revolution in the way Americans think about the spaces 
they inhabit, starting with a more nuanced investigation of suburban, the social patterns each 
was designed to concretize, and ultimately, the way we think about how much space and 
what kind of space given bodies are allowed to inhabit.  Similarly, as the next chapter 
reveals, this re-evaluation of mediated suburban narratives must also include re-evaluation 
of the way mediated anti-urban narratives have traditionally been deployed to support the 
suburbia simulacra. 
Pop culture narratives like White Noise, Stranger Things, and Get Out use their 
respective mass-mediated platforms to confront readers with the often hidden contradictions 
inherent to suburban space, forcing a re-evaluation not only of suburbia but of all types of 
abstract space. Each contributes to an alternative suburban discourse, or suburban counter-
narrative, that helps stimulate new social dialogues (or resurrect old ones) around the 
concept of the suburb while appropriating the very same media channels that helped 
disseminate the dominant images of the suburbia simulacrum in the first place. They reclaim 
the existing mediated images of the suburbia simulacrum, weaponize them, and turn them 
back on the simulacrum itself, thus unmasking the white supremacy and bourgeois ideals 
that have always been endemic to suburban space. This is an absolutely imperative endeavor 
for continued adherence to the suburbia simulacrum has produced a number of material 
consequences that range from increased racial and socioeconomic tensions to the violent 
police brutality that has recently been highlighted by groups like Black Lives Matter. As 
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these tensions come to a head within American society, it is clear that the urban response to 
suburbia simulacrum has been nothing short of a widespread collective reappropriation of 
abstract space, an appropriation that includes not just the suburbs, but expands to re-imagine 
the entire urban fabric, producing new urban and suburban counter-narratives that challenge 
the dominance of suburban hegemony in American society.
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Chapter Two 
From Canfield Green to Ramona Park:  
Vince Staples’ Norf Long Beach and Inhabited Urban Authorship 
 
 Perceived by blind perceptionist giving ignorant opinions in the faces of the biased 
 Let them tell it all we do is riot 
 They pick and choose tragedies to politicize 
 Urban and suburban is day and night 
 Those with a voice say such by not saying much--about the ghetto’s 
 Promising lives cut short, 
 But the media refuses to report—live 
 But hustle to the scene when white kids die 
 Inner city casualties are assumed acts of gang violence 
 So governors and heads of state remain silent 
 Suburban crimes are committed by the quote unquote “looney” 
 That’s an excuse they use to save face in their upstanding communities 
 What an injustice! 
 There’s no equality in the minds of those we voted for and intrusted 
       -Haneef Genno Talib, “Ying Yang” 
 
Introduction 
 
 On February 26th, 2012, George Zimmerman shot and killed unarmed Black 17-
year-old Trayvon Martin on the front lawn of Zimmerman’s suburban home in The Retreat 
at Twin Lakes, a gated community in suburban Sanford, FL. More than a year later, 
Zimmerman was acquitted of both second degree murder and manslaughter, prompting 
public backlash and protest that spawned the formation of the now-ubiquitous “movement 
building project” known as Black Lives Matter. (Black Lives Matter) In the media circus 
surrounding the acquittal, the question at hand concerned whether or not Zimmerman had 
racially profiled Martin, despite Zimmerman’s own statement to 911 that he trailed and later 
confronted Martin simply because he looked “like he’s up to no good” (Moore). 
Zimmerman’s defense claimed he acted in the capacity of the neighborhood watch (of which 
Zimmerman was the sole volunteer) for The Retreat at Twin Lakes. Yet the Miami Herald 
reported that neighbors recalled how Zimmerman “took it upon himself to do nightly patrols 
while he walked his dog” and in the weeks prior to the shooting “went door-to-door asking 
 102 
residents to be on the lookout, specifically referring to young black men who appeared to be 
outsiders, and warned that some were caught lurking” (Robles). Though Zimmerman’s own 
ethnic background is not strictly Caucasian (his mother is of Afro-Peruvian descent), his 
internalized commitment to the role of suburban neighborhood watchmen reveals an 
ideological stance about his neighborhood and his role within it that is steeped in suburban 
white supremacy. In this context, Zimmerman’s commitment to vigilante justice and 
patrolling his gated community seems a material consequence of internalizing the suburbia 
simulacrum to which I devoted the chapter prior. Conceiving his perfected suburban 
neighborhood as besieged by outside threats he associates with a chaotic urban environment, 
Zimmerman’s conflation of urban criminality with the mediated stereotype of the young 
Black man in a hoodie affected the assumptions he made about Martin. That Zimmerman 
was acquitted reveals the degree to which this conflation of urban threat with Black men 
(and with other people of color) has become normative within a political climate and justice 
system increasingly attuned to first and foremost serve the interests of white suburban 
populations. 
 If the suburbia simulacrum represents the apotheosis of a utopian landscape serving 
capitalistic white supremacy, it has achieved this status in part because of a concentrated, 
decades-long parallel effort by mass media, politicians, real-estate investors, and other 
economic actors to depict the urban landscape as suburbia’s dystopian and racialized 
antithesis. In contrast to visions of the suburb as a family-oriented landscape fostering 
community, security, and wellbeing, depictions of the American city since the 1970s onward 
have, as Steve Macek writes, “promoted the terrifying figment of city neighborhoods ruled 
by armies of bloodthirsty criminals, a specter that, in turn, was used to justify a draconian 
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police crackdown on urban lawlessness that helped to criminalize an entire generation of 
urban youth” (Macek 103). Political and media support for these narratives has facilitated a 
rightward movement in American politics bolstered in large part by the ever-increasing 
voting power of the suburban populations at which urban crisis narratives are aimed. An 
array of ideological divisions recognizable in the current American political climate can be 
traced to the potent effects of decades of this mediated urban/suburban binary messaging. As 
Macek writes in Urban Nightmares: The Media, the Right, and Moral Panic over the City 
(2006), a moral panic can be broadly understood as “any sudden upsurge of public concern 
over, or alarm about, a condition or group socially defined as ‘threatening’ or 
‘dangerous’”(Macek xiii) Within moral panic over the city, Black and brown bodies have 
become totemic symbols of urban chaos, criminality, and moral bankruptcy in 
contradistinction to the assumed order and civility of the hegemonic (and predominantly 
white) suburban masses. Police brutality against people of color and suburban vigilante 
justice like that meted out by Zimmerman thus stem from a similar rhetorical origin wherein 
suburban order comes at the expense of divestment from urban neighborhoods and 
dehumanization for the people of color who inhabit them. 
 Both moral panic over the city and the suburbia simulacrum stem from the same 
root, since both are mediated depictions of space that help maintain a dominant, white 
supremacist notion of who is entitled to which types of space, who determines the status 
quo, and which kinds of law and order can be used to maintain it. As Macek asserts, “the 
deviant, threatening, or troubling objects of a panic are social constructions, produced by 
particular social agents in particular social contexts for specific purposes.” In the late 20th 
century, the purpose of constructing anti-urban moral panic narratives was explicitly racist, 
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because “the panic over the city that permeated American culture in the ‘80s and ‘90s...was 
directed at what turns out to be a very carefully fabricated and grossly inflated ‘threat’: an 
urban underclass of working-class blacks and Latinos thought to be so deviant, murderous, 
and immoral as to constitute a serious danger to the nation’s security and well-being” 
(Macek xiv). Arguably, anti-urban moral panic has used faux concern over suburbia’s 
decaying urban core to mask present-day police brutality, infrastructural inequality, 
imbalanced justice, mass incarceration, systemic poverty, and racial bias, among other social 
concerns. (Macek 36) In defiance of anti-urban moral panic narratives, resistant urban actors 
utilize protest, artistic critique, and appropriation of built space itself to re-author the way 
the city is conceived in ways that better reflect the experiences of those who actually inhabit 
urban neighborhoods. Their resistance thus reflects David Harvey’s Lefebvrian assertion 
that the right to the city includes the right for those who actually inhabit space to determine 
how the city functions and the images that will be associated with it. Resistant acts of urban 
authoring or re-authoring constitute a demand to tell the story of urban space in ways that 
counter narratives of chaos and criminality associated with a discourse of urban crisis.1 
 I begin this chapter with a close reading of Darren Wilson’s and Dorian Johnson’s 
conflicting Missouri State Grand Jury testimonies surrounding the high-profile 2014 
shooting death of Black teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO. Using the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) reports surrounding their investigation of both Wilson as an individual and the 
Ferguson Police Department (FPD) as a whole, I argue that the disparity between Wilson’s 
and Johnson’s testimonies offers a useful case study for illustrating how a discourse of urban 
                                                
1 I borrow this phrasing from Macek, who writes that “panic over the city was promoted, at least in part, by a 
culturally authoritative discourse on the urban crisis...that blamed the urban poor for the deprivation and social 
isolation they were forced to endure and inflated they danger they posed to the rest of American society” 
(Macek xv-xvi). 
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crisis correlates with state violence and suburban hegemony in material urban and suburban 
spaces. Here I use Macek’s conception of moral panic and Lynn Mie Itagaki’s conception of 
civil racism in order to contextualize events in Ferguson within the broader contemporary 
media landscape through which moral panic narratives proliferate. Following Itagaki’s lead, 
I consider how the climate in South Central Los Angeles in the years surrounding the 1992 
Los Angeles Rebellion that occurred after the LAPD officers who attacked Rodney King 
were acquitted2 reflected the sort of racial tensions wrought by segregation, neoliberal urban 
divestment, and the proliferation of mediated urban crisis narratives towards the end of the 
twentieth century. As an art form that emerged from within the uniquely fraught social 
climate in Los Angeles during this period, I examine gangsta rap’s efficacy as a resistant 
medium intended to create urban counter-narratives that challenged moral panic over the 
city. Borrowing from hip-hop historians like Brian Cross, Eithne Quinn, and Jeff Chang, I 
consider the dichotomy between gangsta rap’s radical political aims and the eventual 
commercial reduction of those aims to fodder for moral panic. Focusing in particular on the 
gangsta rap ground N.W.A. and their creation of Compton as a mediated, imagined LA 
landscape for gangsta narratives, I consider how the lack of specificity in mediated Compton 
helped rappers sell records and achieve commercial success at the expense of advancing 
more inhabited and resistant urban narratives . Comparing early gangsta rap to iterations of 
the genre that have emerged since events in Ferguson, the last half of the chapter offers a 
close reading of works by contemporary Long Beach rapper Vince Staples, who re-imagines 
                                                
2 Both the events in Ferguson and the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion were referred to as riots rather than protests. 
In both cases, the media focused mainly on acts of violence or looting in order to characterize groups of 
protesters as criminal. Lynn Mie Itagaki, from whom I borrow some of my terminology referring to the events 
surrounding the 1992 acquittal of the LAPD officers who beat Rodney King, covers the issue of using charged 
terms like “riot” to refer to anti-racist rebellion at length in her book Civil Racism: The 1992 Los Angeles 
Rebellion and the Crisis of Racial Burnout (2016). 
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gangsta rap in a ways that resist appropriation and revive gangsta rap’s political force. 
Through his music, his visual art, and his public persona, Staples challenges the idea that 
Los Angeles’ predominantly Black and Latinx neighborhoods are the landscape of a so-
called urban underclass. Staples uses rap to re-author the neighborhoods he inhabits in ways 
that document the real social structures that inform life in North Long Beach and in South 
Central LA.3 In the process, Staples projects a vision of these spaces as would-be idyllic 
were it not for the socioeconomic and racial inequity by which they are ravaged, summarily 
challenging the dichotomy of perfected suburb and corrupted city by which the mainstream 
mass media subdivides urban and suburban space.  
 
A Tale of Two Canfield Greens 
 Around noon on August 9th, 2014, in the street outside the Canfield Green public 
housing complex in Ferguson, MO, a suburb of St Louis, white police officer Darren Wilson 
fatally shot an unarmed Black 18-year-old named Michael Brown, Jr. The highly publicized 
case marked a point of no return for anti-racist activists in the United States, further 
galvanizing the broad collective known as the Movement for Black Lives just as Martin’s 
death had two years before.  In Wilson’s grand jury testimony for the state of Missouri, he 
claimed the encounter began when he confronted Brown and his friend, Dorian Johnson, for 
walking in the middle of a public street. Per Wilson’s account, the altercation turned 
physical when Brown reached into his vehicle and struck him in the head before grabbing at 
                                                
3 South Central LA, now formally called South Los Angeles and including parts of what was formerly both 
South Central Los Angeles and Southwest Angeles, is often used as a short-hand term to refer to the 
constellation of neighborhoods in the southern part of Los Angeles populated predominantly by populations of 
color. While North Long Beach and Compton are not always formally grouped in with South Central LA, they 
are sometimes unofficially considered part of this spatial bloc due to their demographics. 
 107 
his firearm.4 Wilson repeatedly insists that Brown was hostile and confrontational 
throughout the encounter and that Brown attacked him unprovoked. He claims Brown’s 
intimidation made him earnestly fear for his life, that he was physically or logistically 
prevented from using non-lethal force to subdue Brown,5 and ultimately, that the sum of 
Brown’s behaviors justified his fears and all 12 shots he fired. (Missouri State Grand Jury 
Vol. V) 
 Wilson is especially adamant that Brown’s formidable size and demeanor made him 
fear for his life. He repeatedly mentions Brown’s stature and claims the struggle preceding 
the first shot made him “feel like a five-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan,” (Missouri State 
Grand Jury Vol. V 212) despite the fact that while Brown did outweigh Wilson by ~80 
pounds, he was only an inch taller.6 After Wilson show Brown in the hand, Wilson claimed 
“[Brown] looked up at me and he had the most intense aggressive face. The only way I can 
describe it, it looks like a demon, that’s how angry he looked” (Missouri State Grand Jury 
Vol. V 225). After another shot, Brown ran away and Wilson pursued him on foot, at which 
point Wilson claims Brown turned back toward him while “[making] a grunting, like 
aggravated sound” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol V. 225). Even though Wilson claims he 
was himself so anxious that he has no memory of how many shots he fired with his own 
gun, he again feigns incredulity at Brown’s aggressive demeanor, again using a Hulk-like 
description of Brown, saying “he was almost bulking up to run through the shots, like it was 
                                                
4 While I summarize here for brevity, Wilson’s and Johnson’s respective exhaustive play-by-plays of events 
can be found in their Missouri State Grand Jury testimonies, included in the works cited for this project. 
5 Wilson claimed to have mace, handcuffs, a baton, a flashlight, and his gun all on him at the time of the 
altercation. He also admitted that he often refused to carry a taser because he found them too bulky to carry 
around comfortably. In his testimony, he states that despite having all these alternative weapons, his gun was 
the only one he could reach from inside his SUV during the physical altercation that preceded the shooting.  
6 It is reported that Darren Wilson is 6’4” and weighs about 210 pounds and was armed whereas Michael 
Brown, Jr was  6’5”, 289 pounds, and unarmed. (Peter Eisley, “Ferguson Case: By the numbers”, USA Today, 
25 November 2014) 
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making him mad” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. V  228). At that point, Wilson shot 
Brown in the head, incapacitating him. In Wilson’s own words: “When [the last shot] went 
into him, the demeanor on his face went blank, the aggression was gone, it was gone, I 
mean, I knew he stopped, the threat was stopped” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. V  229). 
Wilson called for more officers, but did not call for an ambulance. 
 As a key eyewitness to events, Dorian Johnson also testified to the Missouri grand 
jury and his timeline differs in important ways from Wilson’s. For one, he asserts that 
Wilson’s initial approach was overtly aggressive and patronizing, that the way Wilson 
reversed his vehicle to speak to them nearly struck him and Brown, and that Wilson 
slammed his car door against both men, all before any kind of physical dispute took place. 
Second, he asserts that the altercation turned physical only when Wilson grabbed Brown by 
the neck and shirt, escalating into what he describes as a “tug-of-war” (Missouri State Grand 
Jury Vol. IV). Multiple times throughout his testimony, from Wilson’s initial demand that 
the men “get the fuck on the sidewalk” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV  45) to the 
manner in which Wilson drew his firearm, Johnson describes Wilson’s attitude as being 
“like chastisement from a father to a son” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 114). He 
remembers Wilson being incensed by their refusal to heed his demands about jaywalking but 
says Wilson never addressed the cigarillos during their encounter. (Missouri State Grand 
Jury Vol. IV 45-49) 
 Johnson also testifies that he never saw Brown touch Wilson’s gun, nor did he see 
Brown “physically striking” Wilson at any point, only trying to free himself from Wilson’s 
grip, adding that it wouldn’t likely have been possible for Brown to reach the firearm based 
on the angles. (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 107) Here, as at many points in his 
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testimony, Johnson is questioned by the district prosecuting attorneys as to the validity of his 
memory, with one (Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Sheila Whirley) implying that Johnson’s 
5’6” stature would have made it impossible for him to see for sure, though Johnson insists 
on the veracity of his memory.7 Johnson also accurately asserts that Wilson wasn’t much 
smaller than Brown, calling Wilson a “grown man” with “a little training on him” made of 
“solid muscle” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 114), a far cry from Wilson’s description 
of himself as a child at the mercy of a professional wrestler. He goes on to state that in this 
situation, “[Wilson] was the aggressor by initially just the way he reversed and opened his 
door, and the grab, it was overaggressive” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 114). Though 
Wilson was adamant that the entire encounter started because he recognized the cigarillos in 
Brown’s hand and connected them to a theft that had just been called in, Johnson asserts that 
Wilson never mentioned the theft, only expressed anger that the men didn’t immediately 
obey his authority.  
 When questioned as to why he didn’t try to de-escalate the situation before shots 
were fired (a task that should have been Wilson’s to begin with), Johnson responds: “I felt 
victimized because I felt so afraid that I couldn’t talk. I couldn’t say what was on my mind 
because I’m so afraid of, I couldn’t calm it down. I don’t have the power to calm down the 
police officer and obviously Big Mike is bigger than me” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. 
IV 102). Johnson also admits that due to trauma from being shot earlier in life, he entered a 
state of shock following the initial gunshot, making it difficult to recall subsequent events in 
the kind of detail the grand jury wanted. But while Wilson’s admission of shock as an 
                                                
7 Johnson, on his view of the altercation at the car window: “You’re not going to have that much ease with just, 
hey, get over here in this window. No, he’s big, he’s standing up, and the officer’s gun is on his right side, I 
believe, because that’s where he drew from with his right arm. In order for Big Mike to have touched the gun, 
it is almost like his whole top half of his body had to be inside the vehicle, and that never happened.” (Missouri 
State Grand Jury Volume IV 111) 
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excuse for not knowing how many shots he fired is met with little skepticism, the 
prosecutors regard Johnson’s foggy memory dubiously, questioning him down to the finest 
detail even as he repeats how the bang of the gunshot triggered a trauma response within 
him. (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 116)  Later, Johnson’s fogginess would be used to 
discredit Johnson as a witness. What Johnson does recall is Wilson quickly walking towards 
Brown with his weapon drawn and then shooting again, causing Brown to “[jerk] and stop in 
his track” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 120). Johnson says Brown then turned toward 
Wilson with his hands slightly up “but not so much in the air because he had been struck 
already” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 121).8 He remembers Brown telling Wilson “I 
don’t have a gun,” but “before he can [repeat the] sentence, or before he can get it out, that’s 
when the several more shots came” (Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 123). Johnson 
describes Brown falling in a hail of gunfire: “I can see how many shots this officer is firing, 
and it’s sickening to my stomach, I’m almost bursting in tears right there. I threw up a little 
in my mouth initially...When I see his body hit the ground, in my head I say he’s dead” 
(Missouri State Grand Jury Vol. IV 120). Johnson says he ran home in fear for his own life 
thereafter, and only returned later to see what was happening. 
 Various eyewitnesses disputed Wilson’s account, but many of these witnesses were 
deemed officially unreliable by the Department of Justice (DOJ), who claimed that these 
witnesses presented conflicting statements or gave information that couldn’t be corroborated 
by official evidence. Activists following the case raised suspicions about so many witnesses 
being discredited, particularly because most of the accounts deemed unreliable were those 
that did not favor Wilson and/or came from Canfield Green residents. In order to indict 
                                                
8 This detail is important because witnesses who claimed Brown had his hands up when he was shot were 
discredited, even though Johnson’s explanation clarifies why there might have been confusion. 
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Wilson, the DOJ investigation would have needed evidence enough to prove first that it was 
“unreasonable” for Wilson to believe Brown posed a mortal threat and second, that at least 
one of the 12 shots fired constituted a “willful intent” to harm Brown. As the DOJ report 
states, “although no eyewitness directly corroborates Wilson’s account...there is no direct 
evidence to disprove Wilson’s account,” and thus, “there is no credible evidence to refute 
Wilson’s subjective belief that he was acting in self-defense” (US DOJ, Darren Wilson 12). 
Yet this statement is only possible if one accepts the investigation’s rather subjective 
judgments about who constitutes a credible witness. Referring to Johnson as Witness 101, 
the DOJ report asserts that because an autopsy did not reveal bruising on Brown’s neck, 
Johnson’s statement about Wilson grabbing Brown cannot be corroborated, even as Johnson 
states multiple times that Wilson had Brown more the shirt and later by the right arm which, 
once shot, would not have revealed any physical evidence. Further, Brown’s size is again 
used to discredit Johnson’s account,9 without any acknowledgment of Wilson’s similar size 
or even how a slight strength disparity could account for a lack of bruising on Brown’s 
body. In determining which witnesses can be considered credible and which not, the DOJ 
report is lenient about inconsistencies in reports by witnesses that support Wilson’s account 
while being all too willing to use even specious evidence to discredit accounts that 
contradict Wilson, particularly those from residents of Canfield Green.10 While it would be 
                                                
9 “The private forensic pathologist opined that although the lack of injury does not signify the absence of 
strangulation, it would be “surprising,” given Brown’s size, if Wilson attempted to strangle Brown. The private 
forensic pathologist explained that the act of strangling is often committed by the stronger person, as it is rarely 
effective if attempted by the person of smaller size or weaker strength.” (DOJ Report on Wilson, 20). This 
quote is especially telling considering the fact that it was based in the forensic pathologist’s opinion and 
speculation and uses unclear terms like “often” and “rarely” rather than stating objective observations about the 
physical evidence gathered. The DOJ openly assert that they used this rather subjective finding to discredit any 
witness testimonies to the contrary, such as Johnson’s. 
10 See Witness 109 (32), Witness 113 (33), Witness 134 (34), etc. in the Department of Justice Report on 
Darren Wilson. The most egregious example of this is their decision to mostly ignore biases in the testimony 
from Wilson’s own fiancee, Witness 134, herself a Ferguson police officer who had been Wilson’s Field 
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impossible to prove here that the DOJ’s findings reflect anti-Black bias, suspicions that 
racial bias were a motivating factor in dismissing witnesses, particularly those whose 
inhabited experiences of life in Canfield Green might shed light on the shooting, 
undoubtedly contributed to the level of protesters exhibited in Ferguson following Wilson’s 
acquittal. Further, the disparity in the level of cross-examination between Wilson’s 
testimony and Johnson’s suggests an investigation driven by a narrative in which Wilson 
was always considered a more reliable witness and was hence granted far greater benefit of 
the doubt. 
 Even if one takes Wilson at his word, his account is tellingly steeped in language 
which dehumanizes Brown. In it, Brown is a hulking mass, a demon, a devil fueled by rage, 
but seemingly never a person. His characterization echoes Macek’s assertion that within 
moral panics, the Other is seen as a sort of “folk devil” who embodies evil and can be used 
to amplify fear.11 At no point does Wilson admit that his training ought to have prepared him 
to de-escalate the situation or subdue a larger person peacefully, and his blatant 
mischaracterization of the size disparity between him and Brown reads as egregiously 
intentional. Wilson is also adamant that Brown’s anger and aggression was unjustified, even 
after Brown had already been shot.When one contrasts Wilson’s hyperbole with the more 
neutral account Johnson offers, it seems criminal that Wilson’s exaggerated rhetoric was 
never questioned. As New Yorker journalist Amy Davidson Sorkin suggests, Wilson’s 
testimony implies that “[Brown’s] discontent [made] him presumptively dangerous: scary” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Training Officer and who testified that she knew Wilson had sealed his weapon in an evidence bag even 
though her back was to him when it happened. Meanwhile, Johnson (Witness 101) is listed among witnesses 
considered not credible on account of his history of “misdemeanor crimes of dishonesty” and the subjective 
judgment that his “inability to perceive what happened, or lack thereof” renders his account unviable, despite 
the fact Johnson’s explanation of his foggy memory is consistent with a trauma response to a gunshot. (47) 
11 Macek is borrowing this term from Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods 
and Rockers. Oxford, 1972: Martin Robertson. 
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(Sorkin). If the legal question of Wilson’s culpability rested so squarely on the 
reasonableness and intent of all shots fired, then it is galling that no one thought to challenge 
such outlandishly dehumanizing claims about Brown. Sorkin continues, “In the transcript, 
there is not really a cross-examination [of Wilson], or any interrogation of the portrait of a 
young man who would run, enraged and magically indifferent, toward a volley of bullets, as 
if this were somehow a familiar, easily recognizable character...It’s worth asking if [Brown] 
had a chance” (Sorkin). Sorkin’s indignant summation reflects the ire of the protesters who 
filled Ferguson’s streets in the weeks and months after Wilson’s acquittal, who saw the 
failure to indict Wilson as proof of a wider societal trend in which white cops are taken at 
their word and protected by their own whereas Black men (and other people of color) are 
uniformly regarded as criminally suspicious and unreliable witnesses, even in death. 
In his testimony, Wilson’s biases and presumptions extend to the residents of the 
Canfield Green Apartments, the public low-income housing complex outside of which 
Brown was shot. When asked if the police have a “volatile” relationship with the residents at 
Canfield Green, Wilson responded “it is an anti-police area for sure,” adding that the 
neighborhood tended to make him feel like he needed to be “on high alert.” He elaborates:  
There’s a lot of gangs that reside or associate with that area. There’s a lot of violence 
in that area, there’s a lot of gun activity, drug activity, it is just not a very well-liked 
community. That community doesn’t like the police...That’s not an area where you 
can take anything really lightly. Like I said, it is a hostile environment. There are 
good people over there, there really are, but I mean there is an influx of gang activity 
in that area. (Missouri State Grand Jury Volume V 238-239) 
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By contrast, speaking as a resident of Canfield Green, Johnson describes the neighborhood 
as a welcome escape from a more violent past. He remarks that now that he lives there, he 
walks his dog a lot and “[lives] a peaceful lifestyle,” describing Brown as well-liked and 
popular with neighborhood kids in Canfield Green as well. He characterizes Canfield Green 
as a place where residents look out for one another, saying it was common for people 
Brown’s age to come to him for advice precisely because he had managed to get out of a 
more violent past and establish a comfortable life for himself in Ferguson. (Missouri State 
Grand Jury Volume IV, 61-63) When both accounts of Canfield Green are evaluated side by 
side, one would be hard-pressed to identify that Wilson and Johnson are describing the same 
neighborhood. 
 Wilson’s description of Canfield Green maps to the open hostility residents 
perceived from police officers in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, hostility 
corroborated by the DOJ’s findings about widespread racial bias within the Ferguson Police 
Department (FPD) as a whole. Following Brown’s death, residents asserted that FPD 
officers overtly mishandled the crime scene, failing to cover Brown’s body with a sheet for 
hours and desecrating memorials set in the street for him by running them over with their 
cars and allowing their dogs to urinate on them. (Chang, We Gon’ Be Alright, 94). This 
egregious behavior is reflected in the DOJ’s finding that the FPD perpetuated a police 
culture marked by open anti-Black sentiment. Given the DOJ’s findings on the department 
from whence Wilson came, it is galling that like his other exaggerations, his description of 
Canfield Green is never cross-examined. Even though the shooting took place on a suburban 
cul-de-sac less than two miles from a country club, Wilson insists that majority-Black 
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Canfield Green is riddled with threats like gangs, drugs, and guns, all of which commonly 
come up in anti-urban narratives about the moral failures of urban space. 
 The DOJ’s report on the FPD describes a police culture in which revenues from fines 
and municipal court sentencing are prioritized over citizen well-being and in which open 
racial bias is used to justify the FPD’s excessively punitive and often unsafe treatment of 
Ferguson’s residents of color. The report identifies that “failure to hold officers accountable 
for misconduct” had been a known issue in the department “long before Michael Brown’s 
shooting death” (US DOJ, Ferguson Police Department 79) but little had ever been done to 
address it. Part IV of the report focuses specifically on how FPD routinely violated the law 
and undermined community trust when dealing with Black residents, naming Canfield 
Green as a specific example of an area for which “FPD has no community policing or 
community engagement plan” (US DOJ, Ferguson Police Department 87). The DOJ further 
notes that since Brown’s death, city and police officials “have realized that there are entire 
segments of the Ferguson community that they have never made an effort to know, 
especially African-Americans who live in large apartment complexes, including Canfield 
Green” and that little has been done to rectify this lack of outreach because officials have 
been “too quick to presume that outreach to more disconnected segments of the Ferguson 
community will be futile” (US DOJ, Ferguson Police Department 88). Coupled with the fact 
that despite Ferguson’s two-thirds Black population demographics, only four of FPD’s 54 
officers at the time of the shooting were Black, this refusal to engage large portions of 
Ferguson’s Black community suggests that entire swaths of the population were policed by 
white officers uninterested in serving or protecting them. FPD officers remained completely 
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unfamiliar with important parts of Ferguson’s urban fabric, allowing them to disregard entire 
neighborhoods as volatile and anti-police. 
 The fact that the DOJ could map the FPD’s biases to large apartment complexes with 
mostly Black populations is not immaterial, for it is precisely these complexes that defy the 
mediated image of suburban spaces like Ferguson as the domain of the white and affluent. 
Not only do the FPD’s biases speak to the racialized way urbanity is conceived by white 
suburbanites, but also they reveal how FPD officers mentally segregated Ferguson’s 
neighborhoods along color lines, seeing predominantly Black or low-income neighborhoods 
as separate from the Ferguson community broadly conceived. Given the way the DOJ 
explicitly identified Canfield Green as a blindspot for the FPD, it would seem that Wilson’s 
description of being “on high alert” when near Canfield Green, his assertion that gangs, 
drugs, and gun violence were common there, and his description of the neighborhood as 
anti-police all ought to have been taken into consideration when determining if Wilson’s 
fears about Brown were reasonable, yet his comments about the neighborhood remain a 
mere blip in his testimony. This suggests that the discourse of urban crisis has become 
normative enough in American society as to go unchallenged even when the consequences 
of accepting its rhetoric proves fatal. 
 Wilson’s testimony that Canfield Green was plagued by gangs, guns, and drugs 
reflects Macek’s assertion that “suburban antagonism toward the city manifests itself first of 
all as an obsessive fear of urban crime” (Macek 29). Wilson’s admission that Canfield Green 
is “not a very well-liked community,” the grand jury’s willingness to discount Canfield 
Green residents as witnesses, and FPD’s refusal to engage with the neighborhood 
undoubtedly point to a situation in which Canfield Green’s mostly Black residents are 
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regarded first as liars and potential criminals before Ferguson citizens. As Macek argues, 
this is because when the urban Other is viewed from the perspective of those with power, 
“no commonality, no communication, no shared experience or struggle is desirable or even 
possible; the only possible relation decent (white, suburban) people can have to such Others 
is to exclude, control, and confine them” (Macek 133). It is evident from the DOJ’s report 
on the FPD that this is how the residents of Canfield Green have been treated, revealing the 
relationship between a discourse of urban crisis and racially biased policing. 
 Though the DOJ did not find evidence enough to indict Wilson individually, there 
can be no doubt that his biases about Canfield Green and his assumptions about the types of 
activities young Black men might be engaged in there contributed to his nervousness in 
confronting Brown, not to mention the patronizing hostility Johnson recalled from Wilson 
long before shots were fired. Regardless of whether or not Wilson is culpable for the 
shooting, these biases assuredly played a role in his characterization of Brown’s aggression 
and physicality, his assumption that Brown was likely to be armed, and ultimately his 
evaluation that it would be reasonable to discharge his weapon so many times. In failing to 
indict Wilson, it would seem the DOJ never took these self-admitted biases into account, nor 
did they consider how Brown’s apparent hostility could stem from panic due to his inhabited 
knowledge of the FPD’s racial biases. The gap between the DOJ’s respective investigations 
of Wilson and the FPD reflects a willingness to absolve Wilson’s individual spatial bias 
even after identifying a pattern of racial bias in the department from which he came. Close 
readings of both DOJ reports as well as Wilson’s and Johnson’s grand jury testimonies 
illuminate how a discourse of urban crisis helps normalize white suburban panic about 
people of color, including people of color who do not live in properly urban neighborhoods. 
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Both Martin’s and Brown’s death demonstrate that far from existing as purely theoretical 
concerns, the consequences of widespread acceptance of both the suburbia simulacrum and 
the anti-urban moral panic that upholds it can be fatal. 
 
Moral Panic and the Urban Anti-Suburb 
Moral panic over the city recasts both urban space and people of color as inferior, 
prone to chaos, inherently dangerous, and in need of increasingly restrictive policing, all in 
an effort to assure white suburban residents of the superiority of suburban space and their 
security within it. This discourse of urban crisis directly benefits those economic actors who 
gain the most from the continued proliferation of suburban sprawl, making it useful for 
advancing both right-wing and neoliberal political agendas. Over the last half century in 
both the mainstream mass media and within American politics, moral panic narratives have 
helped create an urban/suburban dichotomy to which suburbanites have responded, as 
Macek clarifies, “with fear and a growing unease about an urban underclass seen as 
criminal, degenerate, violent, and a threat to the family-oriented way of life they cherish,” a 
reaction that is undoubtedly “rooted in suburbia’s culture of privatism and anti-urbanism” 
(Macek 35). Moral panic over the city--a direct ancillary to the suburbia simulacrum and the 
hegemony that attends it--can thus be characterized as an intentional equation of criminality, 
disease, and urban decay with all people of color, but especially with those who inhabit 
ghettoized urban neighborhoods or any other impoverished space where white people are a 
minority. 
 In the logic of suburban hegemony, the ghettoized inner-city and its predominantly 
Black and brown inhabitants are considered infectious agents that perpetually threaten 
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suburban homeostasis. Although Martin was shot by a suburban civilian and Brown by an 
official state actor, both Zimmerman and Wilson committed violence against young Black 
men and then justified it by appealing to a social dictum by which law and order in (white) 
suburban space is exerted through control over a supposed urban Other. Both men operated 
according to their unquestioned equation of young Black men with urban crime and had 
those biases deemed legally reasonable. And both benefited from a system of law and order 
in which Black bodies are preemptively deemed dangerous so as to justify any violence used 
against them, a system that takes its cues from a society now dominated by white suburban 
hegemony. Their cases reflect the degree to which the imagined safety and order of 
suburban spaces--even those suburban spaces, like Ferguson, which are no longer 
predominantly white--tends to take precedence over the bodily autonomy and basic human 
rights of people of color. Even where people of color are brutalized in properly urban 
spaces, they are often brutalized through practices of racial profiling that reflect an implicit 
drive to keep supposed urban criminality from ever bleeding into the (white) suburban 
spaces outside the urban core.  
The effects of mediated anti-urban narratives are especially harmful to residents of 
urban neighborhoods that can be considered ghettoized based on their poverty rate, 
population density, and the intentional segregation historically used to concentrate certain 
ethnic or racial populations within them. This is in part because the continued prominence of 
suburbia as a symbol of American prosperity depends on a reciprocal devaluation of the 
symbolic (non-white) urban inhabitant as Other and it is these ghettoized neighborhoods 
considered most Other to suburban ideals. Like the suburbia simulacrum, the discourse of 
urban crisis is also a mediated imaginary, created to reinforce the hegemony of a suburban 
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culture that has been mass-mediated since the onset of contemporary suburbanization. 
(Macek 34) Macek explains that panic over the city “was neither a simple reflex of the 
suburban mentality nor a realistic response to a genuine threat” but was instead “created, 
fueled, and organized by a right-wing discourse on the ‘urban crisis’ that supplied an 
ideological framework and a set of ideologically laden concepts for interpreting conditions 
in the inner city, one which both amplified suburban fears and gave them a decidedly 
reactionary spin. (Macek 36) He asserts that the ideological framework to which urban panic 
gave shape created a means by which “suburbia’s inchoate anxieties” could “be articulated 
in public debate, made self-conscious, rationalized, connected to a precise political agenda, 
woven into the prevailing cultural climate, and given a modicum of intellectual legitimacy” 
(Macek 36). Following a Foucauldian logic, mediated images of urban crisis were 
considered reliable knowledge in part because they were often transmitted by official 
channels that suburban residents trusted.12 In both fictional and news-based depictions of the 
city throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s in news broadcasts, television, film, and other media, “the 
neighborhoods housing the urban underclass were almost always depicted as chaotic, ruined, 
and repellent, the exact inverse of the orderly domestic idyll of the suburbs” (Macek 38). 
Urban crisis thus became an antithetical foil for the illusions of order and contentment 
reflected in images of suburbia. 
 Where the suburb as mediated through the suburbia simulacrum could be seen as 
hegemonically normative, moral panic over the city redefined urban space in negative 
relation to suburbia’s impossibly utopian characteristics. The suburbia simulacrum rendered 
                                                
12 Enumerating the various media channels that perpetuated discourses of urban crisis is the primary focus of 
Macek’s book Urban Nightmares: The Media, The Right, and the Moral Panic over the City (2006), where one 
can find numerous specific examples of individual broadcasts, speeches, publications, etc. that use its rhetoric. 
For further reading, I recommend his chapter “Crack Alleys and Killing Zones” for its thorough accounts of 
the role played by primetime news stations in disseminating anti-urban narratives. 
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urban space an anti-suburbia, the antithesis of the comfort and order suburbia is supposed to 
foster. Like the suburbia simulacrum, moral panic over the city virtually erased the racial 
coding undergirding its prominence, replacing it with castigation of the city as an 
environment. Macek argues that such racial coding “performs an important socio-
psychological function for the white middle class in that it...permits the expression of deeply 
felt anti-black and Latino sentiment with little self-consciousness or embarrassment,” 
allowing prominent figures (such as politicians, academics, and journalists) to perpetuate 
negative stereotypes about people of color while feigning a neutral distance from explicitly 
racist or classist language. (Macek 136) These coded notions of urbanity remain part of 
biased media reporting and dog-whistle politics to this day, evolving with the media 
landscape and becoming integrated into digital forms of media. As such, perpetrators of 
racially motivated violence often attempt to use these code terms to excuse their crimes or 
otherwise appeal to the necessity of maintaining law and order over chaotic so-called urban 
dangers. Moreover, this coded equation of non-whiteness with urban criminality explains 
how even people of color who do not come from urban neighborhoods may still find 
themselves subjected to racial discrimination that follows anti-urban sentiments. 
Many of the coded terms used in anti-urban narratives are simply negative re-
significations of terms already considered specific to urban space. This includes the word 
“urban” itself, but also includes term like “shady,” “gangster,” “hood,” “thug,” and “ghetto,” 
among many others. Still other terms, such as “underclass,” “superpredator,” and “welfare 
queen” were created by the media explicitly for the purpose of sensationalizing urban crime 
and fomenting moral panic. (Macek 136) Even city names can be turned into anti-urban 
coding, such as the shorthand use of Chicago or Baltimore to indicate urban space overrun 
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by criminality. Such terms are most often deployed in ways that offer speakers a modicum 
of deniability about the racist assumptions underlying their sentiments. Further, while laws 
against hate speech and social norms of liberal civility often prevent the use of more overtly 
racist terms,13 there is far less collective resistance to characterizations of urban residents as 
welfare queens, vagrants, crack heads, or gangster thugs, despite the way the media has used 
all four terms to specifically depict people of color.14 While people of color are the primary 
targets of this coded messaging, anti-urban bias also extends to single mothers, the severely 
impoverished, queer and trans people, the homeless, the undocumented, and those forced 
into illegal or otherwise precarious forms of work, such as prostitution, particularly where 
any such status intersects with one’s non-white racial or ethnic identity.  
 Though statistics suggest that both ghettoization and economic deprivation of urban 
neighborhoods with large populations of color have been purposeful and planned, blame for 
the diminished quality of life residents of these neighborhoods face has too often been 
heaped upon the landscape itself. The infrastructural, political, and social devaluation of the 
city is a predictable consequence of any mass urban out-migration as substantial as was 
white flight, yet idealized characterizations of suburban space have allowed suburban 
residents to presume that the hardships of contemporary urban life are problems of the city 
itself, not a result of concentrated anti-urban social and political action. Beyond its clear 
racial motivation, white flight by means of suburban migration was often marketed as a way 
for the affluent to escape an urban space perceived as too chaotic and dangerous to raise a 
family or foster copacetic communities. Consequently, the assumption that urban decay has 
                                                
13 Admittedly, the prevalent public use of overtly racist words has increased due to the rise of Trumpism, 
though there is not space enough within the current scope of inquiry to make this claim definitively. 
14 See Macek’s chapter “Crack Alleys and Killing Zones.” 
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continued unchecked ever since contemporary suburbanization began underpins the 
discourse on urban crisis, particularly among suburbanites whose interactions with city 
spaces are limited to mediated narratives of the urban environment. While this assumption 
does prove true in many cities, the causes of continued urban deprivation often get ignored 
precisely because moral panic narratives help hide the true social causes or urban decay. The 
result is that anti-urban narratives continue to portray the city as a crisis space in desperate 
need of restored social order, an assumption belied by the way affluent white enclaves 
within urban environments (Beverly Hills, New York’s Upper West Side) have continued to 
fare just fine. When viewed through a suburban lens, the diminished quality of life faced by 
populations of color who remain in the city seems logical, predictable, inevitable, and 
perhaps most worryingly, deserved. Coupled with the American tendency towards 
individualism and the dominant neoliberal belief that economic opportunity is equally meted 
out among American citizen, the prevailing suburban mindset seems to be that if urban 
residents wanted a better life, they would work hard and move to the suburbs as well. The 
blatant fallacy of this logic is of course premised on ignorance about the numerous ways that 
even affluent urban residents of color have historically been shut out from suburbanization. 
 Because mainstream media’s moral panic narratives throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s 
helped reify images of moral panic over urban space, they also helped support conservative 
pushes for greater privatization and individualism in American politics. These narratives 
continue into the present day even as the types of mass media with which people engage 
have evolved. For this reason, moral panic over the city can be linked to the political 
foothold afforded neoliberal ideologies over the past half century. Though both neoliberal 
ideology and the discourse of urban crisis seemingly support conservative more than liberal 
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politics, Macek clarifies that “the discourse on the urban crisis and the moral panic it 
produced helped forge a new right-wing consensus on the city’s ills that reached beyond the 
right’s traditional constituencies and became the ideological common ground of both major 
political parties” (Macek 131). Consequently, “it has helped to forge hegemony in the 
Gramscian sense of creating a platform and political vision uniting heterogenous political 
aspirations and identities” (Macek 131). This rightward political movement also reflects 
how powerful the suburban voting bloc has become over the same period, especially given 
that suburban residents of all political persuasions tend to serve their own interests first and 
foremost.15 On the academic end during this same period, racist anti-urban political 
ideologies were advanced by the likes of Charles Murray, Dinesh D’Souza, and William 
Bennett, all of whom used harmfully unscientific evidence to blame urban decline on the 
moral decrepitude and assumed natural inadequacy of Black and brown people. Rather than 
being tossed aside, both Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton alike embraced these men’s ideas 
in shaping their urban political policies.16 By suggesting that the problems ghettoized 
neighborhoods face are the result of residents of colors’ moral failures rather than forced 
social conditions, such thinkers posited that impoverished urban residents were responsible 
for their own diminished quality of life. Once policy makers and media outlets embraced 
these flawed academic ideas as legitimate, their toxic assumptions came to be seen more and 
more as objective fact. 
                                                
15 “With the exception of their support for programs that aid the elderly like Medicare and Social Security, 
suburbanites largely oppose ‘big government’ and favor instead a politics of extreme privatism and atomistic 
individualism.” (Macek 33) 
16 See Macek’s second chapter, “Inventing the Savage Urban Other,” for in-depth explanations of the ideas 
published by each of the thinkers mentioned. As Macek elaborates, all three were cited by prominent 
politicians as influential in shaping their urban policies. 
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 Moral panic narratives often portray urban residents as unmotivated and lazy, an 
entire underclass generation leeching off a system that suburban residents believe should be 
serving their own more worthy communities. (Macek 68-70) This line of thinking helped 
spurn suburban support for neoliberal disinvestment in urban social infrastructures and 
public services from the 1980s onward. Simultaneously, it “limited the potential for 
urban/suburban alliances around demands for such common goals as more jobs, a cleaner 
environment, universal health insurance, affordable housing, higher wages, and better 
schools” (Macek 133). While there is nothing new about the capitalist strategy of keeping 
the working poor from coming to class consciousness, the neoliberal turn helped concretize 
political divisions along urban/suburban and white/non-white lines and then, through coded 
rhetoric, masked the way the former division was used as a stand-in for the latter. Macek 
writes that in characterizing the urban poor as “shiftless and lazy,” the right-wing discourse 
of urban crisis “implies that the suburban and the affluent are the opposite--responsible and 
hard-working,” assuring that “the plight of the inner-city residents [can be seen] as self-
inflicted,” thus reinforcing the type of individualism that so benefited neoliberal policies. 
(Macek 131) Once individualism came to be seen as the highest American virtue, suburban 
voters paradoxically viewed anti-urban policies as a kindness that discouraged dependence 
on the state and created harsher punishments for forms of criminality and disorder perceived 
as resulting from a lack of discipline. Moral panic over the city provided ideological 
justification for neoliberal privatization and individualism in ways that made suburban 
voters believe these policies served the greater good, even when and where such changes 
proved detrimental to their own interests, let alone those of urban residents. 
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 Divestment in urban infrastructure and social services throughout the Reagan era was 
matched with increased military spending and an attendant increase and militarization of 
police forces, all marketed as necessary steps to protect the suburban masses from a poor 
urban underclass viewed as beyond reform. The moral panic used to rationalize such efforts 
assured that even as public support for even the most basic social services and needs of 
urban populations dwindled, these same populations increasingly found themselves the 
scapegoated targets of a “victim-blaming discourse on the city” that Macek suggests 
constituted a “Gramscian struggle for hegemony” (Macek 40). Since the funding cut for 
urban social programs often got diverted to police to support their efforts at maintaining law 
and order over a supposedly criminal urban underclass, these policies directly contributed to 
increasingly authoritarian police brutality in ghettoized urban neighborhoods.  
 To provide but one example, the LAPD utilized the so-called war on drugs to 
influence voters to support police funding throughout the ‘80s. Towards the end of the 
decade, they established a Gang Related Active Trafficker Suppression (GRATS) program 
and used this new force to profile anyone they suspected might be a gang member, basing 
their stops ostensibly on “their dress or their use of gang hand signals” (Davis, City of 
Quartz, 272). When these efforts failed to curtail gang activity, Police Chief Daryl Gates17 
requested yet more funding to support the LAPD in what he called Operation HAMMER. In 
1988, Operation HAMMER engaged in a raid on a group of apartments on Dalton Street in 
South Central that resulted in only two minor drug arrests. During the raid, residents 
reported being beat with fists and “long steel flashlights” while the police attempted to 
render the apartments uninhabitable by “throwing washing machines into bathtubs, pouring 
                                                
17 Daryl Gates would later be at the center of controversy about the demonstrated racial bias of the LAPD 
surrounding the beating of Rodney King in 1991. 
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bleach over clothes, smashing walls and furniture with sledgehammers and axes, and ripping 
an outside stairwell away from one building” while also engaging in petty forms of 
vandalism like “[spraypainting] the walls with slogans, such as ‘LAPD Rules’” (Davis, City 
of Quartz, 276). The damage was so extreme that the Red Cross extended disaster relief to 
displaced residents, yet when confronted, the officers responsible for the raid attempted to 
claim that the damage was “gang-inflicted” (Davis, City of Quartz, 276).  The Dalton Street 
episode reflects a particularly egregious example of the way moral panic over the city 
couples victim-blaming rhetorics with an appeal to law-and-order politics to justify 
increased policing of urban populations in ways that often increase the likelihood of police 
brutality. 
 In City of Quartz (1989), Mike Davis describes Los Angeles in the late ‘80s as a 
space in which “the contemporary Gang scare has become an imaginary class relationship, a 
terrain of pseudo-knowledge and fantasy projection” (Davis, City of Quartz, 270). Within 
this social climate, suburban fears that gang criminality might escape their ghettoized spatial 
confines justified harmful misapplication of law-and-order justice not just in Los Angeles, 
but in cities all over the country. (Davis, City of Quartz, 270) Simultaneously, Davis asserts, 
the mass media routinely used descriptions of gang violence as a “voyeuristic titillation to 
white suburbanites devouring lurid imagery in their newspapers and on television” (Davis, 
City of Quartz, 270). In framing stories of gang violence in ways meant to increase news 
consumption more than report facts, the mass media benefitted from feeding suburban fears 
and sensationalizing gang violence while at the same time diminishing the chances that the 
social issues affecting neighborhoods would be addressed outside of increased application of 
state violence. When one considers that suburbanites are the target audience of mainstream 
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mass media, it becomes clear that anti-urban fear-mongering was always concerned more 
with manipulating suburban viewers than with documenting the problems facing urban 
neighborhoods. It helped secure the continued devotion of suburban residents to the status 
quo by repeatedly invoking the dangers faced by those Others who lived outside their space, 
making it that much less likely that suburbanites would question the implied superiority of 
suburban space. 
 Where the media portrays suburban space vis a vis the suburbia simulacrum as 
controllable, affluent, morally virtuous, and marked by law and order, mediated portrayals 
of urban space offer the inverse image: the mediated urban is chaotic, impoverished, morally 
corrupt, and marked by an unruly disregard for law and order that is above all characterized 
by a desire to victimize affluent white bodies. While on the one hand such portrayals bias 
suburban residents against the urban environment, they also discourage suburban interaction 
with urban residents of color, thereby precluding the possibility of mass recognition of how 
little urban crisis narratives reflect the everyday lives of urban residents of color. The more 
the media portrayed urban space in derogatory ways, the less likely it became that 
suburbanites would even visit, let alone move to, neighborhoods increasingly depicted as the 
criminal and chaotic domain of populations of color. As a result, few suburban residents 
developed an understanding of ghettoized urban neighborhoods outside of media portrayals 
and second-hand knowledge, compounding suburban racial bias while also contributing to 
greater suburban isolation. Macek writes that “dependence on the media for knowledge of 
the urban ‘Other’ by itself generates a psychological distance between the suburbs and the 
cities…[that is] compounded by the fact that the stories the media tell about urban existence 
are often alarming or derogatory and tend to feed into and reaffirm the agoraphobic leanings 
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of the contemporary suburban outlook” (Macek 35). This psychological distance helped 
reinforce suburban attachment to a “privatized, home-centered life” that in turn benefitted 
the mass media by making television, newspapers, and more recently, social media, the 
preferred forms of suburban cultural engagement. (Macek 35) Moreover, by glorifying the 
safety of suburban space and ignoring its own dangers, these narratives helped prevent 
widespread consideration of new, alternative spatial configurations and living arrangements 
outside suburbanization models, thus perpetuating the negative effects of suburban sprawl.18 
In her book Civil Racism: The 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion and the Crisis of Racial 
Burnout (2016), Lynn Mie Itagaki considers the way the media has historically portrayed 
Los Angeles’ populations of color as violent and incivil. She posits that the mediated 
polarization of urban and suburban space is built into a racialized binary of civility and 
incivility, where suburban space is cast as the natural domain of civilized society and urban 
space is rendered comparatively wild and uncivilized. One place that Itagaki identifies these 
binaries bleeding into mediated racial bias is in mass media coverage of protests and 
demonstrations. While protests by white people are generally seen as peaceful and civil even 
when they turn violent, even non-violent protests by people of color have historically been 
considered incivil and violent. As with moral panic narratives generally, policymakers and 
mass media outlets alike help maintain the status quo by characterizing protests by people of 
color as “the gateway to destructive violence,” and they do so by “[deeming] threatening 
even peaceful or non-violent protests for the way they physically or sonically take up shared 
                                                
18 The more that gentrification continues, the more this tendency seems to be inverting, where affluent white 
residents again feel comfortable returning to gentrified urban spaces, and the urban poor who have been 
displaced from gentrified urban spaces are increasingly moving to older/cheaper suburbs that had previously 
been closed off to them. However, this new dynamic does little to change the prominence of media messaging 
that suggests that spaces predominantly inhabited by people of color ought to be considered off-limits or no-go 
zones for the affluent white population. 
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spaces or create a so-called climate of violence” (Itagaki xii). In the case of both the 2014 
Ferguson protests following Wilson’s acquittal and the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion, reports 
of looting, rioting, and violence dominated the media’s coverage of events. While in both 
instances these reports were not factually untrue, there’s evidence to suggest that these 
activities only took place within small pockets of much larger non-violent demonstrations.  
Moreover, even where violence did occur within these larger demonstrations, it was 
violence that responded to a predominant feeling of voicelessness in the face of state 
violence against people of color that, unlike looting and rioting, gets dismissed as justified 
and normal. Itagaki writes: 
Detractors of protests often fail to acknowledge how peace and civility require force 
and violence. And often, the peace and civility enjoyed by some rests on the force 
and violence directed at many more others, whether by heavily policing specific 
communities, imprisoning more people, or transferring resources from the bottom to 
the top. In delegitimizing and vilifying protest, its critics cast this violence that 
upholds the status quo as just, fair, and democratic. (xii) 
Itagaki goes on to argue that since the mainstream media and those with power control the 
channels by which news of protests is disseminated, they also dictate public perceptions 
about the level of threat a given protest poses. This allows them to admonish the protest 
actions of some while uplifting the protest actions of others, even when the actual actions 
undertaken are the same.19 Such racially motivated characterization of protests by people of 
                                                
19 To provide one indicative example, following the 2018 Super Bowl, groups of predominantly white fans of 
the victorious Philadelphia Eagles tore through Philadelphia engaging in looting, arson, and destruction of 
property. However, unlike in the case of the 2014 Ferguson protests or the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion, media 
outlets largely characterized these behaviors as “rowdy celebrations” (“Philadelphia fans set fire, damage 
property after Super Bowl win,” Reuters, 5 February 2018) by “revelers” (Andrew Parent, “Seven more 
revelers arrested after Eagles Super Bowl celebration.” Philly Voice, 7 February 2018). 
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color as violent and incivil is part and parcel of the depiction of ghettoized spaces as 
domains of incivility.  
Itagaki’s focus on the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion is a useful flashpoint for this 
issue because it constituted one of the earliest examples of a massive demonstration of 
unrest within urban public space aimed at policies and tensions directly influenced by a 
discourse of urban crisis. Moreover, the mass media’s frequent comparisons of Ferguson in 
2014 to Los Angeles in 1992 reflect how prevalent moral panic narratives remain to this 
day, since the media still uses the 1992 Rebellion as a demonstrative example of the 
destructive potential of urban populations of color. In City of Quartz, which was published 
three years before the ‘92 Rebellion, Los Davis characterized racial tensions in Los Angeles 
as a situation in which “the spectre of the Black criminal underclass has begun to augment, 
even replace, the Red Menace as the satanic ‘Other’ which justifies the trampling of civil 
liberties” (Davis, City of Quartz, 289-290). Davis extensively maps the numerous social 
factors that negatively affected everyday life for Black and Latinx Los Angeles residents at 
the end of the ‘80s, noting in particular that LA’s ghettoized South Central neighborhoods 
were unsurprisingly those hit hardest by the de-industrialization of Los Angeles’ labor 
markets during this same period, leaving a generation of urban youth socially isolated with 
few employment prospects. The militarized policing of the LAPD in the era of Operation 
HAMMER simultaneously posed a threat to young people of color who attempted to find 
alternative means of survival within these conditions. “Without the mobilized counterweight 
of angry protest,” Davis writes, “Southcentral LA has been betrayed by virtually every level 
of government” (Davis, City of Quartz, 309). In City of Quartz, Davis presciently predicts 
that police brutality and anti-urban sentiment will only continue to proliferate over time 
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unless something is done to address the pressing needs of residents in LA’s ghettoized South 
Central neighborhoods. Writing in 1989 that “a whole generation is being shunted towards 
some impossible Armageddon,” Davis read the proverbial tea leaves of the tensions that 
would find a breaking point in the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion. 
 In 2012, Davis’ essay “A Tale of Two Riots” compared the ‘92 Rebellion to the 
1965 Watts Rebellion, noting that unlike in 1965, there was “no official interest in 
unpacking the separate but convergent causes of 1992, or looking at the mass repression and 
violation of civil liberties that followed” (Davis, A Tale of Two Riots). He also observes that 
while most of the people arrested during the rebellion were not Black, the media narrative 
focused on “black gangs looting the city” and arranged their reporting around this urban 
spectre. (Davis, A Tale of Two Riots). He chastises the media’s lackadaisical approach to 
reporting on events in 1992, noting that they relied either on paraphrased reports from police 
or on what they could see from news helicopters so as to avoid entering the neighborhoods 
affected. Recalling his own experiences on the day of the event, Davis notes that while he 
did see “looting and some arson” there was “no violence” (Davis, A Tale of Two Riots).  
Davis’ characterization of the way the police and the media handled the ‘92 Rebellion 
resonates with the situation following protests in Ferguson, reflecting Itagaki’s conclusion 
that because racist anti-urban narratives have yet to be eradicated, Americans continue to 
“rehearse old ways of racist knowing and must struggle for an antiracist becoming” (Itagaki 
225). But since even peaceful protest from urban residents of color is seen as violent 
incivility, this struggle for an antiracist becoming must include an effort to create resistant 
counter-narratives that dismantle the discourse on urban crisis and the racialized 
assumptions that underpin it, potentiating new understanding of inhabited urban space. It 
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stands to reason that such counter-narratives must center the voices of those most demonized 
by anti-urban moral panic, for it is only first-hand knowledge of life in ghettoized 
neighborhoods that can supplant the wild speculations of second-hand characterization.  In 
the Los Angeles of which Davis wrote in City of Quartz, within the same social conditions 
that preempted the ‘92 Rebellion, at the height of the discourse on urban crisis, one art form 
found its cause for genesis precisely in the need to advance first-hand knowledge of 
inhabited life in South Central LA. That art form was gangsta rap. 
 
Straight Outta (Mediated) Compton 
 “You are now about to witness the strength of street knowledge.” (N.W.A.)20 So 
declares Dr. Dre on the opening to “Straight Outta Compton,” the first song on the 1988 
N.W.A. (N***az With Attitude) album of the same name. The album is largely considered 
the first contribution to the hip-hop subgenre that would later be known as gangsta rap.21 
Though hip-hop as a whole finds its origins in places ranging from New York City to 
Jamaica, the origins of gangsta rap are deeply tied to the experiences of Black and Latinx 
residents in Los Angeles’ East and South Central neighborhoods from the late ‘80s onward. 
As Jeff Chang illuminates in Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop Generation 
(2005), South Central in the 1980s was “the epitome of a growing number of inner-city 
nexuses where deindustrialization, devolution, Cold War adventurism, the drug trade, gang 
structures and rivalries, arms profiteering, and police brutality were combining to destabilize 
poor communities and alienate massive numbers of youths” (Chang, Can’t Stop, 317). 
                                                
20 For this and subsequent music albums analyzed, I cite the album only on first mention. All subsequent 
references to song lyrics from the album come from the initial cited source unless otherwise indicated. 
21 Alternatively, the genre sometimes gets called gangster rap or hardcore rap. 
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Emerging from within this environment, gangsta rap “captured the feel of the serpentine 
twists of daily inner-city life on the hair-trigger margin” (Chang, Can’t Stop, 317) moving 
from an underground economy of mixtape cassettes and AM radio to become a major force 
in the mainstream music industry within the course of a decade. From the start, the genre 
fulfilled Dr. Dre’s declaration, acting as a narrative form concerned first and foremost with 
knowledge of life on the streets of South Central. 
 The genre likely got its moniker due to the themes investigated on Straight Outta 
Compton, which included the titular track as well as the genre-defining (and conservative-ire 
inducing) anthems “Boyz-N-the-Hood” and “Fuck Tha Police.” The album’s unprecedented 
success made the various members of N.W.A. (Eazy-E, Ice Cube, MC Ren, Dr. Dre, and DJ 
Yella) founding fathers in Los Angeles’ hip-hop legacy. Parting ways with the respectability 
politics that had characterized Black resistance throughout the 1960’s civil rights era, 
gangsta rap rejected the polite civility required to appeal to white mainstream audiences. A 
shared tendency among gangsta rappers towards the obscene, the visceral, and the bombastic 
created a musical aesthetic for gangsta rap that intentionally alienated itself from 
mainstream media channels, at least initially,22 so as to create a space for stories of urban 
street life that was separate from white cultural production. In an interview with hip-hop 
historian Brian Cross, Dr. Dre cites Richard Pryor and Blowfly, both figures who used shock 
and obscenity to push the envelope and avoid mainstream radio suitability, as major 
influences on N.W.A.’s sounds, saying: “I wanted to make people go: ‘Oh shit, I can’t 
believe he’s sayin’ that shit.’ I wanted to go all the way left, everybody trying to do this 
                                                
22 Though gangsta rap continues to have an underground scene, its period of being completely underground 
was relatively short-lived because of the quick rate at which it gained commercial success among youth 
audiences, including white youth. As soon as mainstream channels recognized gangsta rap as a force for 
generating income, they altered their propriety standards to integrate the genre, albeit usually by highlighting 
the tamest tracks and censoring some of the language. 
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black power and shit, so I was like let’s give ‘em an alternative, n***er, n***ern***er 
n***ern***er fuck this fuck that bitch bitch bitch bitch suck my dick, all this kind of shit, 
you know what I’m saying?” (Cross 197). Driven partially by a desire to entertain and 
partially by a desire to give gangsta rap “subcultural legitimacy,” (Quinn 89) Dr. Dre and the 
rest of N.W.A. gleefully pushed back against the idea that they must follow the rules of 
white civility to have their voices heard.23 
 As Itagaki has articulated, civility and incivility are largely dependent on a white 
hegemonic conception of violence where violence is considered acceptable if it maintains 
the status quo and unacceptable if it threatens it. In exaggerating Black incivility to its 
furthest extension through brutal rhetorics of violence and anger, gangsta rap highlighted the 
disparity between the way urban Black bodies are depicted in moral panic narratives and the 
way unrepentant Black criminality would look if urban populations actually embraced it. On 
“Boyz-N-The-Hood,” Eazy-E raps about leaving the house with a Mac-10 pistol strapped to 
his hip, riding around town “jockin’ the bitches, slappin’ the hoes,” getting into deadly 
skirmishes with members of rival gangs, and enduring violent altercations with hostile cops. 
The narrative culminates in a courtroom scene in which Eazy’s girlfriend shows up with a 
“sub-machine Uzi,” recalling an event in the early 1970s in which a young Black prisoner 
named Jonathan Jackson showed up to the courtroom in which he was set to testify with an 
assault rifle. Jackson’s actions followed his transfer from Soledad Prison to San Quentin 
Prison, a move that posed the threat of the gas chamber at a time when even minor 
                                                
23 Though I do not undertake a lengthy investigation of Chicano rap, choosing instead to focus specifically on 
the relationship between Black Angeleno experience and gangsta rap, it is worth noting that similar pushes for 
urban counter-narratives were prominent within the Chicanx community in Los Angeles at this time. A more 
broad investigation of the role Chicanx rap played in re-authoring Los Angeles according to inhabited 
experience can be found in Pancho McFarland’s Chicano Rap: Gender and Violence in the Postindustrial 
Barrio (2008). 
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altercations with prison guards usually meant harsher punishments for Black inmates. On the 
day of the trial, Jackson took a judge, multiple jurors and a district attorney hostage before 
marching all to a van outside. The consequent barrage of gunfire between him and police 
resulted in multiple deaths, including Jackson’s. As Chang argues, whether intentional or 
not, the lyrics to “Boyz-n-the-Hood” called to mind Jackson’s fate and the song “became an 
anthem for the fatherless, brotherless, state-assaulted, heavily armed West Coast urban 
youth, a generation of Jonathan Jacksons” (Chang, Can’t Stop 306). “Boyz-n-the-Hood” was 
a metaphorical assault on a justice system against which young Black men had little to no 
power, and its flagrant gestures toward incivility critiqued the concept that a culture that 
tolerates such injustice can be considered civil at all.  
 Inverting the courtroom scene in “Boyz-n-the-Hood,”  “Fuck tha Police” opens with 
a narrative in which “Judge Dre” presides over the prosecution of the LAPD by his fellow 
N.W.A. members. As Ice Cube takes the stand, Dre asks: “Do you swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help your black ass?” Following this oath, the song 
is fashioned as a series of truth-telling testimonies by N.W.A.’s members, each speaking to 
the police brutality that has become part of everyday life in Compton. Dre’s call to tell 
nothing but the truth speaks to the testimonial character of gangsta rap as a medium to 
counter the comparatively false narratives of mediated moral panic over the city; gangsta 
rap’s characteristic gestures toward authenticity and the proverbial imperative to keep it real 
are outgrowths of this early testimonial drive. On “Fuck tha Police,” Ice Cubes asserts  “A 
young n***a got it bad ‘cause I’m brown/And not the other color, so police think/They have 
the authority to kill a minority,” observing that even when an officer is Black, “they’ll slam 
you down to the street top” because they’re “showing out for a white cop”. Later, MC Ren 
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notes that because “the n***as on the street is a majority,” the police fear the urban Other 
and use that fear to excuse brutality. Rather than rejecting this fear as bias, Ren instead gives 
the police a reason to be afraid, taunting an officer with “But take off the gun so you can see 
what’s up / And we’ll go at it punk, and I’ma fuck you up!” Throughout the song, various 
members threaten violence against the police, an aspect of the song that made it seem so 
incendiary at the time of its release that it inspired the FBI to create initiatives urging 
concert venues to not let the group perform it live. (Quinn 108) The irony, of course, is that 
all of the anti-police violence threatened in the song is framed as retaliation against anti-
Black police brutality and a justice system in which Black lives are considered expendable. 
Towards the end of the song, Eazy E notes that “my identity by itself causes violence,” yet 
the violence to which he refers is not that of the criminal or gangster but that of the state. 
These two songs, and Straight Outta Compton as a whole, became a sonic, aesthetic, and 
political ground zero for all gangsta rap that came after. 
Chang argues that as a moniker, gangsta rap “[named] the theatrics and the threat, 
the liberating wordsound power and the internalized oppression, the coolest rebellion and 
the latest pathology, the new Black poetry and the ‘new punk rock’” (Chang, Can’t Stop 
320). The obscenity of gangsta rap narratives demonstrated the genre’s rejection of white 
mainstream culture with an aggressive force that lent itself to making political demands. But 
obscenity was also a major selling point of a genre that quickly came to represent youth 
rebellion in much the same way that punk rock had done a decade before. Like punk, 
gangsta rap helped foment a rebellion grounded in the street knowledge and experiences of 
disenchanted Los Angeles youths of color who felt cut off from mainstream society. It also 
projected a fantasy of instant gratification for a generation accustomed to being denied. 
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Chang writes: “If the thing was protest, they would toss the ideology and go straight to the 
riot. If the thing was sex, they would chuck the seduction and go straight to the fuck” 
(Chang, Can’t Stop 318). As such, it helped shape an urban counter-narrative in which gang 
life was celebrated rather than denigrated. As Dre alludes at the opening of “Straight Outta 
Compton,” gangsta rap became a way to give a voice to all the street knowledge that forces 
of power would rather keep silent, but it did so within a viscerally satisfying package in 
which Black urban anger was never silenced. The genre spoke simultaneously of the 
precarity of life in South Central and the hyper-masculine hardness that life in these spaces 
seemed to demand of young Black men, becoming a medium for helping explain the 
interrelatedness of Black anger and urban deprivation. 
 Despite its obscenities and consequent lack of mainstream promotion, gangsta rap 
quickly gained traction with mainstream audiences, including young white suburban kids 
hoping to live vicariously through the rebellion gangsta rap espoused. The more marketable 
the genre became, the quicker the white-dominated music industry shifted its expectations to 
carve out room for a genre quickly proving itself to be a financial windfall. While 
white/bourgeois acceptance of gangsta rap represented a seismic shift in popular musical 
sensibilities among American youth, it also anesthetized the genre of much of its 
underground credibility and blunted some of its discursive potential. By the late ‘90s, Dr. 
Dre and other gangsta rap figures like Jay-Z and Sean “Diddy” Combs had launched 
veritable musical empires that beget entire multi-million dollar lifestyle brands, a far cry 
from the hardened urban poverty about which early gangsta rappers sang. The shift towards 
gangsta rap mega-wealth evoked all the neoliberal romance of an urban rags-to-riches 
narrative and these sorts of stories quickly became part of the genre’s narrative tradition. 
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Stories of rap prosperity mirrored the individualism of suburban ideals and the patriarchal 
capitalism of the very music industry to which gangsta rap had once seemed a dramatic 
counterpoint, ultimately limiting some of the genre’s discursive force. This was not entirely 
unintentional, since the members of N.W.A. were always keenly aware that rebellion sells 
record and made music in part because of what rap historian Eithne Quinn describes as  “the 
increased pressure on impoverished urban places to adopt an entrepreneurial stance” (Quinn 
82) As Dr. Dre notes in his interview with Cross: “It ain’t about who’s the hardest, it’s about 
who makes the best record, as a matter of fact it ain’t even about that, it’s about who sells 
the most records. It’s not about I’m harder than you, it’s about record sales” (Cross 197). 
Gangsta rap paradoxically rejected the mainstream media and civil white society while 
recreating the same capitalist models that upheld both, albeit in ways meant to primarily 
benefit a Black populace excluded from traditional commercial channels.  As underground 
credibility gave way to commercial success, gangsta rap “curiously exaggerated the very 
capitalist dynamics that were proving so detrimental to poor urban communities” (Quinn 
67). In so doing, they allowed their narratives to be utilized in ways that reinforced some of 
the basest and most harmful assumptions about urban Black youth advanced by the 
discourse of urban crisis. 
 In the three decades since its emergence and owing in large part to its continued 
marketability with white listeners, gangsta rap has become a medium more often for creating 
commercially successful superstars than for voicing dissent: by 2018, Dr. Dre had a net 
worth of $770 million (Bowman) and his protege, Snoop Dogg, has become more widely 
recognizable for his collaborative television work with white lifestyle icon Martha Stewart 
than for his rap. Where dissent persists in gangsta rap today, it is usually driven into the 
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genre’s underground scenes. Gangsta rap’s contemporary status as a capitalistic juggernaut 
makes it is easy for one to lose sight of its original role as a primal scream venting the 
frustrations of the urban oppressed. No doubt, mass media’s early panic about gangsta rap’s 
surging popularity concerned the way it was assumed to be an unabashed confirmation of 
suburban fears about urban criminality. By engaging in what Quinn has called “ghetto 
mythologizing” (Quinn 67), gangsta rappers capitalized on the very images intended to harm 
them, refiguring them as forms of subcultural capital that could be used to authenticate their 
own claims of gangster criminality. When Ice Cube, a man who had never even been in a 
gang, claimed that he had a “crime record like Charles Manson” on “Straight Outta 
Compton,” even the exaggerated nature of the statement might have seemed to reflect some 
degree of truth to suburbanites steeped in moral panic narratives. However, by the 2010s, 
when figures like Dr. Dre and Ice Cube had proven to be more entrepreneurs than hardcore 
gangsters, it became easier for suburban audiences to recognize the exaggerations contained 
within gangsta rap lyrics. As the sensationalism of older gangsta rap narratives became 
increasingly recognizable, it became harder for gangsta rappers to weave in testimonies of 
urban truth and have them taken seriously. Ironically, this reduced the capacity for the 
medium to resist anti-urban moral panic narratives about urban life and gangs, even if this 
had been one of the original aims of the genre. 
 Though early gangsta rap’s capitalistic commercial models were necessitated by the 
very social conditions against which gangsta rap narratives staged resistance, it is precisely 
this devotion to capital gain that by the twenty-first century had blunted its use as resistant 
art. One reason for this might be the way that commercial success geographically distanced 
successful rappers from the very neighborhoods they claimed to represent by providing them 
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the money to move elsewhere. Another reason concerns the way gangsta rap narratives 
unknowingly bolstered the same anti-urban discourses that helped cement individualism and 
neoliberal capitalism as hegemonic ideals from the Reagan era onward because, as Chang 
writes, “with its claims to street authenticity, its teen rebellion, its extension of urban 
stereotype, and its individualist ‘get mine’ credo, gangsta rap fit hand-in-glove with a 
multiculti youth demographic weaned on racism and Reaganism” (Chang, Can’t Stop 320). 
Having been denied traditional routes into the music business, artists like N.W.A. simply 
created their own versions of the same profit-driven mindset that motivated the larger music 
industry. Knowing full well that their claims to criminal authenticity were exaggerations, 
N.W.A. recognized the need for a “marketable place-image” (Quinn 72) around which 
gangsta rappers could stage their claims to authentic belonging. They found it in the 
mythologization of Compton as a sensationalized catch-all representation for all of South 
Central LA. 
 Though N.W.A.’s narratives about Compton did contain elements of the urban truth-
telling they claimed was central to their work, their larger-than-life stories were calculated 
amalgamation of Black entertainment tropes that Cross describes as a “charade” meant to 
reflect the worst fears and assumptions about urban Black men in a “tragic comedy of 
everyday life” (Cross 37). Even N.W.A.’s main claim to authenticity was a farce--they 
weren’t so much “straight outta Compton,” as from a variety of neighborhoods surrounding 
Compton, and not one of them was a gang member. Cross suggests that since the figurative 
landscape of gangsta rap need only serve as a shorthand term for Black LA in general, 
“Compton was almost an arbitrary choice - it could have been Watts, Long Beach, 
Lynwood, Downey or Willowbrook,” and Compton was likely chosen for the lyricism of the 
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name more than anything else, since it “was created as a reply to the construction of the 
south Bronx/Queensbridge nexus in New York...it was an attempt to figure Los Angeles on 
the map of hiphop” (Cross 37). But gangsta Compton was also what Quinn describes as an 
“imagined community” 24 in that it could be “transplanted, with varying degrees of self-
consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a wide 
variety of political and ideological constellations” (Quinn 75-76). The idea of Compton as 
an imaginary stage upon which gangsta rap narratives could play out is reflected in one of 
Dr. Dre’s statements to Cross: “It’s not really a matter of where people come from, it’s a 
matter of talent. I could have been from fuckin’ Missouri...Compton exists in many ways in 
the music to sell records” (Cross 198). Compton became a spatial brand that other rappers 
could attach to their music to borrow on N.W.A.’s cultural cache. As evidenced by Dr. Dre’s 
2015 release Compton: A Soundtrack, the image of Compton as gangsta rap’s home 
landscape remains a characteristic aspect of the genre. 
 In taking on the function of a simulated reality, gangsta Compton limited gangsta 
rap’s capacity to distinguish fact from fiction in its narratives. It also made it difficult for the 
specificity of local space to play a role in humanizing the genre’s stories. As Quinn notes in 
Nuthin’ But A “G” Thang (2005), while individual rap scenes were characterized by 
“unique places, personalities, styles, rituals, and sounds drawn from the local environment,” 
in California gangsta rap, specificity of origin was expressed in social terms rather than 
spatial terms. As such, “what was exportable and reproducible were not the individuated 
details and local intricacies of place; rather, it was rap’s sense of place-based 
exceptionalism, its rhetoric of emotional attachment to an impoverished locale” (Quinn 76). 
                                                
24 Quinn is borrowing the term “imagined community” from Benedict Anderson’s model in Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983). 
 143 
Gangsta Compton might best be understood as a shorthand for all of Los Angeles’ 
ghettoized neighborhoods and South Central as a whole, but because N.W.A. “conflated 
myth and place,” Chang suggests that the specificity and nuance of local place was replaced 
with the universal sense that “every ‘hood could be Compton” (Chang, Can’t Stop 321). 
Compton helped Los Angeles figure on the map of hip-hop but also limited subsequent 
rappers’ capacity to author stories about their own inhabited, material spaces, including the 
real-life neighborhood called Compton. It allowed the various Black and Latinx 
neighborhoods of Los Angeles’s impoverished center to be folded into one another and 
caricatured as a single spatial image, absolving non-urban listeners of any need to 
differentiate meaningfully between the struggles residents faced in different neighborhoods. 
Consequently, Compton offered a concrete image that echoed tendencies prominent within 
moral panic narratives wherein all urban residents of color are painted in the same broad 
brushstrokes. 
 Moreover, since gangsta rap became one of the few ways that suburban listeners 
engaged with urban residents of color and their stories, the image of Compton substituted a 
sensationalized facsimile of authenticity for genuine engagement with the contours of 
everyday life in inhabited ghettoized urban spaces.  Quinn argues that this allowed white 
suburban listeners to “consume the ghetto vicariously” and take pleasure in its symbolic 
“danger, authenticity, and difference” alongside more traditionally satisfying narratives of 
“stylized youth rebellion, entrepreneurial mobility narratives, and masculinist identification” 
which reflected their own insecurities within an increasingly precarious economy. (Quinn 
85) In this way, gangsta rap “interpellated white/suburban fans” by “[providing] spaces of 
ostensible proximity for the virtual consumption of ‘no-go’ places” like South Central LA. 
 144 
(Quinn 85) However, though hip-hop has by now become the most popular American music 
genre among all demographics in 2017 (Caulfield), it only took a few years before gangsta 
rap was “met with ambivalence and hostility from some of the young people actually 
walking the walk about which gangsta rappers only talked,” as evidenced by a quote Quinn 
cites from a gang member named OG Tweedy Bud Loc: “I’m fed up with the busters 
[hustlers] like N.W.A. A lot of my homies in the neighborhood died, man, and what the 
n***as did was market our life and our image. All them n***as in N.W.A. is buster! They 
never give back to the neighborhood” (Quinn 83). The collective effect of gangsta rap’s 
imagined Compton was an amplification of the very same base assumptions about a Black 
(and Latinx) urban criminal underclass that were championed by those with societal power, 
so there is no surprise that gangsta rap was met with some animosity from those for whom it 
claimed to speak.  
 Though blame remains squarely with the unjust culture of white supremacist 
suburban hegemony that consumes Black art while dehumanizing and devaluing Black life, 
it can be argued that gangsta rap directly contributed to the intensification of the unequal 
conditions it described, even if unintentionally. This had lasting effects on the way urban 
neighborhoods of color are popularly conceived to this day. One of the most volatile is the 
way the media used gangsta rap as concrete proof of the inherent criminality they associated 
with urban Black residents--in the wake of the ‘92 Rebellion and the Ferguson protests alike, 
the media gestured to protestors’ use of the phrase “Fuck the Police” as evidence that their 
aims mapped to the criminality of gangsta rap. But gangsta rap’s narratives also only formed 
one small part of a wider campaign of anti-urban sentiment that would have proliferated 
with or without the genre’s help, so any criticism of the genre for contributing to these 
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tendencies should be understood in that context. Admittedly, there are also other pitfalls of 
the genre that limited its capacities as a resistant medium and these cannot be overlooked, 
such as how gangsta rap historically excludes all but heterosexual male artists and the way it 
normalizes tropes of misogyny, homophobia, toxic hypermasculinity, and violence.  Such 
tendencies are as worthy of criticism today as they were in 1988. Nonetheless, a number of 
influential gangsta rap artists have recently begun to re-imagine the confines of the genre in 
ways that help resuscitate some of its resistant capacity, including many who push back on 
these other harmful tendencies. Consequently, gangsta rap has re-emerged as a potent 
medium for venting the frustrations of devalued urban populations in a post-Ferguson era. 
 Arguably, the similarities between the racial tensions of the pre-Rodney King era in 
which gangsta rap emerged and the heightened tensions contributing to anti-racist resistance 
in the Black Lives Matter era contribute to gangsta rap’s re-emergence as a potent source of 
discourse. Further, both the high regard in which the genre is now held and broader 
awareness of the line between reality and sensationalism in gangsta rap narratives has 
potentiated the emergence of a more documentarian trend in the genre. Gangsta rap’s 
popular acceptance as a resistant documentarian art form is perhaps most directly evidenced 
by Compton-based rapper Kendrick Lamar’s receipt of the 2018 Pulitzer Prize for music in 
recognition of his album DAMN. (2017).25 Though the genre’s tendencies toward vulgarity 
and tough talk remain, these aspects no longer spark the level of ire they once did and can be 
read instead as a passionate response to centuries of racial inequality in American space. 
When Lamar mockingly samples ‘90s talk-show host Geraldo Rivera saying “This is why I 
say that hip-hop has done more damage to African Americans than racism in recent years,” 
                                                
25 Lamar was the first musician to receive this award who was not a classical or jazz artist, further 
demonstrating how well-received gangsta rap has become. 
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on “DNA.”, his resistance to anti-Black urban panic is palpable. (Lamar) Rather than being 
appropriated as spectacle, Lamar’s narratives can be understood in the context of the actual 
geographic Compton of which he speaks from his experiences as a real-life gang member. 
But while Lamar has received numerous accolades and attention for his use of gangsta rap as 
resistance, another gangsta rapper from a similar background remains comparatively lesser 
known, even though he has become one of the most exemplary figures in this new hip-hop 
dialectic. That rapper’s name is Vince Staples. 
 
Vince Staples’ Norf Long Beach 
Just a few months after events in Ferguson pushed the problem of racially biased 
police brutality to the forefront of the collective American discourse, then 21-year-old North 
Long Beach rapper Vince Staples dropped his debut EP Hell Can Wait in October 2014.26 
(Staples, Hell Can Wait) In it, Staples reflects on the childhood he spent splitting time 
between his parents’ home in North Long Beach (which he affectionately calls Norf Long 
Beach) and his grandmother’s home in Compton. The EP contains multiple narratives about 
how his parents’ involvement with drug-dealing and gangs affected him and explores the 
circumstances surrounding him joining the gang Naughty & Nasty Gangsta Crips (2NGC) in 
his early teens. A narrative precursor to the double album Summertime ’06 (Staples, 
Summertime ’06) which debuted in March 2015, Hell Can Wait established Staples as a 
gangsta rapper for a post-Ferguson generation.27 In interviews, Staples has described both 
                                                
26 Prior to Hell Can Wait, Staples had released a number of unofficial mixtapes, the EP was simply his first 
major label debut and one of his first projects in collaboration with the well-known producer No-ID. 
27 Staples is not alone in re-imagining gangsta rap around this time period--while the most notable similar 
figure is Kendrick Lamar, rappers like Danny Brown, Childish Gambino, and Saba have all contributed in 
unique ways to re-imagining the role of the rap figure in the 21st century. Lamar is of particular note because 
of the parallels between him and Staples: both are gang-affiliated rappers from the Compton area who use their 
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Norf Long Beach and Compton as “not necessarily Los Angeles but the places that Los 
Angeles likes to leave out” (X) often pointing to his music as a way to honor these 
neighborhoods and generate greater understanding from those who have little direct 
knowledge of life there. While gangsta rap has always been a political medium, on Hell Can 
Wait and Summertime ‘06, Staples strips his narratives of any of the sensationalism or 
braggadocio that might distract from his unbiased documentation of urban life, thereby 
revamping the genre’s political and social import. 
Though his beats and lyrical flow harken back to the sounds of LA gangsta rappers 
before him, Staples combines these elements with sounds borrowed from electronic, techno 
and rock music into a sonic melange attuned to the genre-less aesthetics of popular music in 
the 2010s. His experimental sound has arguably made him less widely known than 
contemporaries like Kendrick Lamar or Schoolboy Q, but it has also helped him carve a 
unique space for himself in an industry that until recently has often been driven foremost by 
commercial demands.28 His novel approach to the genre is evident on Hell Can Wait, but on 
Summertime ‘06 blossoms into a postmodern rap soundscape that helps soundtrack his 
inhabited authorship of Norf Long Beach and Ramona Park. In addition to sharing a spatial 
landscape and a narrative thread, both Hell Can Wait and Summertime 06’ take place in a 
similar historical moment between the summers of 2005 and 2006.29 Diverging from 
                                                                                                                                                 
lyrics to challenge how South Central LA has traditionally been imagined--Lamar’s most notable contribution 
in this respect is his 2012 album Good Kid, M.A.A.D. City.  However, Lamar’s level of success and fame has 
pushed him to the front of conversations surrounding the new direction  
28 It is worth noting that part of the reason Staples has been given so much space is as a result of his working 
relationship with the producer No-ID who helped broker his move to a major label by signing him to his label 
ARTium in conjunction with his role doing A&R for Def Jam records. No-ID has a long list of hits and a 
reputation for bringing out the best of young artists, so Staples’ affiliation with him likely gave him more 
elbow room to experiment than he might have otherwise had. 
29 Hell Can Wait predominantly covers the summer of 2005, right before Staples was in 9th grade, through the 
summer of 2006, which as the title suggests is the temporal focus of Summertime ‘06.  
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N.W.A.’s gangsta Compton, Staples creates a mappable landscape for the two albums that 
lends specificity to the social politics his narratives highlight. Staples’ Norf Long Beach, and 
the neighborhood of Ramona Park within it, replaces the sensationalism of gangsta rap prior 
with an inhabited slice of everyday urban life in a specific, mappable neighborhood. In 
critiquing rap’s appropriation by anti-urban narratives, Staples authors a new resistant urban 
counter-narrative after his own authentic inhabited experiences. 
Staples’ refusal to fill the role of the sensationalized gangster rapper speaks to his 
apparent desire to act as a documentarian for his community. In a 2014 interview with 
Pitchfork, Staples rejects the idea that rap should be anesthetized of the social realities of the 
street, offering a personal anecdote: “It’s actually a very real thing. It’s not a game. One of 
my friends just died last month--got shot in his face five times in the back of his mom’s 
house in front of his 5-year-old sister. He was 24 and a good dude, went to work, never 
really hurt nobody. So if this is what we’re rapping about, why do you not feel that?” 
(Gordon). The idea that rap should inspire empathy for the dispossessed reflects Staples’ 
entire documentarian approach. His narratives can be characterized as testimonials reflecting 
the experience of being from where he is from, for better or worse. In a 2015 interview for 
Complex’s recurring series “The Neighborhood,” in which artists lead camera crews on tours 
of “the places that helped make them who they are” (Ahmed), Staples begins his tour at his 
grandmother’s house in Compton. He discusses how he shot the music video for “Blue 
Suede” there with people he already knew in order to integrate his community into his work, 
but by the time of the Complex interview, three of those people had been put in jail and one 
had died. Later in the interview, Staples points out an alley in North Long Beach where a 
friend got shot in front of his 10-year-old sister, inspiring most of Hell Can Wait. Rather 
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than being hidden from view or alternatively, exaggerated to sensational effect, the realities 
that inform Staples’ work remain close to the surface of all the work he does.  
On both Hell Can Wait and Summertime ‘06, Staples seems less interested in fame 
and bravado than other rappers, focusing instead on his first-hand testimony of life as a 
young Black man in an impoverished LA neighborhood. Between his parodic use of 
common gangsta rap themes (boisterous criminality, nonchalant violence, gleeful 
womanizing) and the experimental production choices he integrates into his sound, his 
music plays like a deconstruction of the genre he simultaneously uplifts and critiques. On his 
breakout single “Norf Norf” from Summertime ‘06, when Staples declares “I’m a Gangsta 
Crip/Fuck gangsta rap,” the line plays like a manifesto for his new rap vision. The 
identifying label of “Gangsta Crip” means more to Staples than the label “gangsta rapper” 
because in his eyes, only the former represents an authentic connection to Norf Long Beach. 
Staples’ genre-defying musical style complicates gangsta rap’s sound while his lyrics, visual 
art, and public persona challenge ideas about what gangsta rap can do and the roles a 
gangsta rapper can fulfill.30 In the process, his work calls out and rejects the voyeuristic 
moral panic by which gangsta rap has otherwise been instrumentalized and appropriated, 
particularly in relationship to the gangster as a bogeyman figure legitimizing the type of 
authoritarian law and order policing that affects Canfield Green as much as his own home in 
Ramona Park. 
On a track like “Norf Norf,” in which Staples raps about how being a “Norfside 
n***a” who never attended school at “Poly, Wilson, or Cabrillo” separated his life 
                                                
30 One compelling example of a rap stereotype Staples defies is the fact that Staples he abstains from drugs and 
alcohol and always has. In interviews, this is often mentioned as a surprising fact about him precisely because 
of how prominently drugs and alcohol feature in most gangster rap--one need only think of the popular gangsta 
rap song “Gin and Juice” (1993) by fellow Long Beach rapper Snoop Dogg for a well-known example. 
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experiences from wealthier Long Beach residents, he defies the logic that a gangsta rapper’s 
specific zip code need not have a bearing on the stories they tell. In the chorus of “Norf 
Norf,” Staples’ repeated insistence “I ain’t never ran from nothing but the police” challenges 
gangsta rap’s tendency to exaggerate gang-on-gang violence over police brutality. At the 
end of the chorus, when he declares he is from “Norfside Long Beach” and describes it as 
“the city where the skinny carry strong heat,” he emphatically replaces gangsta Compton 
with the real and specific home landscape he has spent the song describing. Staples thus 
challenges early gangsta rap’s ghetto mythologizing without abandoning its original 
imperative to speak forcefully, honestly, and unapologetically about the street knowledge 
accrued through authentic urban experience. On “Norf Norf” and throughout both albums, 
Staples tugs at the complicated network of knots that bind gang violence and street crime to 
issues of systemic poverty, racial and socioeconomic segregation, and police brutality. In the 
music video for the song, Staples extends this critique by stoically rapping about everyday 
life in Norf Long Beach while being arrested, pushed around, booked, processed, and 
released by the police, suggesting that the process of being jerked around by the police is 
also a part of everyday life there. The result of both the song and the video is an effective 
and deeply personal examination of the way Black and brown bodies in ghettoized 
neighborhoods are dehumanized, limited, and harmed by the repressive violence of the state-
-a description that aptly characterizes Staples’ entire oeuvre. 
Staples’ biographical narratives about navigating the urban streets in a world marked 
by spatial inequality resonate with the post-Ferguson resistant zeitgeist. Hell Can Wait is 
especially informed by the social climate of its release, as directly indicated by the song 
“Hands Up,” which references Ferguson protesters’ repeated calls of “Hands Up, Don’t 
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Shoot” in recognition of the raised arm stance some witnesses believed they saw Brown take 
before his death. Reflecting on a post-Ferguson world, Staples use his documentarian style 
to speak truth to the exaggerated brutality of racialized police violence against young people 
of color, recognizing the young Black gangster as a symbolic figure embodying the folk-
devil of moral panic narratives. By offering his own life as an example, Staples shows how 
even the toughest gang members can be better understood as products of their structurally 
impoverished environments than as mindless thugs predisposed to violence and avarice. His 
moral panic counter-narrative demonstrates the degree to which a discourse of urban crisis 
has historically relied on dehumanizing and victim-blaming impoverished urban residents, 
particularly residents of color. Though Staples rejects many aspects of gangsta rap, he 
utilizes the commercial cache the genre has accrued over time to create a mass media 
platform for his de-sensationalized version of events. On both Hell Can Wait and 
Summertime ‘06, Staples authors Norf Long Beach as a resistant landscape in ways that 
sharply contradict both the discourse of urban crisis and the mediated Compton that 
reflected it, thus demanding the right to the city for those who actually inhabit ghettoized 
neighborhoods. 
The two tracks at the center of Hell Can Wait are “Hands Up,” a searing indictment 
of police brutality, and “Blue Suede”, a track that satirically critiques gangsta rap’s tendency 
to glamorize gang violence. Heard back to back, the two songs offer complimentary 
critiques of interrelated forms of violence that map to Staples’ parallel critiques of moral 
panic narratives and older gangsta rap. On “Hands Up”, Staples references specific police 
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divisions31 that targeted him and his friends in 2NGC, using their acronym forms (LAPD, 
CCAT) to give them comparable monikers to gangs. But rather than repeating the us vs. 
them rhetoric of N.W.A.’s “Fuck Tha Police,” Staples begins with an acknowledgement that 
fear fuels violence from cops and gang members alike.32 He opens:  “North Division trying 
to stop my blackness / I’m watchin’ for them badges when out in traffic / Them 9-11’s been 
a tad bit frantic / If lights start flashin’ please don’t panic.” While he recognizes that recent 
events have heightened anxieties between police and people of color, his plea to not panic is 
addressed to both parties, a move that humanizes police despite their tendency to 
dehumanize him. Staples is of course not trying to absolve the police of brutality so much as 
warn his peers that the police are human beings prone to fear and error as much as the rest of 
us, but in their capacity as agents of state violence within an unjust system, it is only the 
police who can panic without consequence.  
“Hands Up” also specifically names Deangelo Lopez, a 22-year-old shot by police in 
Compton in June 2013, and Tyler Woods, who was shot 20 times by police in November 
2013, both of whom were killed in the neighborhoods immediately surrounding Staples’ 
home. After mentioning their deaths, he raps: “I guess the pigs split wigs for the greater 
good / Cause I ain’t seen them lock a swine up yet / At the most they reassign ‘em to prevent 
protest / Just your color is enough to get you under arrest.” Staples argues that when the 
cops “split wigs” (a term for shooting someone in the head), the general public absolves this 
                                                
31 These include the “North Division” of the Long Beach Police Department and “CCAT” (Career Criminal 
Apprehension Team), a special force tasked with tracking the patterns of those with a tendency to complete 
repeat felonies, such as gang members. 
32 Staples echoes his view that fear affects both police and gang members in interviews surrounding the release 
of the EP. For instance, in a 2014 interview with Hard Knock TV, Staples discusses how some actors dressed 
as police officers for a music video of his were told by locals to watch out because cops tend to get shot in the 
area and that it is sentiments like this that make police scared to come to his neighborhood. He adds: “They’re 
not trying to be rude or tryin’ to fuck up my shit, but they’re clearly scared” (Hardknocktv) 
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violence by assuming they must have done so to ensure the safety of those living outside of 
neighborhoods like his. But this stance is only possible if Staples and his peers are seen as 
inherently criminal and dangerous, which is why he says his color is considered its own 
crime. In describing police shootings with a term normally used to signify gang-motivated 
execution, Staples highlights how the practical effects of police violence are as criminal and 
threatening as gang violence, even though only the latter seems to get punished. He also 
mentions how the police target based on color, just as the Crips (blue) and Bloods (red) are 
assumed to attack those wearing the rival gang’s colors. In “Hands Up,” the police appear as 
a rival gang that “[shoots] first without a warning” whenever they see black, a group of 
thugs who do more to protect their own than the civilians they are tasked with serving. He 
emphasizes the parallels between gangs and police still further when he says that the LBPD, 
LAPD, and LASD33 all “ain’t about shit” because residents know all three are “ridin’ round 
these streets givin’ out full clips.” Here, Staples again uses phrasing borrowed from gang 
culture to describe police violence; instead of agents of law and order who serve and protect, 
the police are characterized as the most violent and destabilizing gang in Staples’ territory.  
On “Hands Up” and throughout his work, Staples uses the landscape of Norf Long 
Beach to illustrate how police violence has been used to exert control over a given spatially-
bounded, material, local community. For instance, though the brutality he addresses is a 
nationwide phenomenon, Staples doesn’t namedrop nationally known victims of police 
violence like Brown or Eric Garner but instead mentions fallen members of his own 
community. In so doing, he uses the specificity of the local to show that police brutality is 
                                                
33 Long Beach Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, 
respectively.  
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not an anomaly so much as a common practice that offers each neighborhood its own 
martyrs. His approach here aligns with his documentarian aims since his references are 
specific enough to preclude any counter-argument that the brutality he describes is 
sensationalized. When Staples raps “And they expect respect and non-violence / I refuse my 
right to be silent,” he highlights how both the song and his body of work constitute a refusal 
to remain voiceless in the face of the indignities people of color face when battling an 
asymmetrical system of power, starting with speaking truth to the indignities him and his 
peers face at home. “Hands Up” strikes a careful balance in which Staples repudiates the 
senseless violence of both gangs and the police while acknowledging that the former are 
driven to violence by oppressive circumstances and the latter exert violence under protection 
of those who create the oppressive circumstances.  
“Blue Suede” builds on the narrative of “Hands Up” before it, beginning with the 
hook: “New shoes with the blue suede / Young graves get the bouquets / Hope I outlive 
them red roses.” The song points to the harsh reality that gang violence is a war fought by 
the young, a fact that remains just as true when violence occurs between rival gangs as when 
between police and gang membes. Much of the song mimics gangsta rap’s tendency to brag 
about crime, violence, and the objectification of women and while Staples’ bluster seems 
less obviously satirical here than in later works, verses about “Finna party like it’s prom 
night / Finna kill a n***a walkin’ to his mom’s tonight” are tempered by the hook’s repeated 
reminder that Staples is hoping to outlive the roses placed on young gangsters’ graves. 
Later, Staples reminds the listener that even for gangsters who do not die young, mass 
incarceration might still take their lives: “Play this track in Calipat, get it poppin’ in the 
prison / And play this shit in Ironwood where my little brother livin’ / Live or die for the 
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whoopin’ or the Crippin’, pick a side / Death Row, till they put you in the Pikachu to fry / 
That’s life, three strikes, that’s life.”34 Referring to two different prisons (Calipatria State 
Penitentiary and Ironwood State Prison) in California’s Sonora desert, Staples expands the 
spatial territory of Norf Long Beach to include the desert prisons where his brothers35 are 
locked up. Though Staples is often open about how his rap success has allowed him to cease 
criminal activity altogether, the vast majority of his peers cannot consider rap a feasible 
escape route from poverty. While some may end up in prison for justifiable reasons, many 
others end up there because of an unequal system, because of strikes accrued through crimes 
of necessity,36 because of racial profiling, or any other number of unjust reasons. Staples’ 
spatial extension of his community to include the incarcerated constitutes a refusal to 
abandon those who were less lucky than he was, and reflects his commitment to using his 
platform to signal boost the voices of the voiceless. 
One track on Summertime ‘06 offers an even more fully realized and emotionally 
affecting extension of the Norf Long Beach landscape to include Ironwood State Prison. The 
song “Might Be Wrong” is an exemplary case study in the elegant way Staples uses his 
commercial platform as a rapper to make discursive space for other voices from Norf Long 
Beach, showcasing how his shrewd deployment of spatialized language helps ground his 
music in the documentarian truth of first-hand knowledge. “Might Be Wrong” features a 
hook by Inglewood-based hip-hop collective James Fauntleroy & the Cocaine 80s and 
majority of the verses are performed as spoken-word poetry by fellow Ramona Park native 
                                                
34 Whoopin’ refers to gang-banging (i.e. engaging in gang activity) as a Blood, whereas Crippin’ refers to the 
same activity as a Crip. The term Pikachu is a slang term for the electric chair, since it references the Pokemon 
character Pikachu, who uses electricity to kill assailants. 
35 It is unclear whether Staples means brother in the biological sense or in the gang sense, and in any event it 
doesn’t matter since he would likely use the same terminology in either case. 
36 The strikes refer to California’s Three Strikes law in which defendants automatically receive a life sentence 
on their third conviction of a serious felony. 
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Haneef Genno Talib.37 The poem sounds as if it has been recorded from a phone 
conversation, confirmed later when Talib describes some background noises as just “another 
day in Ironwood,” proving his words to be a dispatch from within the prison. Significantly, 
Staples cedes all of the lyrical space in the verses to Talib--in fact, the only time Staples 
voice can be heard on the track is when he reassures Talib “It don’t even matter. You can 
start from the beginning…” when something interrupts Talib’s flow. The sentiment Talib 
expresses on the track is worth repeating in full: 
 Speaking on the unjust way the justice system is justifying crimes against our kind 
 Justice is supposed to be blind 
 But continue to cross color lines 
 Hands up, don’t shoot 
 Shot. Stand your ground? 
 Blacks don’t own no ground to stand on so we stand on our words 
 Black and hooded is the official probable cause for cops to keep weapons on 
 I can’t breathe through the chokeholds and gunsmoke 
 These realities drift and appear to inform black boys and men  
Of the dangers outside their doors 
Slain in society by sworn protectors 
Protected by their peers, grand juries full of friends 
No charges brought against them 
They kill and arrest us, transgress and oppress us…damn, cuz. 
                                                
37 There is little information available about Haneef Genno Talib online beyond links describing his writing 
credit on the Staples track. However, the cover photo on his Facebook page features the signage for Ramona 
Park at the corner of 65th & Obisbo Aves. in Ramona Park, North Long Beach. Moreover, the dedications in 
his self-published book of poetry, A Way To Say What’s On My Mind (2017), include references to Norf Long 
Beach and multiple linguistic anomalies that suggest he is also a member of Staples’ gang, 2NGC.  
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Here, something interrupts Talib, prompting Staples’ reassurance that he can start over and 
making it sound like Talib still had more to say. Talib does not mince words, so the political 
import of his poem is immediately clear. Moreover, the references he makes connect the 
plight of incarcerated Black men like him to the brutal deaths of Trayvon Martin (“Stand 
your ground?”, “Black and hooded”), Mike Brown (“Hands up, don’t shoot”), and Eric 
Garner (“I can’t breathe”). By ceding a track’s worth of time to an incarcerated 
neighborhood comrade, Staples injects Summertime ‘06 with a dose of reality that extends 
even beyond his own direct experiences. Thematically, Talib’s poem weaves the plight of 
highly publicized Black victims into his own experiences with incarceration, voicing a 
reality about the way Black bodies are controlled through state violence. Talib’s sentiment is 
punctuated by the hook’s message about feeling guilt in the face of success, suggesting that 
Staples sometimes “couldn’t sleep at night” because he “took the money” and left his 
neighborhood behind. 
The feeling of guilt in the hook surrounding Talib’s poem in “Might Be Wrong” 
reflects a thread of turmoil that runs throughout Staples’ work, turmoil centered on his 
conflicted feelings about being a rapper in a community where he finds it unrealistic for 
people to aspire to be rappers. (hardknocktv) Partially because he views rap as an unrealistic 
means of alleviating poverty and partially because he believes gangsta rap’s sensationalism 
harmed his parents’ generation, Staples rejects the idea of the gangsta rapper as a role 
model, even in his own case. When recalling his gang experiences, he is neither 
braggadocious nor apologetic, opting instead to neutrally recount actions he engaged in and 
the social circumstances that necessitated them, such as on “Feelin’ the Love” when he 
contrasts buying a revolver and demanding cash for drugs with the sentiment “I refuse to 
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hear my stomach growl another night.” Where other gangster rappers aspired to seem larger 
than life, Staples is by contrast understated in the persona he cultivates, insisting in his 
Complex interview that all he wants to do is  “be the reason that motherfuckers is proud to 
be [from Ramona Park] and n***as don’t HAVE to leave” (Ahmed). He does not 
romanticize fame or success but instead presents himself as someone who wishes only to 
live in the neighborhood he loves with the same sense of safety and security afforded white 
suburbanites.38  
Staples’ work examines the different ways rap can be a mouthpiece to amplify the 
concerns of everyone who inhabits Norf Long Beach. Being real is for Staples a matter of 
speaking truthfully about both the positive and negative aspects of life in his neighborhood 
and shedding light on how spatial dynamics determine who is and is not afforded 
opportunities in American society. To this end, criticism of mainstream mass media’s 
vampiric obsession with advancing their own self-serving narratives about urban street life 
is a recurring theme throughout his work. On “Hands Up,” Staples recalls how the media 
tends to “blame geography” for the “pride in these n***as” who commit street crimes while 
also profiting off of endless fear-mongering about urban space. The media’s obsession with 
advancing anti-urban narratives thus stokes the fires that “[arouse] attention” and lead to 
ever greater police presence within neighborhoods already constricted by social inequity and 
biased policing. In other words, Staples castigates the media for fanning the proverbial 
                                                
38 Staples’ commitment to use his platform to better his own neighborhood is also reflected in acts of 
philanthropy, such as a publicity stunt in which he ran a GoFundMe campaign inviting his critics to pay him to 
retire forever. After a few weeks, Staples shut down the campaign, matched all donations, and gave the 
proceeds to the Michelle Obama Library, a public library serving the communities of North Long Beach. (Kim, 
Michelle. “Vince Staples Shuts Down GoFundMe, Donating Money to Michelle Obama Library Instead.” 
Pitchfork, 15 March 2018.)  
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flames of both gang and state violence while criticizing communities affected for not 
knowing how to put them out.  
On both Hell Can Wait and Summertime ‘06, Staples uses his stories about Ramona 
Park to author Norf Long Beach as a nuanced and authentic space. Whereas many rappers 
discuss violence between opposing gangs, Staples rarely mentions gang rivalries, most often 
bringing up violence in the context of police attempts to impose authoritarian law and order. 
In other places, he points to gang violence as an inherited survival mechanism wrought by 
generations of inequality and diminished hope. When asked in a 2017 NPR interview about 
how gang violence relates to his musical landscape, Staples critiques the way interviewers 
seem so voyeuristically focused on the topic, saying “I don’t really feel the need to describe 
it, for the simple fact that you can go see and ask someone that is there…[because] what it 
is, is a sense of camaraderie, sense of brotherhood, sense of belonging” (Martin). Staples 
continues by explaining that the drive that prompts journalists to ask about his gang is 
indicative of how the media prefers their own narratives about gangs to the truth: “That 
question isn’t ‘Oh, why do gangs happen?’ It [isn’t] like, ‘Oh, wow, why do these black and 
brown and Pacific Islander -- why do these little boys with no structure, no one guiding 
them, why do they need each other? Why are they trying to figure out life on their own?’” 
(Martin). To counter the media’s gang sensationalism, Staples centers the brotherhood 
aspect of gang life in his narratives. In Staples’ Norf Long Beach (and especially in his 
description of the park for which his neighborhood is named), bonds of community are 
forged both in spite of and in response to structural inequalities that force people to do 
whatever is necessary to keep themselves and their families fed and safe, even if by criminal 
means. Staples rejects as ludicrous the stance that gang activity and street crime occur 
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because of a disparity between urban and suburban morality or because of different ideals 
about the importance of kinship, community, and the nuclear family. Rather, gang activity in 
Staples’ narratives is always an outgrowth of social needs, most of which have been 
intentionally denied through repressive segregation. 
Staples’ comments to NPR reflect an observation Davis makes in City of Quartz that 
forces of power tend to benefit from denying those perceived or portrayed as terrorists a 
“public voice,” as in the case of gang members. Davis argues that “although terrorism is 
always portrayed precisely as inarticulate male violence, authorities expend enormous 
energy to protect us from its ‘ravings,’ even at the cost of censorship and rejection of free 
speech” (Davis, City of Quartz 300). Citing a rare instance when gang leaders in Los 
Angeles were given room to articulate their perspectives, Davis notes that they collectively 
outlined a “coherent set of demands” that included “jobs, housing, better schools, recreation 
facilities, and community control of local institutions” (Davis, City of Quartz 300). In short, 
when pressed to offer a solution that might end the reign of so-called terror gangs exerted 
over South Central’s infrastructurally decrepit and systemically impoverished 
neighborhoods, gang leaders expressed their view that the impoverishment of these spaces 
was itself the cause of gang violence. This echoes Staples’ sentiment in a spoken word 
portion of the song “Like It Is” in which he states: “The people that control it don’t really 
come from here, so they can’t do nothing but look down on us. We look at them, we see 
somebody that could help but they look at us and all they see is a n***a.” His own 
experiences challenge the idea that gang violence is an activity undertaken for fun or even 
for local credibility, as lyrics expressing this motive are virtually non-existent in his own 
music. In pushing back against the mass media’s craving to consume titillating stories of 
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gang violence, Staples draws attentios to the lack of first-hand knowledge behind the 
media’s portrayal of ghettoized urban spaces. 
As a complement to his critique of mediated gang narratives, Staples challenges 
gangsta rap’s tendency to celebrate criminality as a claim to authentic gang affiliation. 
Though he has said in interviews that he has some kind of criminal record, Staples never 
uses it to stake a greater claim to authenticity as a rapper nor does he glorify the acts by 
sharing specifics, though he also never apologizes for the things he did out of necessity. 
Instead, Staples claims authenticity in the one way that older gangster rappers could not: he 
frequently makes direct and unashamed references to 2NGC and his status as a lifetime 
“gangster Crip” from a real gang. When he mentions 2NGC, the Crips, or gang activity in 
general, it is usually to gesture towards the specifically localized bond gangs provide 
(“Always keep it GC/Ask my homies for the proof” on “Blue Suede”) or to emphatically 
parody the bravado and callousness of the wild claims made by other gangsta rappers (“I 
shot your child, so what, you know we wildin’ after dark/The sun come down and guns 
come out, you know Ramona Park” on “Birds & Bees”). If the gangsta rappers of Staples’ 
parents’ generation claimed authenticity by rapping about crimes they never committed, 
then Staples’ known gang affiliation and criminal past establishes his authenticity at the 
outset, eliminating the need for him to posture. If gangsta rap’s parent generation made 
claims to local belonging by situating themselves around a commodified simulacra of 
Compton intended primarily to sell records, then Staples situates himself around a real and 
material Compton/North Long Beach intended to de-commodify gangsta rap’s geography 
and present gangster reality. 
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Staples’ twin critiques of the media’s obsession with gang life and the sensationalism 
of gangsta rap are interrelated because while the media took the bait on gangster rap 
narratives, the un-reality of gangsta rappers’ tall tales is immediately recognizable to anyone 
who actually inhabits ghettoized neighborhoods. Though gangsta rap’s posturing lent 
credence to harmful media narratives about spaces like Norf Long Beach, this was only 
possible because the mass media was created by urban outsiders for urban outsiders--
impoverished urban residents have rarely been afforded an official medium by which to 
challenge the media’s version of events. Having been born in 1993, a few years after both 
the discourse on urban crisis and gangsta rap’s early narratives had become integrated into 
mainstream culture, Staples is responding to a media landscape in which the truth of his 
home space has never been part of the mainstream conversation in his lifetime. While it may 
be true that early gangsta rappers were deploying the bit of cultural capital they had in order 
to turn a needed profit, Staples seems to echo bell hooks’ assertion that gangsta rappers 
nonetheless became the “dupes” of the “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (Qtd. in 
Quinn 40). As Staples states in the interview for Complex’s The Neighborhood: “Rappers 
just make shit seem like ‘N***a, I’m the hardest ever. It’s hard over here. I had to sleep with 
a bullethole in my pillow!’ And nah man, none of that man, we weren’t motherfuckin’ with 
y’all man, we ain’t over here livin’ like animals, bro” (Ahmed). Staples uses his own 
authentic gangster affiliation as leverage to resist appropriation by a media climate itching to 
advance anti-urban narratives and counter the lack of authenticity in gangsta rap narratives 
of his parents’ generation. By integrating the specificity of his real and mappable 
neighborhood, Staples precludes any potential mythologization of his space or experiences.  
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Staples’ repudiation of the spectacle made of gang violence is also a common theme 
in his visual work, most notably in the music video for “Señorita” (2015) off of Summertime 
06’ (Jewell). The black-and-white video opens on a tattooed man credited as the “Preacher” 
whose appearance codes as a media stereotype of a Chicanx gang member in a specifically 
Angeleno context. The preacher leads an assortment of people (credited as “cult members”) 
as they solemnly march down the street in a V-formation. The various figures seem to 
reflect mediated ideas of the different types of people who populate ghettoized urban spaces 
in Los Angeles, from Chicanx figures in plaid and Dickies to a young Black man in a 
business suit. As the video’s director Ian Pons Jewell has explained, “the characters are total 
caricatures...they’re symbols for the most part,” emphasizing that all are “a product of the 
outside gaze, representations of the stereotypes held in the minds of those who have no 
experience of this world Vince [Staples] talks of” (Munday). Consequently, one’s 
interpretation of the figures’ identities depends largely on the stereotypes a given viewer 
brings to the narrative, resulting in a reflexive meta-commentary by which viewers are 
forced to examine their own existing assumptions about who belongs in urban space.  
As the video continues, the cult-members continue marching as one by one, they get 
shot and drop to the ground, earning no reaction from the other marching figures.39 Much 
like the assumptions viewers might attach to the figures’ appearances, it is easy to assume 
that the random bullets represent gang violence. However, as is revealed halfway through 
the video, the invisible bullets are coming from turret guns poised atop high steel towers that 
panoptically dwarf the street’s rooftops. The turrets pan from left to right and shoot at 
                                                
39 Jewell has stated that he intended the march to resemble a form of protest in which the detached and 
unaffected cult members exhibit a “sense of pointlessness” in the face of the violence by which they’re 
besieged. When hit, each falls straight to the ground, until a dramatic trail of bodies populates the street behind 
the now-lone preacher.  
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seemingly random intervals, a visual metaphor for the type of militarized policing Davis 
describes in City of Quartz as “a proliferation of new repressions in space and movement, 
undergirded by the ubiquitous ‘armed response’” (Davis, City of Quartz 223). The solemn 
resignation of the cult-members/protesters thus reads as martyrdom in the face of violent 
spatial repression. 
Towards the end of the video, after all but the preacher, Staples, and a few sideline 
figures have been shot, the camera pans to survey the fallen laying on the ground. First the 
preacher and then the other figures move forward until they are pressed against a glass 
barrier in front of the camera’s gaze. The visual effect provides the striking illusion that the 
figures are contained within the glass screen of the electronic device on which the video is 
being viewed, inviting another self-reflexive critique of the act of mediated urban 
voyeurism. Though the figures push forward, they cannot escape their glass cage. They 
press their faces and limbs to the glass, staring directly into the camera as if into the 
viewer’s eyes, illuminating the space that separates the voyeur from the viewed. In the 
video’s penultimate shot, the preacher heaves forward, grimacing and fogging the glass, just 
as the music changes to a classical piece by Haydn.40 Here, the camera pulls slowly back, 
breaking the screen’s imagined fourth wall to reveal a rectangular viewing space within a 
larger solid wall in what appears to be some sort of exhibit. In front of the glass with their 
backs to the camera, a sweater-clad family of blonde white people sits primly on a bench 
and views the preacher through the glass, smiling and hugging one another as the preacher 
                                                
40 I was never actually able to find a source identifying this classical piece, but my musically minded friend 
Jake Gengler identified it as Haydn’s Symphony No. 94 in G Major “Surprise,” 4th movement. I trust his ear 
and give him all credit for the identification.  
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grimaces in front of them. Thus, the entire narrative is revealed to take place within an 
exhibit akin to a human zoo. 
Jewell has said he built the idea for the video around an August 2014 Pitchfork 
interview in which Staples suggested that when it comes to urban music by Black artists, 
“We’re all in the zoo, and the listeners are the people outside of the cage” (Gordon). In this 
interview, Staples says that while rap music allows an outsider to feel that that it’s safe to 
look through the glass, “you’re not going to step inside that glass, because you know what’ll 
happen to you” (Gordon) He insists that gangsta rappers have often rendered spaces like 
Long Beach a sort of “petting zoo,” where the social ills of inhabiting neighborhoods 
affected by poverty, segregation, and gang violence are only mentioned in sensationalized 
ways. That is, rappers bring up social hardships less to raise social awareness than to provide 
credibility to what Quinn describes as “the twin autobiographical thrusts of ghettocentric 
authenticity (“I used to be poor”) and survivalist individualism (“I used to deal drugs”)” 
(Quinn 152) that traditionally drove gangster rap. As in most of his narratives on the two 
albums, the Angeleno human zoo in Señorita functions as a critical satire of the type of 
urban spectacles created by gangsta rap and the media alike. 
 
Ramona Park Legend 
Authenticity for Staples is thus a matter of speaking without exaggeration about life 
within the real material landscapes he inhabits, and it is to this end that Staples fills his work 
with specific and spatially bounded markers of the neighborhoods he calls home. The 
material landscapes of Compton/Norf Long Beach permeate both Hell Can Wait and 
Summertime ‘06 through references to specific addresses, intersections, landmarks, and local 
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businesses, all of which help contribute to the sense of place he creates for the two 
thematically linked works. One of Staples’ earliest specific references to his local space 
comes from his 2014 mixtape Shyne Coldchain II, released a few months before Hell Can 
Wait. On “Shots,” he mentions his own street name (“N***as die off of Poppy Street”) to 
signpost the specific place where one can find the social conditions he describes: “See you 
black ‘fore you a man and you a n***a ‘fore you that/And that you’ll never understand if 
you done seen it secondhand” (Staples, “Shots”). Staples’ assertion that second-hand 
knowledge is useless in understanding his world speaks to the documentarian motive behind 
his musical homage to Norf Long Beach and Ramona Park. By claiming ownership over his 
neighborhood and experiences, he also claims the authority to narrate Poppy Street, Ramona 
Park, and his city on his own terms.  
Staples’ integration of local landmarks extends to the music videos accompanying 
his songs, such as his decision to film the video for “Blue Suede” at his grandmother’s house 
in Compton and the snapshots of the Long Beach landscape that appear at the opening of the 
video for “Lift Me Up.” Staples’ locatable signposts tie his narratives to the actual, material 
places they represent, preventing the possibility of their being mistaken as tall-tales akin to 
the gangsta Compton of the past.  This is true even when Staples attaches a mythic quality to 
some element of his landscape, such as in the case of the small park for which the 
neighborhood Ramona Park is named. The cover of Hell Can Wait features a single level 
house with the address 6500 above the door, a reference to 6500 N. Obispo Avenue, the 
entrance to Ramona Park. The park is a symbolic landmark for Staples because of the role it 
played as a hangout for him and his fellow gang members; assorted references to Ramona 
Park feature prominently throughout Staples’ work. A street view glance at 6500 N. Obispo 
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Avenue on Google Maps suggests that the house on the Hell Can Wait cover no longer 
exists (if it ever did), but it does reveal the iconic “Ramona Park” signage that appears and 
reappears throughout Staples’ various visual works. As such, the address fittingly names the 
public park itself as Staples’ symbolic childhood home. 
Ramona Park is the spatial center of Staples’ narrative landscape on Hell Can Wait, 
appearing again as the title of the second track, “65 Hunnid”. The EP’s cover image features 
a blue and white house surrounded by a white picket fence, albeit one made of metal spires 
rather than wooden stakes. The house might appear identical to the ideal single family home 
of early sitcom suburbia were it not for the flames engulfing it from the inside.  As the house 
burns, six (presumably gangster) figures sit on the stoop while a black police helicopter 
circles above and a child (presumably Staples) stares on from the front gate. Though the 
image is striking for its resemblance to mediated images of the suburban home, the house 
remains situated within a version of urban chaos that visually re-shapes this ideal. Moreover, 
the calmness of the figures in the image contrasts sharply with the chaos of the fire 
billowing out to the roof, evoking the idea that chaos has become common in their space. 
The effect of the image is one in which urban chaos and suburban utopia seem to collide, 
giving the impression that the urban space could be as ideal as suburbia were it not for the 
violent disorder thrust upon it. It also reflects the suburban nature of Los Angeles’ urban 
fabric, wherein the aesthetics of early suburbanization remain a tangible part of 
neighborhoods that have since been woven into Los Angeles’ totalizing urban space, such as 
in North Long Beach and nearby Lakewood.41 
                                                
41 Ramona Park is located within 3 miles of Lakewood, CA, which a classic example of a planned sitcom era 
suburban development. Aesthetically, homes in Ramona Park appear to have been built during the same period 
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This contrast of urban disorder with images more often attributed to the suburbia 
simulacrum seems intentional, since it echoes Staples own sentiments about his home 
landscape, such as in the interview for The Neighborhood when Staples says his childhood 
in Ramona Park was “just fun...like ghetto Leave It To Beaver”(Ahmed). Throughout his 
body of work, Staples invokes pseudo-suburban aesthetics to show that Ramona Park is less 
different from suburbia than those on the outside might think, thus highlighting racial 
inequality, infrastructural divestment, and state violence as the extenuating factors limiting 
opportunities for urban residents. Such an alternative vision of the ghettoized neighborhood 
is important for the way it upends discourses that claim the urban space itself is 
irredeemably inert, decayed, decrepit, and chaotic. Though Staples refuses to gloss over the 
poverty and crime that affect his environment, he also highlights the amount of community 
and local connection that the neighborhood fosters in spite of the infrastructural inequities 
thrust upon it. Any pitfalls of his neighborhood are justifiably attributed to forces of power 
and state violence against which inhabitants have no choice but to struggle. Staples’ work 
thus pushes back against the idea that the American Dream of home + family + community42 
can only be had by those (mostly white) people who find themselves in a suburban setting. 
In highlighting not only the inequalities designed to limit quality of life but also the bonds of 
community that Ramona Park residents foster despite oppression, Staples suggests that the 
urban environment might even be more conducive to community than the ascetic and 
isolating suburbs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of suburbanization as Lakewood, when both cities would have still been considered suburbs of Los Angeles. 
Anecdotally, I’ve driven down Poppy Street and it looks like a pleasant little suburban street. 
42 As I mention in the first chapter, this conception of the American dream comes from Dolores Hayden’s 
Building Suburbia (2003). 
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The interview for The Neighborhood is especially insightful about Staples 
relationship to Ramona Park itself. In the interview, he sits with some friends on the 
bleachers at Ramona Park and describes how the bonds he formed there created a support 
network that made life in a dire situation more livable. Of the park, he says “This is Ramona 
Park, and in the eyes of the Long Beach Police Department, this is a very violent type of 
place full of very violent type of characters. But when I was younger, I had fun over here” 
(Ahmed). His statement is especially interesting for its similarity to the disparate 
perspectives evident in Johnson’s and Wilson’s recollections of Ferguson’s Canfield Green, 
wherein the police ascribe violence to spaces that local residents of color see as friendly and 
welcoming. Staples goes on to explain that while there used to be a baseball team at the 
park, community-based activities and programs have vanished, leaving only programs that 
serve the predominantly white suburban communities in nearby Orange County. “To play 
football for [Orange County Junior All American Football], you gotta pay $500. That’s $500 
your momma don’t have but she gonna spend that $500 to try and get you outta trouble, 
because that’s the whole objective of these parents out here, to get em outta trouble...what 
happen if your daddy get incarcerated trying to get that money back?” (Ahmed) With this 
one story, Staples demonstrates how the case of Ramona Park reflects local infrastructural 
inequity (lack of community-based activities coupled with a form of youth idleness that 
lends itself to gang activity), economic and spatial segregation (represented by the high cost 
of other nearby youth activity options meant to serve a predominantly wealthy and suburban 
populace), poverty (represented by the need for some to turn to criminal means to provide 
for their families), and police bias (reflected in the likelihood that one’s father could end up 
incarcerated). In the context of Staples’ anecdote, the social conditions that helped make the 
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park a gathering place for youth gangs seems clear enough, given the lack of viable 
alternative uses for the space. But by telling the story of how he and his friends still made 
the most of the park as a space to call their own, he lays claim to the park and grants himself 
the authority to tell a different kind of story about its importance than the narrative of 
violence with which the LBPD affiliates it. 
Staples’ authorship of Ramona Park and Norf Long Beach dominates Summertime 
‘06. Since Summertime ‘06 is spread over two distinct parts, the songs “Ramona Park 
Legend, Pt. 1” and “Ramona Park Legend, Pt. 2” act as brief intro tracks to the two 
respective halves. “Ramona Park Legend, Pt.1” lays a loose and distorted kick drum beat 
over the sounds of seagulls and lines hitting the masts of boats, presumably a sample of 
landscape sounds taken near a dock or marina. While the beat isn’t exactly arhythmic, it 
creates a stilted effect that makes it sound as if it has been distorted to mimic explosions in 
the distance. The beat eventually piles up on itself in an imitation of gunfire before giving 
way to the sound of an actual gunshot, all while the soundscape of water, seagulls, and mast 
lines remains constant. The short instrumental track establishes a clear sense of place in 
which the simultaneously peaceful and violent acoustics of Staples’ Norf Long Beach 
preface the similarly paradoxical street narratives on Summertime ‘06. Without pause, the 
gunshot sounds transitions into “Lift Me Up,” a song about the struggles of living as an 
impoverished Black man in a city better known for white affluence, which opens on a 
provocative truth: “I’m just a n***a until I fill my pockets / And then I’m Mr. N***a, they 
follow me when shoppin’.” The combination of the intro track with this opening sentiment 
establishes the thematic thrust of Summertime ‘06 and its investigation of the struggle 
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required to navigate a segregated and dichotomous landscape in which one’s race and one’s 
zip code determine the kind of life one will lead. 
Inverting its counterpart, “Ramona Park Legend, Pt. 2” begins with the same gunshot 
sound before repeating the beat and soundscape from before. However, this time Staples 
raps over the top of it, calling himself a legend and requesting that someone “build a shrine 
on [his] part of town” when he dies. As before, the intro immediately transitions into the 
next song, “3230,” a reference to 3230 Poppy Street, one of Staples’ former addresses in 
Norf Long Beach. On this song, Staples describes gang life as a “deadly game of tag the 
older generations passed to us” within a landscape where “evictions notices go unnoticed” 
and one is forced to commit “crime that’s organized” in order to keep the power and water 
from being turned off. The song sets up the themes explored in the second half of the album, 
which is more overtly political than the first and on which Staples shows a greater degree of 
experimentation in communicating his ideas. 
At the very end of the album, the outro song “06” features a faux TV announcer 
saying “Next time on Poppy Street...” before a brief rap in which Staples demands to be paid 
for his services as entertainer. When Staples raps “I’m finna bring the gang in the buil--”, his 
words get cut off by static before he can complete the word “building.” The effect of this 
outro is a mocking illustration of the way the media and the music industry welcome the 
opportunity to be entertained by even the most visceral gangsta rap narratives so long as 
rappers never bring the real gang in the proverbial building. In satirically referring to both 
himself and his stories of Ramona Park and Poppy Street as a legend, Staples highlights all 
the more how realistic the narratives on Summertime ‘06 actually seem. By mocking the way 
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the media might prefer to commodify his experiences, Staples preempts the appropriation of 
Ramona Park and Norf Long Beach and strengthens the documentarian aspects of his work.  
The remainder of Summertime ‘06 is replete with songs that either challenge 
dominant anti-urban tropes or that point to urban quality of life issues the media is unwilling 
to highlight. On “Birds & Bees,” Staples points to the inherited nature of gang violence by 
contrasting the observation “they found another dead body in the alley” with the sentiment 
“rounds up in that chamber / I’m a gangsta like my daddy.” On “Jump Off The Roof,” 
Staples raps about wanting to sleep without his lungs “stopping like they used to,” gesturing 
to the asthma and air pollution levels that affect residents of South Central LA at higher 
rates than LA in general. (Huerta) On “C.N.B.”, Staples calls himself the “coldest n***a 
breathing” in a hook that exaggerates the criminal claims of gangsta rappers, only to contrast 
this false bragging with the song’s verses, all of which directly address the motivations 
behind gangsta posturing: “On 65 I tell the truth no lies / The sheets and crosses turned to 
suits and ties / In Black America, can you survive? / They made a nuisance once the noose is 
tied / We gentrified, we victimized, we fighting for survival / No hopes and dreams just 
leave us be, we leanin’ on the Bible / They preyin’ on us, prayin’ for a better day tomorrow / 
Hide the fear behind this here bravado.” This verse on “C.N.B.” acts as a recursive reminder 
of Staples’ entire rap philosophy wherein he uses the familiar tropes of gangsta rap to 
articulate a new kind of narrative that dignifies and defends his community rather than 
contributing to their mischaracterization. Even the gangsta rappers he criticizes get 
redeemed through his recognition that fear motivates their outsized claims--the truth Staples 
speaks “on 65” (which is to say, in Ramona Park) is the truth of the hopeless and 
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dispossessed urban masses confined to neighborhoods like his, a truth which is rarely 
granted an official platform. 
By the end of Summertime ‘06, Staples has authored a vision of Norf Long Beach as 
a space where people manage to forge a path towards community and survival in spite of the 
panoply of repressive forces attempting to make this impossible. On “Like It Is,” the last full 
song on Summertime ‘06, Staples summarizes his rap mission by intimating: “No matter 
what we grow into we never gonna escape our past/ So in this cage they made for me 
exactly where you find me at / Whether it’s my time to leave or not I never turn my back.” 
The statement serves as a promise to Ramona Park and Norf Long Beach that no matter how 
successful he becomes as a rapper, he won’t abandon the community that made him who he 
is. He thus inverts the hopelessness associated with the “cage they made” of ghettoized 
neighborhoods by demonstrating how vibrant his community is. On both Hell Can Wait and 
Summertime ‘06, Staples fashions himself a voice for the voiceless people of color in urban 
spaces abandoned by a suburban-serving culture and in so doing, authors his own urban 
counter-narrative that defies those panicked mediated anti-urban narratives that would have 
the city seen as nothing more than criminality and chaos. 
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Chapter Three 
Claiming the New Berlin:  
A Case Study in Collective Spatial Appropriation as Right to the City 
 
   Alles nur künftige Ruinen 
   Material für die nächste Schicht 
   [Only future ruins all 
   Materials for the next layer]1 
   -Einstürzende Neubauten, “Die Befindlichkeit des Landes” 
 
Introduction 
Though Los Angeles and Berlin are a world apart, both cities share a history of late 
twentieth century de-industrialization, wealth inequality, and racial and socioeconomic 
segregation exacerbated by the effects of neoliberal globalization, allowing one to draw 
spatial parallels between them. First, both cities spent the end of the twentieth century 
struggling through racial and socioeconomic tensions resulting from authoritarian attempts 
to exert control over targeted parcels of the population, tensions which took on spatial form 
through the subdivision of each city’s space into drastically delineated districts of lower and 
higher income residents. Second, American critiques of police brutality and white 
supremacy during this period parallel many Berliners’ recognition that after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, they would need to create a culture that resisted the fascist, xenophobic, and 
authoritarian tendencies that had marked most of the city’s history, both East and West. In 
both cities, the final decade of the twentieth century was marked by popular efforts to 
reshape urban space in ways that better served underrepresented populations who had long 
since become the most common targets of forceful state repression. Further, the East/West 
cultural and social divide that characterized Berlin’s post-Wall transition paralleled the sharp 
South/North division created by racialized ghettoization and the discourse of urban crisis in 
                                                
1 My thanks to Tegan Raleigh for lending me her translation prowess to help with a properly poetic English 
translation of this epigraph. 
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Los Angeles, meaning that both cities experienced the post-Cold War urban landscape as a 
contentious space in the process of being re-conceived anew.  
In the previous chapter, I pointed to Vince Staples as an individual resistant actor 
who uses his art to author Los Angeles’ urban landscape after his own inhabited 
experiences, countering the commercially mediated discourse of urban crisis. In this chapter, 
I broaden my scope from the individual actor to the collective actions of all manner of 
resistant actors, artists, and inhabitants in Berlin to consider how entire urban populations 
engage in collective spatial appropriation of a given city space. By focusing on a number of 
individual Berlin artists and activists who appropriate public space in ways that help author 
urban counter-images or create urban counter-narratives, this chapter considers the resistant 
efficacy of moving beyond individual action to create a constellation of counter-narratives 
that add up to what Tobias Morawski has termed a Gegenöffentlichkeit,2 or counter-public. 
(16) For Morawski, the Gegenöffentlichkeit represents the sum actions of all resistant actors 
engaged in re-imagining a given urban space in contradistinction to its development 
according to dominant commercial, state-approved image. The Gegenöffentlichkeit is a body 
of loosely related individual nodes of resistance that add up to a de-centered whole. In 
Berlin, the spirit of counterculture and protest that characterizes the city in the global 
imagination is largely the product of myriad contributions to this Gegenöffentlichkeit from 
individual groups and actors committed to the appropriation of Berlin’s existing built 
abstract space. 
                                                
2 Morawski only gestures towards Habermas’ conception of Öffentlichkeit (public sphere) but 
Gegenöffentlichkeit is sometimes used to distinguish a non-state public sphere from the type of public sphere 
that Habermas identifies as administrated by the state. 
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Berlin’s counter-cultural reputation predates the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but 
the fall represented a seismic shift in the spatial politics of the city at a moment when a 
political and social vacuum reduced the state’s ability to control the built environment. Such 
a rupture in the city’s spatial logic potentiated a new wave of resistant interventions in 
Berlin’s cityspace, interventions that continue to inform the spatial politics of the so-called 
New Berlin. Berlin serves as a useful case study in the way a Gegenöffentlichkeit can 
collectively re-author a given city’s image in ways that counter its dominant commercial 
characterization, primarily by potentiating new forms of spontaneous spatial intervention 
and by making it difficult for forces of power to counter all individual nodes of spatial 
resistance simultaneously. Berlin is particularly attuned to this kind of intervention because 
even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the city’s tumultuous history of destruction and 
reconstruction made it a model par excellence of the kind of continual reinvention to which 
all world cities now aspire in the age of globalization. The frequent polarizing changes 
Berlin underwent throughout the twentieth century have made it that much more likely that 
counter-images from the Gegenöffentlichkeit might eventually be integrated into the long-
term process of reconceiving the city. In Berlin, resistant actors utilize numerous 
intersecting strategies to intervene in the built environment, disrupt the commercial urban 
image, and potentiate the emergence of what Lefebvre has called differential space, that is, 
space which promotes social codes and norms that differ from the highly controllable and 
strictly delineated forms of space championed by hegemonic forces of power. Throughout 
the long-term process of reunification, Berlin’s residents have continued to find ways to 
demand the right to the city, affording the city a global reputation as a locus of 
countercultural resistance. While it is true that this is often because Berlin’s counter-images 
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are appropriated as cultural capital and integrated into the city’s commercial image, Berlin’s 
Gegenöffentlichkeit continually conceives of new interventions and new resistant strategies 
to counter this effect. The city’s myriad resistant actors keep their strategies malleable, 
welcome creative new approaches, and ultimately aspire to be adaptable enough to address 
citizens’ shifting concerns as they arise. This assures that no commercial adoption of 
resistant efforts as cultural capital can ever remain static, for there is always some mutated 
new counter-image fomenting on Berlin’s subcultural margins. 
Even with the strength of Berlin’s Gegenöffentlichkeit, commercial and state 
interests have nonetheless remained most dominant in the discourse surrounding what the 
new Berlin should like and whose interests it should serve. Yet as the strategies I highlight 
in this chapter make clears, inhabitants’ resistant interventions have slowed, altered, and at 
times even halted development of the city along these purely commercial lines. Some of the 
artistic efforts I highlight in this chapter seek to preserve the cultural memory of a given 
space, as in the photos in Berlin Wonder Land (2014) or the spatial remembrance art created 
by Stih & Schnock’s Orte des Erinnerns (1993). Others seek to directly intervene in the way 
the city distributes its resources and addresses underrepresented populations, such as the 
anti-gentrification efforts of the Demokratische Initiative 100% Tempelhofer Feld (2014), or 
the occupation efforts of Refugee Tent Action (2014). And still others seek to claim 
ownership over the city by offering inhabitants a greater say in the way the city is seen and 
interpreted, such as the graffitial images of East Cross Project’s Berlin Spricht Wände 
(2013) or in literary interventions such as Tanja Dücker’s novel Spielzone (2000) and David 
Wagner’s essays in Mauer Park (2013). The diverse array of spatial appropriations at the 
center of this chapter represent a mere cross-section of the prism of unique spatial 
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interventions resistant actors have adopted in Berlin in the years since the, a sampling of 
interartistic and interdisciplinary strategies chosen to express the collective needs of Berlin’s 
Gegenöffentlichkeit.  
Though forces of power have often tried to deny disadvantaged populations a seat at 
the proverbial table when conceptualizing the future contours of the New Berlin, resistant 
actors in the city have used the strength of the Gegenöffentlichkeit to quite literally make 
space for themselves. Their efforts help make visible countless subcultural inhabitant 
populations, many of whom might otherwise remain invisible were it not for the resistant 
strategies used to remind Berliners of their existence and their need to be considered in the 
city’s development efforts. The effect of so many counter-images is a collective counter-
collage that allows even the most dispossessed and itinerant of Berlin’s inhabitants to 
demand the right to the city, often by directly altering the city’s material environments to 
better suit their needs.  
Most strategies adopted by Berlin’s Gegenöffentlichkeit are in no way unique to 
Berlin, since similar expressions of protest, occupation, and spatial appropriation can be 
found in any number of global sites since the beginning of the 21st century. To name but a 
few examples, collective spatial appropriation has played a role in all manner of recent 
resistant spatial movements throughout the world, including the 2010 Tunisian Revolution 
that helped launch the Arab Spring, the 2011 occupation of New York City’s Zucotti Park 
by the Occupy Wall Street movement, the 2016 squatting occupation at Standing Rock in 
North Dakota in opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline, and Catalonian protests for 
independence in 2017. Moreover, towards the end of the 1980s, mass protests like the 
Monday demonstrations at Leipzig’s Nikolaikirche helped precipitate the end of the German 
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Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) at the same time that mass demonstrations 
like the Singing Revolution in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania helped precipitate the end of 
the Soviet Union.  Just as the individual strategies adopted by Berliners combine to create a 
constellation of spatial intervention, so too does Berlin’s Gegenöffentlichkeit represent a 
singular contribution to a global strategy of collective resistance that seeks to mutate global 
space in ways more conducive to the needs of a worldwide precariat who themselves form a 
global counter-public. Given this context, the resistant atmosphere in reunited Berlin should 
be read more as an exemplary continuation of existing global energies than as a new 
paradigm unto itself.  
Though mass protests and demonstrations have always been an important part of 
German identity, spatial appropriation in Berlin has become all the more future-minded 
since the Wende,3 with resistant actors seeking ways to pre-emptively mutate urban spatial 
codes rather than merely resist authoritarian spatial control after it has already been 
imposed. Undoubtedly, Berliners’ collective memory of the Berlin Wall as a material 
expression of authoritarian spatial segregation and control helps keep this type of resistance 
alive in Berlin today. The goal of this chapter is not to focus on Berlin to the exclusion of 
similarly productive threads in other cities but instead to use Berlin to highlight how 
collective resistance functions at a city-wide level, with the hope that such observations can 
be extrapolated to offer constructive ideas that shed light on how a Gegenöffentlichkeit can 
be created on a global scale.  
Moreover, as a global city with a history of American intervention in its spatial and 
commercial planning, Berlin’s spatial development has always been influenced by American 
                                                
3 A term meaning “the turn,” used to describe the period during and immediately after reunification. 
 180 
models, either by mirroring American development or pushing back against it. Investigating 
where American-style commercialization has seeped into Berlin’s spatial politics helps 
illuminate the effects of American-style neoliberal commercialization not just in Berlin but 
also within the world economy as a whole. Consequently, my analysis of the role of 
Gegenöffentlichkeit and counter-image authorship in Berlin resonates with the explicitly 
American spatial critiques on which the prior two chapters focused, since all three chapters 
can be read as an attempt to uncover how counter-images and counter-narratives help resist 
hegemonic spatial control on scales ranging from the local to the global. If one considers the 
expansion of globalized neoliberal capital as a sort of worldwide expansion of American 
suburbanized consumerism and bourgeois hegemony, then all forms of right to the city 
resistance worldwide can be understood as an attempt by the global precariat to construct a 
global Gegenöffentlichkeit.    
One specific way in which the German works considered in this chapter find 
consonance with American works considered in the chapters prior is the way that all 
highlight the street as a specific type of public space that is especially conducive to 
appropriation and spatial resistance. The street is a type of public abstract space that resists 
privatization and which can be re-imagined as a space of cultural encounter, affording it a 
special type of primacy in considerations of how art and activism help address the right to 
the city. The power of the street as raw material for spatial resistance is evident in both 
Black Lives Matter’s post-Ferguson tendency to stage protest by blocking highways and 
public streets in the US and also the way Berlin’s club scene organized anti-PEGIDA4 raves 
                                                
4 PEGIDA stands for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes [Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamicization of the West] and they are a nationalist, far-right political movement founded in 
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on the streets of Berlin in 2018. The valorization of street knowledge as a form of counter-
knowledge that upends anti-urban commercial myths is evident in hip-hop by both Black 
and Chicanx artists in South Central LA and also Turkish and immigrant youth in Berlin-
Neukölln. And the idea of white bourgeois space as the antithesis of the right to city is 
evident in both American anti-suburban narratives and in Berlin’s artistic critiques of 
gentrification, since in both countries, elite classes often attempt to privatize street space so 
as to counteract its suitability for resistant appropriation. Moreover, in both countries, the 
bourgeois social codes informing privatization of formerly public spaces correspond with 
increasingly authoritarian forms of law-and-order policing that map to both racist and 
xenophobic sentiments that remain palpable in discussions about who deserves the right to 
the city and its resources. Focusing on the street as a public space that all inhabitants can 
access also grounds resistance in the local since street-level spatial politics counter the more 
metro-regional or even nationalistic spatial images championed by commercial strategies. 
While a city’s commercial image subsumes the needs of local inhabitants in favor of a 
totalizing city image that primarily serves the normative interests of elite populations, 
resistance at the street level necessarily addresses the nuanced and specific needs of a given 
swath of a cities inhabitants, no matter their socioeconomic status. 
To this end, many of Berlin’s resistant spatial interventions deploy the idea of the 
Kiez5 as an inhabited, micro-level community representing a smaller space within a larger 
district of neighborhood, usually marked by social interactions surrounding a given street or 
set of streets. The term is rarely applied to an official designation of space but it instead 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dresden in 2014 that has recently gained traction in Germany on account of tensions surrounding the country’s 
recent influx of refugees. 
5 Kiez is a term that dates back to the Middle Ages and its contemporary use is generally limited to Berlin and 
specific parts of Hamburg. The term originally referred to somewhat temporary Slavic settlements that formed 
their own micro-communities within German towns. 
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socially deployed as a term denoting a particular local community within a broader city 
quarter. Much like Vince Staples’ connection to Ramona Park helped offer specificity to his 
critiques of Long Beach and of Los Angeles as a whole, so too does the logic of the Kiez 
help ground Berlin resistance in the specificities of given micro-neighborhoods. The borders 
of the Kiez are often unofficial and their designation is heavily dependent on the locality 
provided by the intersecting of given streets, helping inhabitants situate their local 
experiences within the wider context of the city and, by extension, the world. The concept 
helps knit the needs of locals together with the needs of a global precariat since, as Bastian 
Heinsohn has written, “Berlin’s urban transformation affects global space as well as local 
space” (203). The Kiez becomes a key site to address issues like gentrification and 
dispossession because it integrates aspects of local everyday life and culture that tend to get 
erased during commercialized development. As Heinsohn writes, “the local Kiez struggles 
between the increasing image-production of a ‘yet untouched’ part of the urban space and 
the attempt to resist [a] loss of authenticity by deliberately positioning itself in contrast to 
global space,” (Heinsohn 203) thereby actively offering inhabitants an opportunity to author 
counter-images that protect against this erasure. Since “local space is destroyed by the 
increasing uniformity of conventionalized urban space” (Heinsohn 208), Kiez-level 
resistance resurrects what commercialization seeks to destroy, using the local specificity of 
inhabited knowledge as a weapon against global urban homogenization. By focusing on the 
intensely local politics of the Kiez as a spatial unit, one recognizes how a kaleidoscope of 
small-scale resistant strategies can help create a rhizomatic global network of heterogenous 
spatial interventions by which a global Gegenöffentlichkeit might resist the totalizing 
bourgeois ideals of neoliberal twenty-first century global capitalism. 
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The Precariat’s Right to the City 
In his 2014 book Reclaim Your City: Urbane Protestbewegungen am Beispiel 
Berlins,6 Tobias Morawski articulates three possible planes on which to intervene in and 
appropriate urban space. The first plane he calls “spatial practices” [räumlichen Praktiken] 
which refers to intervention “on the physical plane through appropriation of material 
spaces.”7 Examples he gives for strategies of city appropriation [Stadtaneignung] on this 
plane include all manner of occupations, such as temporary and long-term squatting, guerilla 
gardening, free and open-air parties, and street protests/blockades. (Morawski 47) The 
second plane he calls “spaces of representation’ [Räume der Repräsentation] which refers to 
intervention “on the symbolic plane through appropriation of space as communication 
space.”8 Examples offered for this plane include all manner of street demonstrations, 
including those that integrate strategies from the first plane, as well as numerous forms of 
street art such as graffiti, murals, mosaics, urban design projects, posters, banners, and 
protest flags. To this plane he also ascribes any resistant attempt to infiltrate or manipulate 
official channels of communication, such as the mutilation of advertisements and grassroots 
attempts at information distribution, such as flyers. The third plane he calls “representation 
of space” [Repräsentation des Raums] which refers to intervention  “on the symbolic plane 
through appropriation of the media which represent these spaces.”9 (Morawski 46) While 
Morawski’s examples for this plane focus primarily on the creation of alternative city maps 
as a form of critical geography, he seems to overlook literary, cinematic, and artistic 
representations of city space as a potential form of alternative space-making. Since he 
                                                
6 Reclaim Your City: Urban Protest Movements Using the Example of Berlin. From here onward, all German 
translations are my own except where otherwise indicated. 
7 “auf der physischen Ebene durch Aneignung von materiellen Räumen” 
8 “auf der symbolischen Ebene durch die Aneignung des Raums als Kommunikationsraum” 
9 “auf der symbolischen Ebene durch die Aneignung der Mittel, die diese Räume repräsentieren” 
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asserts that “representations of space fundamentally decide how space is perceived, how it is 
used, and how people meet in it,”10 (138) it would seem that artistic representations of space 
contribute a similar form of counter-image authorship informing the way the city is 
characterized and understood. 
In the Wende-era New Berlin, resistant counter-image making begins with the 
squatters who commandeered the abandoned buildings of the formerly East German 
neighborhood known as Mitte in the days and weeks immediately following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. For the remainder of this chapter, I employ Tobias Morawski’s model for 
collective physical and symbolic appropriation of urban space as a means to consider six 
different contemporary forms of resistant practices in Berlin that genealogically trace their 
interventions to the legacy of the Wende squatters’ movement (Hausbesetzerbewegung).11 
The Wende squatters employed numerous artistic and political strategies befitting all three 
planes of collective spatial appropriation that Morawski maps in Reclaim Your City, making 
them a useful entry point for considering how collective spatial intervention can create a 
Gegenöffentlichkeit that articulates right to the city resistance. Though the Wende squatters’ 
movement had no central leadership and was articulated through a variety of individual 
groups working in concert with one another, their collective legacy of resistance has been 
adopted in ways large and small by Berlin’s Gegenöffentlichkeit ever since. For whatever 
failures might be attributed to the Wende squatters, they did successfully prove it was 
                                                
10 “Darstellungen von Raum entscheiden grundsätzlich mit, wie dieser wahrgenommen wird, wie er genutzt 
wird und wie sich Menschen in ihm begegnen.” 
11 For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the totality of actors in this broadly defined movement as “squatters” 
even though not all who participated were actively involved in the actual act of squatting – the movement also 
included artists, musicians, students, and political activists, spread out across multiple sub-groups. I use 
“squatter” as the catch-all definition primarily because of its spatial implications relating to the way the 
movement as a whole occupied space, though I in no way mean to imply that the physical act of squatting was 
more important than any of the other resistant performances that occurred within squatted spaces. I also use the 
modifier Wende to distinguish this wave of squatters from those who came before and after them. 
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possible not only to imagine Berlin’s city space in ways outside the scope of the commercial 
image, but also to transform the social codes guiding how the material urban environment 
could be used, even if only temporarily. Their experiments in Mitte demonstrated the 
potential that resistant spatial practices pose for appropriation of the city’s built 
environment, illustrating in the process how social groups concerned with asserting their 
right to the city can do so by means of subversive spatial re-authoring. It was not until 
November 1990, when Berlin’s police violently attempted to clear a number of squats on 
Mainzer Strasse, that the state was able to muster a forceful enough display to really 
challenge the movement’s stronghold over Mitte. By that point, the squatters had already 
generated a discursive presence strong enough to leave blueprints for future models of urban 
counter-image making in Berlin. They established resistant art and politics as an integral 
component of the New Berlin’s cultural and social landscape, planting the seeds of a broader 
culture of resistance that would help develop Berlin’s reputation as a global hub for counter-
cultural energies. 
As this introduction to this work explores at length, Henri Lefebvre’s notion of the 
right to the city concerns the rights of all who inhabit the city to have a say in determining 
how the city functions, how its resources are used, how the city is imagined by those outside 
of it, and ultimately, how space can be used to govern everyday life. Since wealthy urban 
inhabitants and social elites interact with the city primarily through consumption, Lefebvre 
identifies the working class masses as those who actually inhabit and shape the city. The 
right to the city thus becomes a way for the urban working classes to assert that their more 
direct and inhabited interaction with the built urban environment ought to afford them to 
right to determine how urban space is used. Lefebvre describes the right to the city as the 
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need “to reach out towards a new humanism, a new praxis...of urban society” (Lefebvre, 
“Right to the City” 150) in order to transform the city into what he calls “the act and ouevre 
of a complex thought,” one which can only be expressed by “social classes and class 
factions capable of revolutionary initiative” (Lefebvre, “Right to the City” 154). He insists 
that the creation of a new urban society requires one to imagine new utopian possibilities 
without regard for their practical implementation, since the existing built (abstract) space of 
the city is so confined by existing hegemonic ideologies that interventions which are merely 
reformist are unlikely to have much effect. Lefebvre suggests that since forces of power use 
any means necessary to control the built environment, or abstract space, it is difficult for 
resistant actors to meaningfully appropriate built space in order to re-imagine it. 
Nonetheless, he writes, “between [society’s] sub-systems and the structures consolidated by 
various means (compulsion, terror, and ideological persuasion), there are holes and chasms. 
These voids are not there due to chance. They are the places of the possible” (Lefebvre, 
“Right to the City” 156). Since, Lefebvre continues, “the conditions of the possible can only 
be realized in the course of a radical metamorphosis,” any revolutionary attempts to re-
imagine the city can make use of these “holes and chasms” to potentiate a new urban praxis 
that better expresses the right to the city and restores urban authority to the working class 
masses. (156) 
David Harvey’s 21st century expansion of Lefebvre’s concepts moves the 
revolutionary capacity for urban transformation from a general conception of the working 
class to a global urban precariat marked by “insecure, often part-time, and disorganized low-
paid labor” (Rebel Cities xiv). While Lefebvre’s concept of the right to the city offers a 
theoretical model for understanding urban resistance, Harvey asserts that since spontaneous 
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precariat resistance has been potentiated by the same processes of urban erasure about which 
Lefebvre only theorized a few decades prior, “what has been happening in the streets, 
among the urban social movements, is far more important,” (xi-xii, Rebel Cities) 
necessitating a push towards a praxis of the right to the city. Harvey further suggests that 
without an attendant integration of anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal revolutionary 
strategies, resistant transformation of urban space will never adequately address the needs of 
the contemporary urban precariat, since it will inevitably be re-absorbed by the totalizing 
power of globalized capital. If, as Harvey asserts, the goal is to “imagine and reconstitute a 
totally different kind of city out of the disgusting mess of a globalizing, urbanizing capital 
run amok,” then “that cannot occur without the creation of a vigorous anti-capitalist 
movement that focuses on the transformation of daily urban life as its goal” (Rebel Cities 
xvi). In both Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s estimations, only ruptures, voids, and chasms in the 
existing social and spatial logic of the urban environment can potentiate such revolutionary 
transformation, so the goals of any anti-capitalist resistance movement must include a push 
to either seize spatial ruptures as they occur or to use resistance to potentiate their eventual 
emergence. 
Drawing on both Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s conception of the right to the city as “a 
right to change and reinvent the city more after our heart’s desire” (Harvey, Rebel Cities 4), 
Morawski begins Reclaim Your City (2014) with a description of Recht auf Stadt as the idea 
that “all people who live in a city should…be able to decide how city life will be designed, 
irrespective of their origin or social status”12 (16).  His conception of the right to the city is 
one in which fissures and chasms can be created in the city’s existing spatial logic through 
                                                
12 “Alle Menschen, die in einer Stadt leben, sollen demnach unabhängig von Herkunft und sozialem Status 
entscheiden können, wie das städtische Leben gestaltet werden soll.” 
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concentrated anti-capitalist efforts re-imagine how the city’s public spaces can be used in 
order to meet the needs of populations cut off from official commercial channels. Morawski 
emphasizes the right to transform, design, and reinvent urban space because the right to the 
city is a collective right that can only be engendered through intentional transformation of 
the social structures that organize the urban environment toward commercial ends, social 
structures which depend on the spatial codes that help shape them. To express one’s right to 
the city is also to express one’s right to have a say in authoring how the city is seen and to 
modify the way the city is used by all who inhabit it. Since one cannot transform space 
without creating a new, counter-image after which that transformation could be modeled, the 
right to the city is expressed first and foremost through the creation of a potentially 
generative counter-image. The act of authoring or re-authoring urban space in ways that 
counter the dominance of commercial urban images is thus inherently a form of right to the 
city resistance. 
Like Harvey, Morawski considers the added challenges of staging right to the city 
resistance under the dual forces of late capitalism and neoliberalism that created the 
precarity that characterizes present-day globalization. Morawski’s model also resonates with 
Alex Vasudevan’s assertion that “the re-emergence of a radical housing politics in Berlin 
has...placed particular emphasis on the articulation of a right to the city by, with and on 
behalf of its precarious, vulnerable and often voiceless inhabitants” (190). Vasudevan 
suggests that the use of squatting in Berlin has resulted in an apparent “re-functioning” of 
radical spatial practices (191) but, as Harvey illustrates, “to claim the right to the city is, in 
effect, to claim the right to something that no longer exists (if it ever truly did).” (Rebel 
Cities xv)  More than just a “re-functioning” of prior practices, Harvey sees spatial 
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resistance as an authorial act grounded in the recognition that “the right [to the city] is itself 
an object of struggle” in which the powerless (“the homeless and the sans-papiers”) 
articulate continuous resistance against the powerful (“the financiers and developers”), lest 
the latter claim the entire city for themselves. (Harvey, Rebel Cities xv) The urban precariat, 
as the city’s proverbial homeless and sans-papiers, cannot articulate their right to the city 
without first imagining how the city could be conceived to integrate rather than exclude 
them, so the process of counter-image making is effectively step one in a larger process of 
revolutionary urban transformation. Collective resistance to dominant urban commercial 
images and narratives is thus always a struggle to extend the right to the city to those 
inhabitants whose lives are most marked by precarity. 
Like Lefebvre, Morawski emphasizes the necessity of multivalent spatial 
appropriation precisely because he recognizes how much control commercial and state 
powers exert over space itself, making it nearly impossible for resistant actors to do anything 
more than intervene in or co-opt the existing environment—there is no such thing as a truly 
blank urban slate. In contrast to the community-serving spatial interventions of the urban 
precariat, “when economic actors control and occupy public spaces, as a general rule their 
interest is to direct the behaviors of those present to commercially viable channels”13 
(Morawski 27). Consequently, economic actors14 actively resist uses of public space 
detached from commercial and consumerist activity, such as uses associated with play, 
eroticism, rebellion, creativity, and (non-commercial) leisure, all of which are uses Lefebvre 
                                                
13 “wenn wirtschaftliche Akteure öffentliche Räume kontrollieren und besetzen, ist ihr Interesse in der Regel, 
das Verhalten der Anwesenden in kommerziell verwertbare Bahnen zu lenken” 
14 I borrow this term from Morawski who uses “wirtschaftliche Akteure” to refer to anyone whose interests in 
the city space are motivated primarily by financial gain. In German, the term Akteur can refer to an actor in a 
theatrical sense, but can also be used to refer to a stakeholder or used in the sense one might use the word 
“player” in English as in “a player in the decision-making process.” I will thus use the term “economic actor” 
and the term “actor” more generally in the same sense. 
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deems necessary to fulfill inhabitant’s anthropological needs and extend the right to the city 
to all who inhabit. (Lefebvre, “Right to the City”147) Moreover, since Morawski suggests 
that “economic actors decide on both access and use regulations as well as on the exclusion 
of unwanted social groups”15 (27), valorization of a commercial image for the city assures 
that any and all new investment, construction, and development need only benefit 
economically-advantaged inhabitants, usually exacerbating the corresponding racial and 
socioeconomic segregation of the disadvantaged and helping maintain abstract space’s 
hegemonic status quo.  
Consequently, Morawski argues that “the development of the modern city can be 
viewed as a continuous struggle around access to and exclusion from public space,”16 (46) to 
which one might add the struggle around access to and exclusion from urban spatial 
resources, including recreation, education, and housing. Resistance to the dominant, 
commercial image of the city also means resisting uneven development and its attendant 
negative social effects, namely gentrification and displacement. Notably, Morawski uses the 
word Verdrängung to describe displacement. In German, this word has the added 
connotation of a repressive squeezing out or crowding out, in which one is slowly but surely 
robbed of the space one takes up. Thus, the German term emphasizes how displacement 
constitutes a form of anti-precariat spatial violence commercially touted as necessary for the 
greater municipal good. Morawski’s conception of the right to the city is thus inherently 
anti-capitalist, for he recognizes that the result of any form of commercially viable urban 
                                                
15 “wirtschaftliche Akteure [bestimmen] sowohl über Zugangs- und Nutzungs-regelungen als auch über den 
Ausschluss unerwünschter sozialer Gruppen” 
16 “die Entwicklung der modernen Stadt kann…als ein kontinuerlicher Kampf um Zugang zum und Ausschluss 
vom öffentlichen Raum angesehen werden” 
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development is always necessarily the Verdrängung of the urban precariat and the 
exacerbation of existing economic inequality. 
 
Towards Lefebvrian Differential Space 
If right to the city resistance is ever to effectively resist the Verdrängung of the urban 
precariat, then it must strive to produce what Lefebvre has referred to as differential space, 
or space that differs from the built environment as conceived in the commercial image. The 
Wende squatters’ movement exemplifies this kind of resistance precisely because their 
embodied occupation of Berlin’s central districts coincided with explicit efforts to transform 
the space to suit their own needs and extend resources to disadvantaged members of the 
populace. Whereas Lefebvre characterizes the entire built environment as abstract space, 
differential space occurs when the contradictions inherent to abstract space cannot be 
suppressed and the space no longer adheres to the expected social/spatial divisions that help 
forces of power maintain hegemonic control. Potentiating the emergence of differential 
space is the ideal goal of all spatially motivated resistance because the contradictions 
inherent to abstract space constitute an exploitable weakness in the otherwise all-
encompassing dominance of the capitalist system. Traditionally, the problem with extending 
Lefebvre’s concept of differential space to the actual practice of spatial resistance has been 
that the mechanisms of spatial control utilized by both state and economic actors are 
generally rather successful in disguising the contradictions inherent to abstract space. This is 
mainly because abstract space is rendered apprehensible only by means of its 
compartmentalization and coding into spaces and places, by its division into designated 
recognizable segments (i.e. public square, school, park, parking lot, etc.). These spatial 
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delineations and the social behaviors they direct are posited as natural to the social space of 
the city, even as they are produced alongside the material spaces that engender them. This 
natural-seeming fragmentation of abstract space often makes it difficult to recognize the 
contradictions inherent to it. 
Harvey echoes this sentiment in “The Political Economy of Space” (2006), stating 
that the division of abstract space is used to depoliticize space generally, by making binaries 
like public and private seem natural and inert while implicitly reinforcing social behaviors 
and rules that privilege those with wealth and power. (“Political Economy” 6) Hence, 
Lefebvre’s own claim: 
…That the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action; that in 
addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of control, and hence of 
domination, of power; yet, that, as such it escapes in part from those who would 
make use of it. The social and political (state) forces which engendered this space 
now seek, but fail, to master it completely; the very agency that has forced spatial 
reality towards a sort of uncontrollable autonomy now strives to run it into the 
ground, then shackle and enslave it. (Production of Space 26) 
Since the division of abstract space into compartmentalized social spaces/places facilitates 
hegemonic control over social relations, it stands to reason that a given abstract space could 
be appropriated and the seemingly natural divisions reflected in it challenged. Then, the 
resistant (and hence, differential) possibilities of the space could be revealed, potentiating 
the generation of differences that would transform it into differential space. Through their 
transformative experimentations with the material space of Mitte, the Wende squatters 
attempted this exact type of spatial transformation, and the various resistant actors who 
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followed in their footsteps have been building on the incremental spatial changes the Wende 
squatters helped potentiate. The New Berlin’s entire resistant history might consequently be 
understood as an attempt to make Berlin itself into a differential space. 
For Lefebvre, class struggle and its relationship to the contradictions of abstract 
space assume primacy in the creation of differential space. In The Production of Space 
(1974), he writes: 
Today, more than ever, the class struggle is inscribed in space. Indeed, it is that 
struggle alone which prevents abstract space from taking over the whole planet and 
papering over all differences. Only the class struggle has the potential to 
differentiate, to generate differences that are not intrinsic to economic growth qua 
strategy, ‘logic’ or ‘system’ – that is to say, differences which are neither induced by 
nor acceptable to that growth. (55) 
Though Lefebvre sees class struggle as that which inhibits the expansion of abstract space to 
all available space, he is reticent to grant that differential space could be produced through 
appropriation of an already produced abstract space, partially because he formed his theories 
in an era in which globalized capitalism was not yet apparent. He argues that mere 
appropriation would constitute an “inappropriate spatial morphology” (Production of Space 
380) which merely “[simulates] existing space, parodying it, and demonstrating its 
limitations, without for all that escaping its clutches” (Production of Space 382). However, 
he also argues that a body or collective can “inaugurate the project of a different space” by 
“putting up resistance” to existing abstract space, often by beginning this resistance in the 
artistic sphere. (Production of Space 349) When viewed as the inauguration of a potential 
future space, even seemingly unsuccessful transformative revolutionary projects like the 
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Wende squatters’ attempts to transform Mitte into a Gesamtkunstwerk can be understood as 
kindling for future resistance project and fuel to fan the flames of a burgeoning 
Gegenöffentlichtkeit. 
In Warped Space (2001), Anthony Vidler ventures an all the more affirmative claim 
about the productive potential of spatial appropriation for the precariat. He suggests that in 
the twenty-first century, “total rebuilding, total demolition, or total revival are all blocked by 
the inertia of the ‘already built’ and the ‘institutionally confirmed’,” suggesting that 
transformation of space can now only occur through a process of “gradual mutation” (135). 
Vidler continues: 
Space…is considered to be an already occupied terrain, a territory to be surveyed 
carefully, invaded silently, and with preparations made for proper retreat. The new 
avant-garde is no longer a joyful proclaimer of future technological or formal bliss; it 
is personified instead by the squatter, the panhandler, the vagrant, the unwanted 
stranger…the squatter appropriates, the homeless refuse to move, the vagabond 
ignores fixed boundaries…[and all employ spatial shifts as] instruments of insertion, 
opening rifts and faults in the apparently seamless fabric of the city to let in its new 
inhabitants. (136) 
Vidler sees the precariat and their subversive infection of abstract space as a mutating force 
that gradually evolves the urban environment. He describes resistance as a wedge that finds 
potential openings in the seemingly closed logic of abstract space, prying it open to make 
way for discursive re-consideration. Despite his seeming contestations to the contrary, 
Lefebvre does not actually exclude the possibility of differential space emerging by means 
of incremental, fragmentary mutation akin to Vidler’s description. He simply suggests that 
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slow mutation cannot generate a differential space unless it is accompanied by a 
revolutionary moment capable of upending the existing logic of abstract space. As Harvey 
explains, Lefebvre believes any such revolutionary movement requires a “spontaneous 
coming together in a moment of ‘irruption,’ when disparate heterotopic groups suddenly see, 
if only for a fleeting moment, the possibilities of collective action to create something 
different” (Rebel xvii). Without question, the Wende can be characterized as such a moment 
of irruption, for the fall of the Berlin Wall portended the inevitability of a major upheaval of 
everyday life in the cityspace. The fact that the process of reunification still cannot be 
considered complete nearly three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall reinforces the idea 
that even after a moment of irruption, transformation is more likely to come through slow 
mutation than full upheaval. Berlin’s history of collective resistance is thus a continuous 
timeline of evolving action that appropriates the city’s remaining spatial voids to slowly 
mutates the city’s spaces after its own counter-image. The Wende squatters, in being the first 
to take advantage of the moment of irruption that characterized this irruption, helped 
inaugurate the emergence of differential space in Berlin. 
 
Image-Making and Post-Wall Berlin 
        In order to adequately address the legacy of counter-image making in the new 
Berlin, it is first necessary to take a moment to examine how the commercial image became 
dominant in debates about Berlin’s post-reunification urban renewal. In his 1997 article 
“The Voids of Berlin,” Andreas Huyssen argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall rendered the 
city a pockmarked landscape, covered in gaps and voids. Consequently, he describes 
Berlin’s long-term reunification project as the process of slowly filling in these voids, a 
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process he describes elsewhere as the development of an urban palimpsest.17 Huyssen’s 
argument refers not only to the physical voids left in the city’s topography by the demolition 
of the Berlin Wall but also to the social, economic, and cultural gaps separating what was 
once two ideologically opposed German societies, a separation typified by author Peter 
Schneider’s concept of the “wall in the head” [Mauer im Kopf]. Tellingly, Huyssen’s 
concept reflects Lefebvre’s assertion that an irruption can be characterized by the voids and 
fissures it leaves behind. To Huyssen, the process of void-filling is an authorial act that 
renders Berlin “a text frantically being written and rewritten” (57). He emphasizes that 
scholarly consideration of the city as text had historically been informed by cultural and 
literary evaluations of urban space, generally through considerations of “how real and 
imaginary spaces commingle in the mind to shape our notions of specific cities” (57). 
However, by the end of the twentieth century, Huyssen suggests that the concept of the city 
shifted to a more “pictorial and image-related” (58) conception that helped center 
commercial urban images to the detriment of inhabited urban narratives. 
Whereas prior concepts of city-as-text concerned “a critical discourse involving 
architects, literary critics, theorists, and philosophers bent on exploring and creating the new 
vocabularies of space after modernism,” Huyssen suggests that more recent discourse of 
city-as-image involves ”‘city fathers,’ developers, and politicians trying to increase revenue 
from mass tourism, conventions, and office or commercial rents” (58). As a result of this 
shift, the needs of existing inhabitants have increasingly been minimized in favor of 
developing the city into an economic powerhouse focused around “aesthetic spaces for 
cultural consumption, megastores and blockbuster museal events, festivals, and spectacles of 
                                                
17 See Huyssen’s 2003 book Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory. 
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all kinds, all intended to lure the new species of city tourist,” (58) which Huyssen suggests 
has replaced the familiar model of the flâneur. He continues, “the flâneur, even though 
something of an outsider in his city, was always figured as a dweller rather than as a traveler 
on the move. But today it is the tourist rather than the flâneur to whom the new city culture 
wants to appeal, just as it fears the tourist’s unwanted double, the displaced migrant” 
(Huyssen 59). Even as the flâneur perceived and evaluated the cityspace, their role was still 
that of an inhabitant and thus ultimately participatory. The tourist, by contrast, passively 
consumes the city as a set of commercial experiences without necessarily participating in 
acts of inhabitance. Whereas the flâneur was enmeshed in the city’s everyday life, the tourist 
remains on the city’s surface. 
The displaced migrant that Huyssen calls “the tourist’s unwanted double” is feared 
precisely because their existence signifies not transience but a demand to occupy and inhabit 
a space that is perceived as not belonging to them. Considered more permanent than the 
ephemeral presence of the tourist, the migrant figure is perceived in negative relation to the 
commercial benefits that tourists generate. The migrant challenges the eventual consecration 
of the commercial image by insisting upon their inclusion in rather than displacement from 
the city’s space,18 a stance that takes on particular import given Germany’s recent influx of 
refugees, including approximately 1.35 million refugee arrivals since the beginning of 2015. 
(Chase) In the commercially imagined neoliberal city, the tourist is privileged and conceived 
as enriching the city while the migrant is demonized and conceived as being a drain upon it, 
even as both tourist and migrant constitute a type of drain on the city’s resources, not the 
                                                
18 Though I do not have the space to do so here, it is worth considering how alternative terms like “ex-patriate” 
are used to describe more desirable (and often white, Western) migrants whose behavior and/or spending 
habits generally afford them the ability to blend with the city’s existing bourgeoisie. The term migrant is more 
often affixed to those whose status as Other is noticeably working class, that is, to those whose migration 
would strengthen the numbers of the city’s existing precariat. 
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least of which includes the space used for housing. When the city is conceived through its 
commercial image, any use of the public space that cannot be monetized is forced to 
transform into a consumable attraction/service or is otherwise transformed to better suit the 
service of commercial interests, barring the few remaining spaces where low-income 
inhabitants are the majority. Even then, those places face the constant threat of eventual 
gentrification, and thus of further dispossession and displacement of the urban precariat. In 
effect, this means the entire city is re-tooled to suit the needs of tourists and the bourgeois 
classes whose consumption patterns mirror them. 
It could be argued, as plenty have, that Berlin’s post-reunification commercial 
renewal allowed the city to generate more cash-flow and create a multitude of necessary 
short-term economic benefits that stimulated growth, which was ultimately good for a city 
burdened by the costs of reunification. However, this growth came at the expense of 
generating long-term sustainable provisions for those residents whose financial access to the 
city and its resources is most limited. The city’s existing bourgeois/elite residents, whose 
spending habits, social tendencies, and general engagement with the cityspace tend to map 
more closely to the behavior of tourists, likely noticed very little negative change in their 
daily routines. As the benefactors of gentrification’s capitalistic colonization of the city 
space, the bourgeois classes are equally enamored with the commercial image of the city, for 
like the suburbia simulacrum in the US, the cosmopolitan image of commercial Berlin has 
been crafted to appeal to their tastes explicitly. Meanwhile, having been denied access to 
increasingly privatized urban public spaces, the displaced and dispossessed urban precariat 
is forced by necessity to find inventive ways to restore their right to take up space. Class 
struggle in the age of neoliberal globalization thus necessitates both authorship of a counter-
 199 
image for the city and physical and symbolic appropriation of city space in order to re-
imagine the urban environment in ways that include the precarious masses too often 
rendered invisible.  
Like the precariat it represents, this counter-image must be fragmented, fluid, and 
itinerant—not a single image at all but rather a collage of fragmented images coming from a 
multitude of sources. It is a collective, accumulated image that draws upon varied resistant 
performances and practices accounting for a diverse number of artistic, political, and social 
actors working both together and individually. While Anja Kanngieser refers to a “politics 
of collective appropriation” (1) and Morawski speaks of Gegenöffentlichkeit, in both cases 
the notion of the collective frames the rhetoric of Berlin’s contemporary spatial resistance. 
Thinking of precariat resistance in this collective way helps resurrect the power-in-numbers 
mentality that has always existed in the proletarian struggle for class consciousness but 
which has recently been hindered all the more by neoliberalism’s drive towards 
individualism, isolation, and increasingly precarious labor. Accordingly, one of the primary 
goals of neoliberal urbanization is to limit the possibility that the precariat will ever 
recognize the strength of their collective resistance, and it is for this reason that forces of 
power so insistently attempt inoculate resistance by integrating it into the city’s commercial 
image as subcultural capital.  
In A Brief Introduction to Neoliberalism, Harvey offers a concrete illustration of this 
issue using the example of New York City. By the 1970s, decades of suburbanization had 
left New York City in a so-called ‘urban crisis’ characterized by widespread violent crime 
and poverty. Though the city had been receiving federal assistance to combat these issues, 
Richard Nixon significantly diminished that assistance in 1975, causing the city to fall into 
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default on loans from local investment bankers and financial institutions.19 Rather than 
forgive the city’s debt or work out a more equitable solution for the public good, these 
financial institutions used their newfound leverage over the city to stake first claim to all 
future municipal revenue while at the same time exerting an unprecedented degree of 
influence over city planning efforts, pushing the city to focus on revenue-building at the 
expense of all else. (Harvey 44-5) The result was what Harvey calls “a coup by the financial 
institutions against the democratically elected government of New York City” (45) during 
which investment bankers “seized the opportunity to restructure [the city] in ways that suited 
their agenda” (47), robbing the city’s inhabitants of their democratic right to help shape the 
urban environment. These economic actors prioritized creation of a “good business climate,” 
requiring the city to author a new commercial image for itself. “This meant using public 
resources to build appropriate infrastructures for business” at the same time that “the city’s 
elite institutions were mobilized to sell the image of the city as a cultural centre and tourist 
destination (inventing the famous logo ‘I Love New York’)” (Harvey, Neoliberalism 47).  
On the one hand, Harvey reports that this so-called “neoliberalization of culture” 
(47) required that “the city elites [accede], though not without a struggle, to the demand for 
lifestyle diversification (including those attached to sexual preference and gender) and 
increasing consumer niche choices” (47). On the other hand, this increased social diversity 
and extension of niche consumerism to subcultural tastes was permitted only because it 
served commercial interests, turning formerly denigrated populations into proof of the city’s 
cosmopolitan, liberal alluere. This allowed economic actors to obfuscate their commercial 
                                                
19 Notably, this is also around the same time that the Nixon administration started using the kind of anti-urban 
victim-blaming rhetoric about urban over-reliance on the public sector that precipitated the discourse on urban 
crisis I described in Chapter Two.  
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intentions behind subcultural capital and assuage elite liberal concerns about the state 
repression of and neoliberal divestment from disadvantaged populations. Embracing a few 
token progressive social issues allowed New York City to portray itself as a space 
welcoming to all while at the same time reorganizing it’s infrastructure to support 
commercial and corporate investment that benefitted only the city’s most wealthy residents. 
The city’s new commercial image as an open-minded space for creativity and self-
exploration facilitated an increase in tourism and attracted new, wealthier inhabitants, 
raising rents and increasing the gap between those who could afford to live in the city and 
those who could not. Those who had helped shape New York City’s diverse subcultures and 
lifestyles but who lacked the financial resources necessary to compete with commercial 
interests were relegated to their continued displacement from the city by means of cultural 
erasure and systematic gentrification.  
Harvey’s description of 1970s New York offers a useful analog to the situation in 
today’s Berlin, a city that former Mayor Klaus Woworeit famously described as “arm aber 
sexy” [poor but sexy] (Huggler). Morawski traces the influence of neoliberal thinking in 
Berlin and elsewhere to de-industrialization and privatization following the oil crisis of 
1973. He notes, “since then cities have acted as corporations in location-based competition 
[Standortwettbewerb] for investors, tourists, tax revenue, and large events. Subsequently, 
private property ownership and rental income have developed into a lucrative business”20 
(21). While this is clearly the case in Harvey’s example, Huyssen’s description of the first 
decade of German unification as a frenzy of commercial image-making reflects similar 
                                                
20 “Städte stehen seitdem wie Unternehmen in Standortwettbewerb um Investoren, Touristen, Steuereinnahmen 
und Groß-Events. Aus Wohnraumbesitz und Mieteinnahmen entwickelte sich in der Folge ein lukratives 
Geschäft.” 
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tendencies. Berlin in the ‘90s was concerned primarily with a process of becoming, typified 
by the 1996 tourism campaign “Berlin wird” [Berlin becomes]. Yet at the time of his 
article’s 1997 publication, Huyssen observed that “nobody seems to know exactly what 
Berlin will become” (62). Though “much of central Berlin in the mid-1990s [was] a gigantic 
construction site, a hole in the ground, a void,” (Huyssen 62) only economic actors were 
afforded a chance to fill those voids. Huyssen observes that under neoliberalization, “the 
very image of the city itself becomes central to its success in a globally competitive world” 
(Huyssen 66). Even beyond the state’s preference for commercial interests, pressure from 
the global economy to integrate Berlin as a global city, particularly once the nation’s capital 
was moved from Bonn to Berlin in 1999, also helped valorize the commercial image of the 
city. Noting how in 1997 “the political triumphalism of the Free World during the Cold War 
has now been replaced by the triumphalism of the free market in the age of corporate 
globalization” (71), Huyssen predicts the eventual neoliberal transformation of Berlin’s city 
infrastructure in a manner akin to New York City’s transformation a few decades earlier. He 
writes: 
The major concern in developing and rebuilding key sites in the heart of Berlin 
seems to be with image rather than use, attractiveness for tourists and official visitors 
rather than heterogeneous living space for Berlin’s inhabitants, erasure of memory 
rather than its imaginative preservation. The new architecture is to enhance the 
desired image of Berlin as capital and global metropolis of the twenty-first century; 
as a hub between Eastern and Western Europe; and as a center of corporate presence. 
(66-7) 
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Huyssen later suggests that the city’s transformation will result in an inevitable “loss of 
urban life” and “may represent the worst start into the twenty-first century one could 
imagine for this city” since “many of the major construction projects, it seems, have been 
designed against the city rather than for it” (72). In the two decades since Huyssen first 
published his article, it would seem that almost all of his predictions have come to fruition. 
Harvey’s New York City example also reflects how the efforts of resistant and 
subcultural actors, like the Wende squatters, are always already susceptible to appropriation 
by economic actors as cultural capital – especially once resistant efforts coalesce in the 
creation of a so-called lifestyle that can be marketed as youthful, hip, artistic, or rebellious to 
tourists and would-be residents. This is especially true when a subculture’s resistant efforts 
also make a given space seem more commercially profitable, such as when they generate art 
or nightlife. But no matter how profitable a subculture may seem to the city, these efforts to 
appropriate their output tend to displace resistant actors whose race, ethnicity, migration 
status, or socioeconomic status make them that much more vulnerable to urban precarity. As 
Vasudevan writes, “the recent history of Berlin is a story indelibly marked by the ongoing 
neo-liberal transformation of the city” identifiable as “urban regeneration, large-scale 
modernization, and the advent of a new property regime [that] precipitated the widespread 
displacement of existing residents who were no longer able to afford rents” (182). Far 
beyond merely controlling rents and access to property, gentrification efforts attempt the 
Verdrängung of the precariat from all of urban space. 
In this context, it is clear why inhabited occupation of urban domestic space formed 
such a large part of the Wende squatters’ resistant strategies. When they were still part of the 
GDR, East Berlin neighborhoods like Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg had been deemed 
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undesirable due to their peripheral location along the path of the Berlin Wall. Because of 
this, many buildings within these districts were never even restored after WWII bombs left 
them in shambles. After reunification, these areas became the city’s central districts, 
meaning that the undesirable, decrepit old buildings the squatters occupied geographically 
represented the most desirable investment real estate in all of Berlin. Speaking of Prenzlauer 
Berg, Andrej Holm notes that following reunification, “the price of land spiked to 1,000 
Deutsche Mark (DM) per square meter, surpassing by far the price of even the best 
residential areas within West Berlin” (116). Though the squatters likely occupied these 
central districts primarily because the abandoned buildings made the area a perfect 
playground for their experimental re-authoring of everyday life in Berlin, their physical 
appropriation of the city’s now-desirable central real estate was not an insignificant 
component of their anti-capitalistic resistance.  
Ironically, however, the Wende squatters’ occupation of such highly desirable real 
estate undoubtedly hastened the speed at which economic actors converted their resistance 
into cultural capital, thereby hastening their displacement. While early attempts to forcibly 
evict the squatters generally resulted in pushback from a mostly sympathetic populace, the 
almost inconspicuously subtle re-branding of the city as hip, subcultural, and artistic ensured 
that support for or interest in the Wende squatters’ lifestyle could be quickly monetized. 
Morawski describes the appeal of artists and subcultures as “soft locational factors” [weiche 
Standortfaktoren] used to market a city, noting that “cultural and artistic creativity within a 
city establish an ambience that attracts technologically and economically creative people”21 
(25). Since the presence of the squatters and the scene that surrounded them made the 
                                                
21 “Kulturelle und künstleriche Kreativität innerhalb einer Stadt ein Ambiente schafft, das technologisch und 
ökonomisch kreativ tätige Menschen anzieht.” 
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central districts that much more attractive to culturally minded tourists and investors, the 
movement’s efforts at germinating a counter-image were cut short through their absorption 
as cultural capital to market the city. As a result, the very districts the Wende squatters 
attempted to claim as their own were the first to be gentrified following their displacement.  
By the mid 1990s, the dual forces of violent state-supported eviction efforts and co-
optation of the scene as cultural capital had more or less anesthetized the resistant capacities 
of the squats that remained. Describing how this effect played out in the branding of a 
rapidly gentrifying Prenzlauer Berg, Holm says the district was “transformed into a code for 
a specific consumer pattern and lifestyle never before seen in Germany” (120). He 
continues: 
Portrayals of Prenzlauer Berg do not simply reflect reality, they construe it; they take 
up old themes, remix, compress, and spatially reorder them. Put crudely, the myth of 
Prenzlauer Berg arose in the 1990s from a recycling of various basic components 
that are combined in ever-new variants today: (1) Prenzlauer Berg as the ‘new 
Kreuzberg’; (2) Prenzlauer Berg as Montmartre, Soho, or the Lower East Side of the 
new ‘world-class city’ of Berlin; and (3) Prenzlauer Berg as a microcosm of the 
‘growing together’ of East and West…This cultural boosterism increasingly became 
a foundation for serious investment in a ‘cultural’ infrastructure in the 1990s. (120) 
The first comparison to Kreuzberg explicitly relates the counter-cultural behavior of the 
Wende squatters in the district to the squatting scene that emerged in Kreuzberg during the 
student movements of the 1960s and again in the 1980s. While “Kreuzberg” serves as one of 
Berlin’s calling cards for subcultural lifestyles, the word “new” points to the gentrifying 
effects of cultural capital within urban renewal, since the idea of a new Kreuzberg is a 
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rhetorical extension of commercial image creation. For this and other reasons, Holm 
suggests that Prenzlauer Berg exemplifies the “neoliberal turn of urban policy” which 
both  “[boosts] a post-Fordist orientation toward sophisticated lifestyles and conspicuous 
consumption” and “renounces the prior orientation toward welfare” present in prior phases 
of urban renewal. (114) While the case of Prenzlauer Berg’s gentrification is one of the most 
explicit in Berlin, similar strategies were repeated in the subsequent gentrification of Mitte, 
Friedrichshain, and later, Neukölln and Kreuzberg. No surprise that these are also the 
districts where squats were most common. 
 As reunification efforts matured, Vasudevan writes that “Berlin underwent a period 
of intense urban restructuring within which the activities of squatters were seen as a major 
obstacle to be both pacified and proscribed” (Vasudevan 159).  Given the relative ease with 
which economic actors succeeded in removing the Wende squatters as an obstacle to 
development, one might assume that as the movement dispersed, so too did their discursive 
impact. Vasudevan, however, argues that “the dissolution of the scene as a coherent 
‘movement’ was also accompanied by the emergence of new experimental geographies in 
Berlin that adapted and reworked the tactics and strategies of urban squatting as a means of 
reclaiming a renewed right to the city” (159). As in Morawski’s nod to spatial appropriation 
as a form of critical geography, Vasudevan’s notion of squatting as experimental geography 
gestures toward the way even temporary spatial appropriation like the Wende squatters’ 
movement help build a toolkit of local strategies that can be deployed and adapted over time 
by a Gegenöffentlichkeit. Consequently, “the attempt to re-imagine the city of Berlin as a 
crucible of political change did not come to an end with the violent clearing of the squatters” 
(Vasudevan 160) but instead, it created an opportunity for a more diverse, fragmented, 
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collective conception of spatial resistance in the city. As previously discussed, this new way 
of imagining spatial resistance was necessary to develop a counter-image which might better 
address the needs of an equally fragmented precariat. Vasudevan argues that “the spatial 
practices mobilized by squatters thus transformed Berlin into a living ‘archive’ of alternative 
knowledges, materials and resources…that continues to play a central role in the struggle for 
a more radical and socially just urbanism” (Vasudevan 160). One can therefore argue that 
the fragmented, collective brand of spatial resistance within Berlin’s Gegenöffentlichkeit 
today stems in part from a discursive re-imagining of the cityspace that the dissolution of the 
Wende squatters’ movement potentiated. 
 
Squatting in a Wende Wonder Land 
In the 2013 travel guide Berlin: Kiez für Kiez, Julia Brodauf introduces Mitte as the 
representative heart of Berlin. She notes that while squatters and artists occupied the district 
during the Wende, their subculture has since been displaced by investors and new upper-
class residents, glossing over this transformation by simply noting “What began in occupied 
houses, self-organized clubs and small bars has grown over the course of two decades into 
highly grown-up gastronomy establishments.”22 (11) Yet the displacement of the squatters 
was in reality the result of bourgeois colonization of the Wende squatters’ collective efforts 
to reimagine the space. Piece by piece, Mitte’s crumbling squats gave way to opulent 
apartments, high-end retail establishments, and luxury tourism, a transformation exemplified 
by Brodauf’s closing sentiment: “Die Berliner Mitte ist wieder bürgerlich geworden” 
[“Berlin Mitte has once again become bourgeois”] (11). Though the adjective bürgerlich can 
                                                
22 “Was in besetzen Häusern, selbst organisierten Clubs und kleinen Bars begann, etablierte sich im Laufe von 
zwei Jahrzehnten zu höchst erwachsenen Gastronomiebetrieben.” 
 208 
also be translated as middle-class, Brodauf’s phrasing and use of geworden (from werden, 
“to become”) also calls to mind the verb verbürgerlichen, meaning “to become bourgeois” 
or “to become gentrified.” Accordingly, Brodauf’s description of the district today reads like 
a bourgeois utopia peppered with art galleries and fine dining. Once the chaotic domain of 
the Wende squatters’ comparatively un-bürgerlich alternative urbanity, Mitte has since been 
restored to a commercially viable, civilized form that, most importantly for Brodauf’s 
purposes, poses no threat to tourism. 
Statements like Brodauf’s exemplify how normative Berlin’s commercial image has 
become. If the commercial image refers to the image of the city as a brand that can be 
marketed to economic actors as a viable space for commercial investment, then a counter-
image is any image of the city as a space that resists and repudiates commercial interests. In 
the decades since reunification, the commercial image of Berlin promoted by both the state 
and economic actors portrayed New Berlin as a prosperous, urbanized, and cosmopolitan 
city of the future. This commercial vision for the city often contrasted the views of poor and 
working-class residents who more often saw the New Berlin as a malleable space to imagine 
new social configurations, retain collective cultural memory, and correct the imbalance of 
power that had facilitated the expansion of fascism and authoritarianism in the city’s past. 
Brodauf’s evaluation of Mitte as a bourgeois paradise helps clarify how much the city has 
transformed in the years since the squatters made Mitte their proverbial wonderland, yet the 
continued prominence of the squatters’ legacy in Berlin’s collective memory is a testament 
to the revolutionary spatial mutations they helped inaugurate. 
Immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Wende squatters 
occupied Mitte in order to take advantage of the political vacuum that accompanied the 
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collapse of the GDR. Though the movement lacked central leadership and the various 
individual groups that comprised it each had their own goals, they were unified by a desire 
to resist profit-centric urban development and to claim part of the city space to transform 
after their own image. In Berlin Wonder Land (hereafter BWL), a 2014 photo series 
documenting the Wende squatters’ movement which includes interviews with squatters and 
artists from the movement, Line Maass23 remarks, “our idea was to create new space for a 
kind of culture that we could relate to” (23). The broader project of squatting was 
approached as an experiment in communal living in which new social relations could be 
both imagined and tested out. David Wagner echoes this sentiment in his introduction to 
BWL, calling Mitte “the magic city of the in-between…a wish-fulfillment zone [where] 
everything was possible”24 (5). Brodauf’s description of Mitte in 2013 and BWL’s depiction 
of Mitte25 in the early 90s display the stark contrast between the city as a fully gentrified 
bourgeois space and the city as tabula rasa, raw material for creating a new type of urban 
life. The artists and activists who comprised the movement used their occupation of Mitte to 
stave off commercially imagined urban renewal, at least temporarily. Their strategies 
included artistic modification of buildings, graffiti and street art, musical and theatrical 
performance, DIY rehabilitation of buildings, open-air parties, temporary art installations, 
dance clubs, erotic spaces, spaces for drug use, political demonstrations, and myriad other 
                                                
23 Since it is comprised entirely of first-hand anecdotes and photos, I mention the individuals quoted in Berlin 
Wonder Land by name when citing them, with the note that all quotes from squatters come from the this book 
and are cited as such unless otherwise indicated. Since the series is presented in a dual-language format, I 
quote the English translations for ease of reading. All translations from Berlin Wonder Land are the work of 
the series’ editors. 
24 “Mitte lag im Zwischenraum, wurde die Zauberstadt der Zwischenzeit. Wurde Wünscherfüllungszone, alles 
war möglich.” 
25 Neither the squats nor BWL’s photos of them were centered exclusively on Mitte, so it is a little misleading 
that BWL makes it seem that way. Rather, since Mitte also means “center” or “middle,” it appears to be used as 
shorthand for all of Berlin’s occupied central districts, which during the Wende included Mitte, Prenzlauer 
Berg, and Friedrichshain in the East and Kreuzberg in the West. 
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creative uses of the city space, all of which explicitly contrasted the potential commercial 
use of Mitte’s city space. Their anti-capitalist resistance during this period of total 
transformation can be considered an early attempt at authoring a counter-image for the New 
Berlin. It was also one of the first expressions of Gegenöffentlichkeit in the newly unified 
city, since their models of resistance brought members of the precariat from both East and 
West Berlin together around a common goal. 
       Within a few years, the combined power of both state and private economic actors 
had supplanted the Wende squatters’ control over the city center.  As previously mentioned, 
the squatters’ efforts were eventually used to hasten their evictions since, as Karin Bauer and 
Jennifer Ruth Hosek write, “subcultures and unique practices both express Berlin and 
market it, increasing its cultural capital and, over time, its commercial value”(294). It is an 
effect of what Andrej Holm has called “symbolic gentrification” wherein the potential 
cultural appeal of resistant actors makes the district appealing to new renters and users with 
countercultural aspirations. (119) In the case of the Wende squatters, it wasn’t long before 
their party-centric lifestyle gave Mitte the reputation of being hip. The labels “alternative” 
and “creative” were affixed to the district, attracting creative types with money enough to 
satisfy the higher rents demanded by investors. Parties, concerts, theatrical performances, 
and other events staged by squatters became a way to sell the appeal of central districts in 
the same moment that privatization and an increase in governance to protect economic 
actors limited the squatters’ ability to resist eviction efforts. In a manner not significantly 
different than the one I describe in the previous chapter in which the political aims of Los 
Angeles’ gangsta rappers were subsumed as a form of cultural capital to sell anti-urban 
narratives and monetize youth rebellion, Wende era economic actors used the squatters’ art 
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and activism to sell Berlin as a bastion of rebellious, erotic, artistic creative energy. Though 
pockets of squatters remain to this day, gentrification had effectively killed the Wende 
squatter’s movement by the mid 1990s. 
 Yet far from marking the end of spatial rebellion in Berlin, the mid ‘90s death of the 
squatters movement precipitated myriad collective and overlapping uses of Berlin’s 
cityspace that have since contributed to a resistant counter-image for the city. The paradox 
of Berlin’s reputation as hip, alternative, and subcultural is that the same rebellious image of 
Berlin that commercial investors deploy as cultural capital has also frequently been 
effectively deployed to stir residents’ support for political efforts that resist commercial 
development. The effect is that sympathy for resistant counterculture effort has become an 
integral part of many residents’ identities as Berliners. Since the Wende squatters’ 
movement included artistic and social collaborations between East and West Berliners and 
borrowed legacies of resistance from both of Berlin’s respective histories, the Wende 
squatters became icons of a spirit of reunified collective resistance with which many 
Berliners continue to identify. Many of the city’s present day strains of spatial resistance 
stem from practices borrowed from the counter-image making associated with the Wende 
squatters, ensuring that while only a few of their squats remain, their ideological aims 
remain alive in Berlin’s streets.   
While the Wende squatters were certainly influenced by the efforts of prior squatting 
movements,26 they responded to the unique opportunities afforded them by the political 
                                                
26 As Alex Vasudevan’s 2015 book The Spatial Politics of Squatting in Berlin makes clear, the Wende 
squatters were actually the second or third wave of squatters in Berlin. There is no question that just as 
contemporary resistance builds on the Wende squatters’ ideas, they too built upon an already-existing politics 
of squatting in the city by combining tendencies from prior examples in both East and West Berlin. In the 
West, this legacy was characterized by attempts at communal living during the student movements of the late 
60s and early 70s, whereas in the East, it was characterized by the practice of Schwarzwohnen, or illegal living 
 212 
instability of their era. During the Wende, the state’s ability to assert spatial control over 
East Berlin was significantly weakened due to a short-term political vacuum following the 
dissolution of the GDR. Sensing new possibilities in the face of this heretofore impossible-
seeming seismic shift in Berlin, the Wende squatters asserted their right to the city at a time 
“when East German police lacked authority but their West German counterparts had yet to 
assert theirs” (Falconer 100), allowing them to establish themselves in Mitte before they 
could arouse much attention. The various squatters interviewed for BWL frequently use the 
term vacuum to describe not just the political situation but also the chaotic cultural and 
social upheaval unique to the Wende. Brad Hwang articulates, “It was like the whole of 
mankind had simultaneously decided to just take a step back and allow each moment to 
resonate with whatever it happened to bring. Life had been put on hold. There was a vacuum 
– a cultural, social, political and economic vacuum. And we were the first people to fill it”27 
(BWL 180). Presented with the opportunity to rebuild the city in a completely new image, 
the Wende squatters experimented with alternative possibilities and ventured their own 
artistic visions of the city’s future well before a coherent commercial image for the New 
Berlin could be established. As a result, the counter-image of Berlin as a playground to 
investigate alternative and anti-commercial patterns of everyday life persists even as 
                                                                                                                                                 
in abandoned apartments. As Vasudevan writes, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, “squatting 
in Berlin formed part of a broader narrative of urban development, dispossession and resistance” in which 
“squatting and other occupation-based practices re-imagined the city as a space of refuge, gathering, and 
subversion” (4). Vasudevan suggests such practices contributed to the “making of an alternative urban 
imagination” (4), akin to the making of a counter-image for the city. In Berlin, “at least 610 separate squats of 
a broadly political nature [emerged] between 1970 and 2014” (Vasudevan 4), suggesting that while the practice 
may have occurred in waves, it has remained an integral part of a repertoire of resistant spatial practices and 
discursive knowledges in Berlin through the present era. 
27 “Es war so, als hätte sich die ganze Menschheit gleichzeitig entscheiden, einfach mal beiseitezutreten und 
jeden Moment zu erleben, wie er kommt. Das Leben war in der Warteschleife. Es gab ein Vakuum – ein 
kulturelles Vakuum, ein gesellschaftliches, ein politisches, ein ökonomisches. Und wir haben es als Erste 
gefüllt.” 
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Berlin’s commercial image continually attempts to subsume and supplant the rebellion 
inherent to it. 
Of course, it was not long before the political vacuum filled in enough for the state to 
take aim at the squatters’ collective spatial experiment. When 4000 West German police 
officers attempted to clear an entire block of squats on Mainzer Strasse in Mitte in 
November 1990 (Vasudevan 283), it had a “sobering and disenchanting effect” that squatter 
Uta Rügner  says “[cut] a huge gash through the movement both physically and 
symbolically”28 (125). Because the event “posed such danger to life and limb” (125), it 
galvanized some while causing others to abandon their squats or pull away from collective 
actions. The evictions caused the movement to lose some steam, forcing some residential 
projects to disperse and yet others to adopt tenancy agreements (125), marking a symbolic 
end to the movement even as pockets of squatters held out for years after. Yet the Mainzer 
clearings did little to quell the spirit of resistance that motivated occupation efforts and in 
fact, they likely helped crystallize the need for a broader effort by a Gegenöffentlichkeit. 
Following the Mainzer Strasse clearings, Heike Stuckert interviewed squatters at Tacheles, 
one of the Wende squatters’ movement’s most prominent art houses, who said that the 
targeted police violence only made them more certain of their cause. “They feel that 
Tacheles will become even more important now,” Stuckert writes, because “Tacheles allows 
for the possibility that something will be created out of a volatile history, a history that the 
German government may want to censor, presenting instead a polished commodity culture” 
(176). For the Tacheles squatters, resistance to the creation of a commercial image for Berlin 
was not only an anti-capitalist stance but also an anti-authoritarian stance, one that 
                                                
28 “…das hat – auch bildlich – eine Schneise in die Bewegung geschlagen” 
 214 
demanded Berlin’s history of authoritarian excesses not be erased to make way for a shiny 
new commercial image. The interviews in BWL suggest that this mindset is indicative of the 
movement as a whole. 
 
Collective Spatial Appropriation – From Tacheles to Mauer Park 
The social context of the Wende squatters’ movement was thus one in which the 
immediate revolutionary capacity of the void left in the Berlin Wall’s wake was met with the 
necessity for a slow but permanent mutation in the city’s socio-spatial organization. That the 
Wende squatters saw their work as the creation of an experimental Gesamtkunstwerk that 
might effect this transformation is indicated by their shared desire to imagine new 
possibilities for Berlin’s cityspace. In BWL, Jochen Sandig describes the Wende squatters as 
“possessed by a collective urge to create something new”29 (55) at a time when, as Ulrike 
Steglich notes, “nothing retained validity, everything was changing”30 (98) Though the 
political import of squatting was never far from sight, creative endeavors and the technical 
demands of do-it-yourself infrastructural repair remained the primary focus of day-to day 
life for those squatters who actually lived in the squatted buildings. Moreover, all aspects of 
everyday life were integrated into the dual political/artistic project constituted by domestic 
occupation. As Brad Hwang writes, “the everyday stuff that normally drags you down – 
getting the groceries, buying bread, figuring out how the heating works, fetching coal – all 
those things became part of a Gesamtkunstwerk”31 (49). By elevating the routines of 
domestic life to the level of artistic expression, the Wende squatters used their physical 
                                                
29 “Wir waren beseelt davon, gemeinsam Neues zu schaffen” 
30 “Nichts galt mehr, alles änderte sich.” 
31 “All das, was einen im Alltag eigentlich nervt – einkaufen, Brot holen, herausfinden, wie man heist, Kohlen 
finden – all das war Teil eines Gesamtkunstwerks.” 
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occupation of space to effect symbolic occupation as well. Their democratic approach to 
deciding how space should be used and the emphasis they placed on open lines of 
communication between squatter factions also transformed social relations within the 
occupied environment. Insofar as their occupation was marked by a completely transformed 
set of social relations to govern the neighborhood, the squatters did in fact succeed at 
creating a differential space atop the ruins of abstract space – even if only temporarily -- and 
thus jumpstarting the slow mutation of Berlin into a collage of counter-images. 
Squatter Ines Burdow recalls the movement having an implicit recognition of their 
right to the city, noting “Our basic feeling was: these are our buildings, this is our city – it all 
belongs to us”32 (49). Many of the squatters interviewed for BWL say they wanted to 
transform space itself, usually through disruption of the spatial classification categories used 
to subdivide abstract space according to hegemonic social relations. Photographs in the 
series include depictions of: an art gallery where the art is hung on the outside of the 
building façade; an open air installation with no walls but which simulates an indoor living 
room; city streets employed as makeshift living rooms/dining rooms; buildings (such as 
Tacheles) in which entire walls are missing, creating a diorama effect; and a whole host of 
everyday objects literally turned on their sides to create art, including military equipment 
and fighter jets stolen from abandoned East German bases. Accompanying all of these 
projects are a bevy of graffitial images, banners, signs, and other artistic interventions in 
Mitte’s linguistic landscape. Such projects helped the Wende squatters transform material 
space in ways that deconstructed binaries like inside/outside, public/private, work/play, and 
civic/domestic, all while also challenging norms regarding which kinds of space can be used 
                                                
32 “Unser Gefühl war: Das sind unsere Häuser, das ist unsere Stadt – das ist unseres.” 
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to which ends and who can access which kinds of spaces. Speaking of the RA.M-M theater 
performances in Tacheles, Arthur Kuggeleyn suggests that this mindset extended to the 
symbolic aspects of their occupation as well. He writes, “the idea was to touch the audience, 
to break down barriers using theatre, to perform without a stage – or, conversely, to expand 
the stage to include everything”33 (201). The Wende squatters saw the entirety of the city 
space as raw material for their performance of occupation. They used the “empty halls, 
ruins, and stretches of wasteland” of occupied former East districts as “starting points and 
integral features of their work”34 (BWL195), but they also imbued material spaces with 
artistically rendered symbolic meanings that contradicted the commercial narratives 
associated with the city.  
For this reason, the Wende squatters forecasted the kinds of twenty-first century 
resistance which Morawski identifies as necessary for the formation of a city-wide collective 
of spatial appropriation. Morawski suggests that any successful strategy to create differential 
space in the city must marry the pursuit and development of an urban counter-image with 
collectively defined Gegenöffentlichkeit’s attempts to appropriate the material city space 
from numerous points of entry. He sees the right to the city as a right to a renewable 
[erneuerbares] urban life, achievable only through “the collective appropriation of urban 
space”35 (16) with the intention of extending the fulfillment of basic human needs 
[menschliche Grundbedürfnisse] to all. Like Huyssen, he also believes that the dominance of 
neoliberal and capitalistic thinking in Berlin is extension of the way the commercial image 
has made the city more of a corporate enterprise than a living environment. He writes that as 
                                                
33 “Die Idee war, das Publikum zu berühren, durch Theater Grenzen zu sprengen und ohne Bühne zu spielen 
beziehungsweise alles zur Bühne zu erklären..” 
34 Die leer stehenden Hallen, Ruinenund Brachen wurden Ausgangspunkt und Teil ihrer Inszenierungen. 
35 “die kollektive Aneignung des städtischen Raums” 
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cities like Berlin attempt to make themselves seem more attractive to economic actors, they 
“[pursue] similar strategies as economic enterprises: the construction of a brand (for 
example, “Be Berlin”) together with representative modern buildings and the corresponding 
offer of a lively culture. The appearance and the image of the city becomes [its] calling 
card”36 (24). However, whereas Huyssen’s discussion of the commercial image described a 
process still in motion in the late 1990s, by Morawski’s account in 2014, the city’s 
commercial image has already resulted in widespread neoliberal urbanization. Resistance 
can no longer fend off the city’s capitalistic transformation but must instead develop new 
strategies of spatial appropriation based on intervention in an already solidifed commercial 
environment.  Like Vidler, Morawski sees intervention in space as a way to trigger spatial 
mutation. Rather than a massive overhaul of space, resistant actors must use individual 
strategies across the city to infect and appropriate the spaces from which they are supposed 
to be excluded, transforming spatial codes in the process. In the absence of strategies that 
might slice through the commercial image, this strategy seeks to bleed the commercial 
image to death through a million tiny pinpricks. Though the Wende squatters’ transformation 
of Mitte was relatively brief, it can be considered the catalyst that helped foment broader 
resistant swells in the decades that followed, helping create the multi-faceted 
Gegenöffentlichkeit of Berlin today. 
Returning to Morawski’s tri-level framework for spatial appropriation, it is clear that 
the Wende squatters employed strategies befitting all three planes of urban spatial 
appropriation. On the “spatial practices” plane, the act of squatting is an obvious 
                                                
36 “…[verfolgen] ähnliche Strategien wie Wirtschaftsunternehmen: den Aufbau einer Marke (z.B. “Be Berlin”) 
samt repräsentiver moderner Bauten (z.B. Potsdamer Platz) und entsprechendem ‘lebendigem’ Kulturangebot. 
Das Aussehen und das Image der Stadt werden zur Visitenkarte.” 
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appropriation of the material space of the city. However, one might also consider the 
squatters’ do-it-yourself building renovation efforts an extension of this material occupation, 
since the physical alterations they made also transformed the physical space. Further, since 
their use of the material environment subverted the classificatory categories used to 
subdivide abstract space, they reconceived the physical forms that the built environment 
could take. In BWL, photos of the squatters scaling buildings, sitting atop rooftops, erecting 
their own scaffolding, or jumping into public pools in the middle of the night all suggest that 
their creative transformation of occupied buildings extended beyond pure aesthetics to 
include a re-conception of how a given building could be used. This creative re-conception 
extends to their use of building materials, such as in one photo in which a man has stacked 
couch cushions atop a pile of bricks in order to create a makeshift couch. Their material 
subversion is also relevant to the second plane concerned with appropriation of the space of 
communication [Kommunikationsraum], since the squatters’ aesthetic transformation of 
space also re-imagined the places where people socialize, such as their communal approach 
to meal preparation and dining, or their use of public streets as party plazas. 
Many of the types of art the Wende squatters made constituted a direct appropriation 
of the space of communication, especially their use of graffiti, banners, and signage. 
Morawski points out that generally, channels of communication in public space are limited 
to the scope of official commercial and state communication, such as advertisements and 
billboards, signs indicating stores and offices, street signs, and warnings, all of which cannot 
be erected by anyone without power and money enough to do so.  “Communication in 
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public space is linked to societal positions of power, and thus does not take place equally”37 
(39), he writes, suggesting how the “massive presence” of advertising in the linguistic 
landscape38 of the city creates an imbalance of power in the relationship between sender and 
receiver. (39-40) By employing techniques that inscribe alternative communication in space 
itself, such as the use of message-bearing graffitial images on both the inside and outside of 
occupied buildings, the Wende squatters replaced commercial channels of public 
communication with unofficial, transgressive channels of public communication. This 
allowed them to appropriate Mitte’s linguistic landscape and reconfigure the kinds of 
messages transmitted in and through the material environment. Their use of graffiti also 
communicated the squatters’ ownership of and physical claim to the occupied space, since it 
physically announced their ownership of walls marked by their tags. 
        As for appropriation of the “spaces of representation,” the Wende squatters’ 
contributions to strategies on this plane are more difficult to articulate, at least in part 
because so much of the artistic work created by the Wende squatters was performative and 
therefore ephemeral. That said, any artistic output about their space, any attempts to archive 
the history of their cultural moment, any writing or art or photography meant to document 
the resistant knowledge contained in their history could be considered part of their long-term 
intervention on this third plane. To that end, I would argue that publications like BWL are 
themselves appropriations of the representation of space, since they restore the history of a 
transgressive cultural moment that might otherwise have been lost, bringing discussion of 
the moment back into the public domain. If the clichéd axiom about history being written by 
                                                
37 “Die Kommunikation in öffentlichem Raum [ist] mit gesellschaftlichen Machtpositionen verknüpft und 
findet damit nicht gleichberechtigt statt” 
38 Sociolinguist Uta Papen defines linguistic landscape as all uses of textual communication in a given space, 
which mark that space as belonging to or being associated with one or multiple population groups (57). 
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the victors is true, then publications like BWL speak to hidden alternative histories and 
perform the discursive work of demonstrating how space could have been conceived 
otherwise.  
 It is not insignificant that BWL was published in 2014, when anti-gentrification 
sentiments caused occupation-based forms of resistance to again gain steam in Berlin. The 
photo series situates the Wende movement in a new historical context and points to the 
relevant parallels that can be drawn between the Wende squatters and the present 
Gegenöffentlichkeit. In her review of BWL journalist Jane Paulick observes, “given [Mitte’s] 
complete transformation over the last two decades into the apogee of cool, looking back at 
those years is like trying to remember a dream” (Paulick). The photos in the series give 
present-day readers a comparison point against which to evaluate the gentrified spaces of 
Berlin today. They contribute to a counter-image of Berlin by reminding the city’s 
inhabitants that the commercial image of urban renewal was not always absolute. In a 
manner not unlike the genealogical possibilities produced by Foucauldian critique where 
power-backed societal norms are “associated with a domain of possibility and consequently, 
of reversibility, of possible reversal,” (Foucault 66) representations of appropriated spaces 
reveal how the commercial image’s control of the cityspace is more tenuous than fixed. 
Projects like BWL remind readers that the discursive power of resistant spatial practices 
resonates long after their tangible staging is complete. As such, any text which attempts to 
either preserve the city space in its contemporaneous resistant form or to preserve the 
memory of a form since lost to capitalistic urbanization takes part in the project of 
appropriating representations of space. Such texts reignite discussion about the right to the 
city and reveal a Berlin that could have been, still is, or could still be. For the remainder of 
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this chapter, I outline multiple instances of post-reunification resistance in Berlin that map to 
each of Morawski’s planes of intervention, all of which build upon the legacy of counter-
image making about the New Berlin that the Wende squatters inaugurated. Moreover, the 
texts investigated in the remainder of this chapter span numerous media, artistic positions, 
and disciplines as a reflection of Morawski’s observation that a Gegenöffentlichkeit must 
draw from myriad discursive wells in order to create collective city appropriation. 
 
“Spatial Practices”: Occupation of Physical Space 
Morawski begins his analysis of the type of spatial intervention he calls “spatial 
practices” with a comprehensive discussion of occupations (Besetzungen). He suggests that 
occupation is a grounding strategy not just for spatial practices, but also for all forms of 
collective city appropriation (Stadtaneignung) since “occupations can temporarily or 
permanently evade government control and the exploitative interests of the free market 
economy, thus making alternative forms of encounter, productive debate, and coexistence 
possible, often for the first time”39 (48). Since the first plane of intervention, that of “spatial 
practices,” is the only one concerned with the physical, rather than symbolic, appropriation 
of space, physical occupation of the city’s material spaces is its natural expression. Even so, 
“presence in space forms a good starting point for effective high-publicity communication of 
protest in the public sphere and thereby also for appropriation of the symbolic plane of 
space”40 (48). As an inhabited performance of occupation, squatting might be considered a 
strategy for interventional occupation par excellence, since it integrates the routine practices 
                                                
39 “Besetzungen können Räume temporär oder dauerhaft behördlicher Kontrolle und den 
Verwertungsinteressen der freien Marktwirtschaft entziehen und damit alternative Formen des 
Zusammentreffens, der produktiven Auseinandersetzung und des Zusammenlebens oft erst möglich machen.” 
40 “Die Präsenz im Raum [schafft] eine gute Ausgangslage für die öffentlichkeitswirksame Kommunikation 
von Protest im öffentlichen Raum und somit auch für die Aneignung der symbolischen Ebene des Raums.” 
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of everyday life into the act of spatial appropriation and allows for slow mutation of space 
on both the physical and symbolic planes. 
        Though a small number of Berlin squats from both the Wende era and prior remain, 
they are few and far between. As one of the most high-profile Wende-era squats, Tacheles 
remained functional for many years but was finally shuttered in 2013. Still, a few smaller 
squats remain, such as Kopi 137 in Kreuzberg, a punk squat which predates even the Wende 
squatters, and newer squats such as those on Rigaer Strasse, which were the site of violent 
eviction attempts and contentious social clashes as recently as 2018. (squat.net) Sites like 
these are a testament to how important squatting remains to Berlin’s counter-cultural 
identity, even if popular criticism of the leftist and often anarchist political leanings of recent 
squatters has seemingly intensified as the city has gentrified. Following a 2016 raid on 
Rigaerstrasse 94 aka R94, Feargus O’Sullivan of CityLab observed that “Rigaer Strasse is in 
a gentrifying, well-to-do area that frequently acts as a second choice overspill for people 
who’d really like to live in the more expensive neighborhood next door,” noting that while 
squats once “[formed] a cornerstone of the city’s alternative mythos,” the commercial 
transformation of the city has made it harder and harder for them to sustain popular support 
as neighborhoods become more desirable. (CityLab 2016). In their own blog on squat.net, a 
site where squatters from around the world trade information and news, R94 detail a long-
term process of surveillance and state resistance directed at their building, describing the 
state’s actions as a “reality and praxis not only against Islamic fundamentalists or allegedly 
crazy terrorists but also against resistant, ideological disagreeables, against members of the 
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opposition, against us…”41 (Rigaer94). They assert that they are targets of outsized police 
violence, further evidenced by O’Sullivan’s recognition that raids on R94 have had an 
“almost military” character and that the squat tends to be targeted because “officialdom sees 
them as an inconvenience”  (CityLab, 2016). As dangerous as occupation has become in the 
current climate, squatters generally see the act of inconveniencing the state as productive in 
its own right, because it forcibly makes visible the state violence required to maintain 
control over urban space. 
Such exposition of state violence was a central focus of one recent use of squatting 
undertaken by a group of “displaced citizens of Sudan, Uganda, Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and other nations” calling themselves Refugee Tent Action. (Landry 399) In 
the autumn of 2012, Refugee Tent Action’s roughly 100-150 members occupied Berlin-
Kreuzberg’s Oranienplatz for 550 days to protest the dehumanizing conditions42 they faced 
as asylum seekers in Germany, eventually relocating to the abandoned Gerhart-Hauptmann 
School in Kreuzberg after police evictions forced them from the more public Oranienplatz 
location. On June 24th, 2014, authorities again attempted to evict Refugee Tent Action from 
the school, resulting in violent clashes not just between police and squatters but also 
between police and protestors, journalists, and politicians who showed up in support of the 
refugees, resulting in an eight-day standoff at the Gerhart-Hauptmann School. In their video 
report on the standoff, VICE News got footage of police brutally detaining refugees, 
                                                
41 “All das Beschriebene ist heute Realität und Praxis, nicht nur gegen Islamist*innen oder vermeintlich 
verrückte Terrorist*innen sondern gegen Widerständige, ideologisch Unliebsame, gegen Oppositionelle, gegen 
uns…” 
42 Since I am focused on the function of this protest rather than its specific cause, I have not elaborated at 
length as to the issues the asylum seekers were protesting, but Landry cites “the Dublin II regulation, which 
stipulates that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first European country they enter” as well as “the 
lack of transparency and the inefficiency in the asylum application process; the labour, education, and 
subsidized health-care bans; and regular deportations” as just a few of the issues that sparked Refugee Tent 
Action’s occupation. (Landry 402) 
 224 
assaulting high school students who staged a sit-in to support the refugees, and denying the 
press access to the school and the refugees within it. In one shot, a refugee woman 
passionately shouts in German through the fence to the press, “They will be deported! Single 
[document] inspection means death [for] these people! When the people come here, what 
happens to us? They want to evict us forcibly!”43 (Vice News, “Evicting the Unwanted,” 
2014). Her use of German highlights the degree to which her status as perceived Other has 
nothing to do with any lack of willingness to adjust to Berlin’s local spatial codes. The video 
also shows refugees who have climbed onto the roof, claiming they will jump if they are 
forcibly evicted. The life-or-death stakes of Refugee Tent Action’s occupation amplifies the 
violence required to deny them asylum. In the Vice video, it is clear that Refugee Tent 
Action actively places their own bodies on the line in order to defend the right for all 
refugees to stay.  
As a precursor to the massive influx of refugees into Germany from 2015 onward, 
the demands made by Refugee Tent Action spoke to the pitfalls of Germany’s asylum 
process and the changes that would be necessary to treat asylum applicants with more 
human dignity, exposing issues that would reach a fever pitch a few years later when the city 
was flooded with refugees as a result of the crisis in Syria. In contrast to the generally more 
creatively-minded occupations of most Wende squatters, Refugee Tent Action was an 
explicitly political squatting movement, concerned foremost with asserting their right to take 
up space within Germany and within the global society. To this end, they also disseminated 
information as a form of grassroots public education, using their occupation to spurn 
political action from Berlin’s citizen inhabitants. As Olivia Landry observes, Refugee Tent 
                                                
43 “Sie würden abgeschoben! Einzel Verprüfung bedeutet tot dieser Menschen! Wenn die Leute hier kommen, 
was passieren mit uns, man? Sie wollen uns mit Gewalt räumen!” 
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Action included asylum seekers “with no home, no resources, and sometimes even no 
documents” who would have been cut off from more official forms of political action, 
meaning that “the collective power of bodies and voices in a public space became their only 
means of redress against what is for many an unjust and debilitating asylum system” (399). 
Resisting state powers that rendered them invisible, Refugee Tent Action used their 
corporeal occupation of a high profile public square44 to insist upon recognition of their 
existence and their need for integration into German society. In this way, they not only 
asserted their right to the city but also their right to take up space at all.  
Refugee Tent Action extended the notion of the urban inhabitant to include itinerant 
populations in ways that Landry argues “transcend the narrow limits of nation and ethnicity 
and open up broader communities of inclusion” (Landry 409). Their demand for the right to 
the city illuminated the parallels between the struggles of itinerant and displaced migrants 
and Berlin’s existing displaced and homeless inhabitants, particularly when compared with 
the rapid gentrification of historically working-class Kreuzberg and nearby districts. Landry 
compares the group to the Kreuzberg-based anti-gentrification renter’s collective, Kotti & 
Co., saying “just as the protesters of Refugee Tent Action have been fighting for their 
existence and their human and civil rights, on a smaller scale the members of Kotti & Co. 
have been fighting for their homes and their right to social participation in the urban space” 
(407). She explains that Refugee Tent Action “forged an ideational solidarity and coalition 
with Berlin-Kreuzberg residents” that “contested both the devastating and exclusionary 
politics of ghettoization that has shaped the neighborhood’s recent history and the 
                                                
44 The refugees initially tried to occupy the even higher profile Pariser Platz near Brandenburg Gate but, in a 
move that will shock no one who has been following along, they were quickly displaced to Kreuzberg so as to 
avoid bothering tourists. 
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commodification of urban space in Berlin-Kreuzberg” (408). Refugee Tent Action’s 
material appropriation of the public space of Oranienplatz included a symbolic occupation 
of Kreuzberg at a time when the effects of gentrification were increasingly contributing to 
the displacement of many Kreuzberg residents, something with Kotti & Co. had already 
been protesting in their own right. Tellingly, Marowski also mentions both groups in his 
discussion of the second plane of spatial intervention as well, since both used “occupation as 
a communications strategy,” heightening squatting to the level of political demonstration 
and educational campaign. By mapping their own cause to that of the rest of Kreuzberg’s 
precariat, Refugee Tent Action signal-boosted the political needs of all of the district’s 
displaced inhabitants, forging solidarity with their local Kieze and attuning their actions to a 
city-wide resistant collective bonded through the experience of urban precarity. 
Just as the Wende squatters challenged binary designations used to exert control over 
abstract space, Refugee Tent Action subverted binary designations such as citizen/non-
citizen, belonging/exclusion and legal/illegal, reconfiguring the idea of the urban inhabitant 
to respond to still greater modes of precarity. As Landry argues, Refugee Tent Action’s 
public outreach proclaimed “We are global citizens in search of basic human and civil 
rights, and the city – especially Berlin-Kreuzberg – as the space of global practices and 
processes is our medium.” (411) Given Germany’s recent influx of refugees and the 
country-wide rise in xenophobic sentiments that has attended it, concerns raised by Refugee 
Tent Action have only become that much more pressing. Consequently, Refugee Tent 
Action’s discourses surrounding citizenship and urban belonging remain a salient part of 
collective occupation processes in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Further, Refugee Tent 
Action’s occupation resulted in a few immediate successes, including an easing of residence 
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requirements for asylum seekers and the right for asylum seekers to work following a 
designated waiting period. (Landry 410) By adopting a locally preferred strategy for spatial 
intervention, Refugee Tent Action embedded themselves in Berlin’s unique local protest 
climate. However, they also expanded the city’s squatting history by extending its scope in a 
global way and demonstrating how disparate forms of occupation can address collective 
precarity. 
Less direct but no less salient a form of contemporary spatial appropriation in Berlin 
is the collective mostly unplanned reconstitution of the Tempelhofer Feld (Tempelhof 
Airfield) as a mixed-use public space. When Tempelhof Airport was closed in 2008 it left 
roughly 940 acres of de-commissioned airstrips and open space in the center of Berlin’s 
Neukölln neighborhood. Rather than letting the space fall into complete disuse, city officials 
temporarily opened it up to the public in 2010, at which point Berlin’s citizens more or less 
spontaneously put it to use as an open-air park replete with community gardens and 
recreational activities. As Yuma Shinohara writes in DEMO:POLIS--The Right To Public 
Space (2016), the success of Tempelhofer Feld as a park “seems to lie in its anti-
programmatic character: (almost) every activity is allowed, and decisions on how to 
appropriate the space are left open to individual users” (210), meaning that portions of the 
parks are devoted to uses as varied as political demonstration, instructional programs, public 
performances, and all manner of recreational activities, especially those that make unique 
use of the airport tarmac, such as cycling and kiteboarding.  
As Neukölln gentrified, the prospect of such a vast empty space tantalized real estate 
developers and the state alike. Worries that the space would eventually be sold off to 
investors prompted concerned citizens to form the group Demokratische Initiative 100% 
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Tempelhofer Feld e.V., who have began campaigning in 2011 for “the full preservation of 
the field as an open landscape in the middle of city” (210). Their citizen’s referendum 
(Volksbegehren) referenced the need not only for open, recreational space to counteract the 
demands of urban life, but also the need to preserve the historical and cultural memory of 
the airfield and its relics, including memorialization of the concentration camp labor the 
Third Reich used to build it. Using a website, a carefully outlined YouTube video, a strong 
social media presence, and a volunteer-based street campaign, the club engaged in a variety 
of grassroots techniques to disseminate information and amass signatures supporting their 
referendum, such as “self-made and distributed clipboards and signature lists; a mobile 
‘bicycle table’ in the form of a board that could be carried on a cyclist’s back and converted 
into a table by laying it across a bicycle; and a campaign newspaper, which parodied the 
style and tone of the German tabloid Bild.” As a consequence of this highly-coordinated and 
multi-dimensional effort, the referendum to prohibit any further construction on 
Tempelhofer Feld passed with a 64% majority of votes, defying “the majority opinion in 
Berlin’s house of representatives” and assuring that the park remained open to all citizens. 
(Shinohara, 210) 
One of the club’s primary arguments against development on the field specifically 
concerned the commercial image of the city. They suggested that private investors 
intentionally mislead citizens by paying lip service to a desire to increase housing 
opportunities for all while advancing development plans that ultimately only served elite 
interests. The group asserted that even if initial development were pursued equitably, the 
increased commercial interest in the area would exacerbate the displacement of poorer 
residents from historically working-class Neukölln. Though the Tempelhofer Feld citizen’s 
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campaign was arguably more polished and professional in its approach than most squatting-
based occupations, it constituted a similar symbolic re-authoring of the field’s importance to 
match the spontaneous material appropriation the space had undergone through its popular 
use by Berliners of all persuasions. As Shinohara notes, through their reclamation of 
Tempelhofer Feld, “the citizens of Berlin...claimed their right to have a say in urban 
development,” thereby also claiming their right to the field as one of the city’s most valuable 
spatial resources. Since 2015, Refugee Tent Action’s cause has become linked to 
Tempelhofer Feld’s—the airport building at Tempelhofer has become a so-called “Container 
Village” [Containerdorf] after the state designated it as a refugee accommodation 
[Flüchtlingsunterkunft] for refugees awaiting housing in Berlin. In addition to an open space 
where citizens can escape the chaos of urban life, Tempelhofer Feld has also become the 
largest temporary housing site for refugees in Berlin. (Haak, Berliner Zeitung, May 2018) 
 
“Spaces of Representation”: Graffiti and Street Art 
Graffiti and street art are a ubiquitous part of Berlin’s contemporary culture, so it is 
no surprise that both have been integrated into collective spatial resistance in the city. Both 
Stih & Schnock’s Orte des Erinnerns [Places of Remembrance] (1992) and East Cross 
Project’s Berlin Spricht Wände [Berlin Speaks Walls] (2013) showcase techniques that 
appropriate the space of representation, Morawski’s second plane concerned with channels 
of communication in public space. Orte des Erinnerns, a public art installation that acts as a 
sort of counter-monument was created in Berlin’s Bayerisches Viertel (Bavarian Quarter) in 
1992, following a 1991 contest for project ideas concerning a memorial to the cultural 
history of Jewish life in the quarter and to the atrocities Jewish residents suffered there under 
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the Nazi regime. In the catalog for the 2016 Berlin art show DEMO:POLIS, which brought 
together projects from around the globe concerned with the right to public space, Renata 
Stih reflects on the evolution of public art in Berlin since the Wende. She observes that after 
reunification, remembrance art like Orte des Erinnerns helped Berliners forge their identity 
in a new Berlin, acting as a “constant” (49) amid the chaotic changes of the period. During 
the Wende, “topics of cultural politics, like the artistic confrontation of the German past, the 
Third Reich, and especially the Holocaust” achieved primacy as Germans found themselves 
questioning what should be retained in a reunited German identity. Within this social 
climate, public space became a sort of “democratic soapbox” where citizens could 
collectively imagine the meaning of German identity and what role it ought to play in 
shaping Berlin anew. (Stih 50) It was in this context that Stih and her partner Frieder 
Schnock presented their “radical concept for a decentralized memorial” that could “situate 
the memorial in close proximity to the local residents” and become an integral part of the 
neighborhood’s linguistic landscape. (Stih 50-51)  
To accomplish this, Stih & Schnock interviewed local residents to “find out how 
much of these historical events was still present in people’s memory” and then built the 
project around their findings, thus creating a physical manifestation of the district’s 
collective cultural memory. As Stih describes: 
Eighty double-sided signs, a colorful image on one side, revised paragraphs of anti-
Jewish legislation from the years 1933-1945 in black and white on the other, 
confront the passersby with the almost forgotten history of this neighborhood and 
accompany them throughout their day-to-day routines...By distributing the signs all 
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over the streets of the neighborhood, we created a kind of walk-through 
documentation and interlocked the memorial with the urban environment. (51) 
Though the project was officially commissioned and thus may be considered a more 
commercial use of space than other forms of spatial intervention, its critical content and 
radical positioning penetrate the project’s commercial use. By adding these snippets of text 
and photo into the official signage of the neighborhood, cultural memory is integrated into 
the neighborhood’s official linguistic landscape, albeit in ways that restore a voice to the 
neighborhoods historical inhabitants. Because of the way the memorial periodically 
confronts residents and visitors as they go about their daily routines and move through the 
neighborhood, it serves as “a metaphor for the daily hardships, the deprivation, and 
ultimately, the deportation and murder of Jewish citizens during the Third Reich” (51). Orte 
des Erinnerns thereby creates the sort of “active remembrance” (52) that Stih suggests is a 
necessary to potentiate a more “conscious and animated” public space. (53) 
Orte des Erinnerns is a testament to Stih’s observation that “art, zeitgeist, and social 
and urban space are all part of a symbiosis,” and that public art and installations must “be in 
tune with the psychological quality of [their] location” (Stih 48). But it is also a permanent 
alteration of the spatial logic of an entire neighborhood in ways that actively refuse to erase 
the authoritarian violence historically used to control the space of said neighborhood. In a 
manner not unlike the embodied demonstrations by Refugee Tent Action, Orte des 
Erinnerns renders visible the state violence used to control which bodies have access to the 
city space and its resources. By highlighting the laws once used to control Jewish citizens 
(One example: “Jews in Berlin may only shop for groceries afternoons between 4 and 5pm, 
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4.7.194045), the signs force a reflexive consideration of the space one occupies and the 
forces of power once used to control its inhabitants. The memorial’s spatial situated-ness 
thus contributes to its discursive critique in manners mirrored by other Berlin memorials, 
such as the vast swath of central real estate afforded the Denkmal für die ermorderten Juden 
Europas [Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe] in Mitte or the ubiquity of the small 
square Stolpersteine [Stepping Stones] that can be found throughout the city embedded in 
the ground outside the former residences of those who died in concentration camps. Like 
these and many other forms of remembrance art in Berlin, Orte des Erinnerns renders 
visible a history that might otherwise be erased by the constant reproduction of the city as 
abstract space. Though all three memorials I mention have been easily integrated into 
Berlin’s commercial image through the cultural value of dark tourism, they also echo the 
way many counter-images of Berlin use collective memory to contribute to the slow 
mutation of space along anti-authoritarian lines.   
Yet official memorials and state-sanctioned art are by no means as omnipresent an 
appropriation of Berlin’s communication space as is the ubiquity of graffitial images, a term 
I use to designate any non-commissioned use of graffiti or street art (pictorial, textual, or 
otherwise) on public-facing buildings or surfaces. Berlin Spricht Wände is a multimedia 
documentary composed of multiple smaller film and music video projects made over the 
course of a few years that focuses on the diversity of Berlin’s graffitial images. The first two 
parts of the film, “Berlin spricht” [Berlin Speaks] (2010) and “Berlin spricht…für sich” 
[Berlin Speaks…for itself] (2012) were both made by a rapper named Emus Primus, who 
filmed various depictions of mostly textual graffitial images in Berlin, then combined the 
                                                
45 “Lebensmittel dürfen Juden in Berlin nur nachmittags von 4 bis 5 Uhr einkaufen. 4.7.1940.” 
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mixed German and English text of the images into rap songs. After the first two Emus 
Primus videos gained popularity on social media platforms like Vimeo and YouTube, the 
project was expanded into Berlin spricht Wände [Berlin speaks walls] (2012), a 
documentary which included a third text/rap video of the same title in addition to footage 
from various events in Berlin’s street art scene and live footage of street artists at work.  
The titles for the three Emus Primus music videos make it sound as if Berlin’s walls 
speak for themselves on behalf of the city as a whole, which is an apt description of the 
impression the project gives. The title “Berlin spricht…für sich” also uses the reflexive sich 
to demonstrate how graffitial messages communicate collective resistance on behalf of the 
city’s Gegenöffentlichkeit. It suggests that ownership of Berlin’s “voice” (and thus of Berlin 
itself) rests with the precariat who control the graffitial messages, rather than with those who 
have access to more official channels of communication. Though the longer documentary 
features footage of artists in action, the music videos more or less remove the presence of 
the artists to focus on a series of textual snapshots. Even when artists are seen, their faces are 
obscured, leaving the graffitial images to form their own narrative. In the sense that they 
offer a visible, public voice to an otherwise muted precariat, graffitial images do in fact 
enable a city’s walls to speak on behalf of the city, where the city is understood as the sum 
total of all of its inhabitants. In this way, graffiti can be considered a primary 
communication channel of the Gegenöffentlichkeit. Graffitial images make interaction with 
public space itself a form of communication, as graffitied walls enter into conversation with 
public viewers of all stripes, inserting discursive possibilities into the city’s linguistic 
landscape. What is more, even where the specific message of a given graffitial image cannot 
be apprehended by a given viewer, it’s material location within the built environment 
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communicates spatial transgression nonetheless, since graffiti is always a violation of 
hegemonic spatial codes.  
The supplemental footage in the longer documentary features many of Berlin’s most 
famous street artists, including Phos4, B52 Crew, Feliks Stift, and Bosso Fataka. In a blatant 
nod to the legacy of the Wende squatters, the film also includes footage from the proverbial 
end days at Tacheles before they lost their lease in 2013. While the amalgamation of 
graffitial messages in the project highlight numerous issues central to contemporary 
resistance movements in Berlin, the supplemental documentary footage expands the purview 
of the original music videos by revealing the collective ways in which street art is created 
and passed on to new artistic generations in Berlin. As an appropriation of the space of 
communication, the graffitial images used in the film mutate the built environment by 
altering Berlin’s material aesthetics and forcefully inserting an alternative voice into the 
linguistic landscape of the city. Moreover, the film’s worldwide dissemination through 
social channels like Vimeo and YouTube extends the scope of spatial appropriation to insert 
itself into digital representations of Berlin as space.  
Majority of the graffitial images Emus Primus filmed for the music videos are 
explicitly resistant or transgressive, even when meant purely as jokes or deployed for sheer 
shock value. A large portion are infused with anti-capitalist messages such as “Freude hat 
mit Autos nix zu tun” [Joy has nothing to do with cars]; “Good things in life are not things”; 
“Shoot the bank”; “Eat the rich!”; and “Kauf um den Leben” [Buy for life]. Of these, many 
highlight anti-gentrification sentiments, such as “Gentrifick dich!” [Gentri-fuck you!], 
“Luxus für Alle!” [Luxury for all!], “Diese Stadt is aufgekauft” [This city is sold out], “Die 
reich’n wern ärmer und die andern auch” [The rich get poorer and the others too]; and 
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“Welcome to Schwabylon,” a reference to the widespread belief that an influx of new higher 
income residents from Schwabia is a driving force of gentrification. Related to these are 
those with anti-tourism messages , such as “U Touri kill our Kiez”; “Stop being a tourist”; 
and “Hässlich Willkomen” [“ugly welcome”], a play on the traditional German greeting 
“Herzlich Willkommen” [“Affectionate Welcome”]. Tellingly, anti-gentrification and anti-
tourism messages seem to opt for English over German at a higher frequency than other 
messages do, suggesting that they are intended for an international audience that includes 
tourists and other itinerants.46 Such targeted messaging highlights how graffitial images can 
be used as a unidirectional form of messaging that addresses an intended discursive target. 
What is more, anti-gentrification and anti-tourist sentiments appeared less frequently in the 
first music video, made in 2010, and at a much higher frequency in the third music video, 
made in 2012. This suggests that collective anti-gentrification resistance gained momentum 
in the time between films, a sentiment reflected by the dual concerns of Refugee Tent 
Action and Kotti & Co. in the same year.47 Viewed together, the evolution in graffitial 
messages across Emus Primus’ three rap videos creates a timeline demonstrating how 
quickly resistance movements in Berlin shift focus to respond to present need, and how 
easily these shifting focuses can be integrated into subversive communication in the city.  
A number of the graffitial messages in the videos are spatially-bounded to 
communities or Kieze in Berlin, making reference either to well-known squatting projects, 
                                                
46 That said, the use of English in Berlin is by no means uncommon--since so much of the existing populace 
comes from outside of Germany, even German-born Berliners are generally comfortable conversing in English, 
and a large swath of the city’s linguistic landscape includes the use of English. For this reason, the use of 
English in so much of Berlin’s street art can also be considered an accurate reflection of the city’s current 
culture. 
47 Anecdotally, I can confirm this with my experience in Berlin doing research in 2014. Nearly every piece of 
graffiti I saw, particularly in the Neukölln area, contained either an anti-gentrification or anti-tourism message. 
The preponderance of these kinds of messages was actually so obvious that it was the exact observation that 
put me on the research path that eventually brought me to the present chapter.  
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such as “I support Tacheles” and “Deutschland verrecke – Kopi bleibt” [Germany kicks the 
bucket – Kopi remains], or commenting on particular neighborhoods, as in “F’hain ist 
risiko” [Friedrichshain is danger/risk]; “Ostkreuz Superhelden” [Ostkreuz superheroes]; 
“Happy X-berg [Kreuzberg] & Happy Neukölln! and “This is not Kreuzberg”. Place names 
are used not only to claim those spaces as occupied territory but also to center locality in 
way’s less broad than the Berlin-wide rhetoric of the commercial image. This also includes 
frequent reference to the Kiez as a micro-local spatial designation, appearing frequently in 
messages like “der Kiez schwart über” [the Kiez is swarming over]; “I love my Kiez”; and 
“Kiez statt Kies” [Kiez instead of money]48. In addition to claiming the city’s spaces for 
themselves, street artists also claim authority over Berlin’s alternative history by referencing 
slogans of local resistance movements past and present like “Wir bleiben Alle” [“We are all 
staying”], a rallying cry of both East Germans and squatting movements since the 70s; 
“Reclaim your city”; and “Fuck der Media Spree” [Fuck the Media Spree], referring to 
occupations and demonstrations against corporate and commercial development of the Spree 
riverfront. Unsurprisingly given the medium, there are also a number of anti-police/anti-
authority messages in the videos, such as “Love art, hate cops” and “Cops ruin everything 
around me”, as well as calls to riot or rebellion such as a park and ride sign transformed into 
“Park & Riot!” and “Steine sind zum werfen da” [Stones are there to be thrown]. A few also 
contain general declarations of love for the street, such as “Home street Home” and “The 
street never ends, the art never dies.” All of these types of graffitial images serve an 
explicitly politicized, resistant function and appropriate public space as a medium for 
communicating political or ideological opposition to urban commercialization. 
                                                
48 “Kiez statt Kies” is not actually included in the Berlin Spricht Wände project, but is a message on the side of 
a building in Neukölln that I passed frequently during my time in Berlin in 2014. 
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Yet another set of graffitial messages from Berlin Spricht Wände perform a different 
function, since they are intended to alter the appeal of the material environment for investors 
and elites. These messages include curse words, drug references, sexual innuendo or crass 
humor. Some are deployed for shock value, as in “Broke on coke but that’s okay”; “Happy-
go-fucky”; “Fickt euch alle” [Fuck all of you]; “Team Kokain”; and “Cocaine 4 free” 
accompanied by a surface painted with three white lines to mimic the drug. Others are 
merely an effect of subversive humor, such as “Fuck the Fuck”; “Smells like street (f)art”; 
and “Die Kinder vom Bahnhofs Klo” [The children from the train station toilet], a reference 
to the 1981 film Die Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo about the drug scene in West Berlin in the 
1970s. Such messages subvert official and acceptable forms of public communication within 
the linguistic landscape in ways that intentionally desecrate hegemonic ideals of politeness. 
Considering the prominence of anti-gentrification and anti-tourism messages in Berlin’s 
graffitial landscape, shock-centric or otherwise impolite messages may also use such 
magnified displays of urban moral decay to make the city seem more dangerous, criminal, 
and chaotic than wealthier prospective inhabitants and visitors might prefer. Such crass 
graffitial images are intentionally unappealing if not outright hostile to bourgeois 
sensibilities. 
Still other graffitial images are defacements of existing messages in the commercial 
linguistic landscape, especially advertisements. One section of Berlin Spricht Wände shows 
an artist defacing an advertisement featuring a crying baby. Atop the existing advertising 
image, he affixes images of a bottle of beer and a pack of cigarettes, both cut from other 
advertisements, positioning the beer like a baby bottle and painting a suited arm offering the 
cigarettes to the baby. After, he uses white paint to erase the existing advertising text. This 
 238 
sort of defacement is a particularly clever appropriation of the space of public 
communication, since the amended advertisement remains in the space designated for 
advertisements and would likely be viewed as such, at least on first glance. A passerby 
apprehending the image might briefly mistake it for real, and their resulting shock would 
assumedly spark critical thought about the content of the message. Moreover, defacement 
removes the original advertisement from the linguistic landscape, thereby appropriating the 
commercial value attached to the space that the ad once occupied 
In this way, graffiti and street art constitute collective communication within Berlin’s 
public sphere, discursively linking disparate parts of a fragmented Gegenöffentlichkeit and 
even becoming a space for anonymous call and response between different factions of 
resistance movements. Graffitial messages are integrated into the physical landscape of the 
city, helping to transform material space and halting the one-way communication of 
advertising and other official or commercial language. Graffitial images resist the 
commercial image of the city by quite literally defacing it, authoring a counter-image in the 
process. This counter-image is concrete in so far as it reshapes the physical environment, but 
it is also discursively apprehended through the frequent anti-commercial content of 
individual messages. Whereas the Wende squatters used graffiti as a means to claim 
ownership of their own linguistic landscape, street art in Berlin today has expanded to cover 
the vast majority of the city’s abstract space, making it one of the more salient forms of 
continuous counter-image making in the city.  
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Appropriating “Representation of Space”: Berlin Stories 
        Morawski’s explanation of the third plane concerning representations of space 
considers representation in a very literal sense, focusing primarily on map-making and other 
forms of critical cartography. Yet the power of literary texts to shape counter-images of the 
city cannot be underestimated, particularly where literary narratives center alternative urban 
spaces and experiences and highlight the everyday routines of the types of Berlin inhabitants 
who often get overlooked by commercial interests. Admittedly, symbolic, literary 
appropriation of city space is generally less transgressive than spatial interventions from the 
first two planes and is thus all the more likely to be easily subsumed by commercial interests 
than some other media. Nonetheless, literature has always had the capacity to penetrate the 
veneer of commercial images and re-author the city. Moreover, Berliners’ comparative 
willingness to use online publishing, alternative presses, literary zines and art books to boost 
the dissemination of counter-imaginary texts deepens their discursive potential.49 Yet even 
commercially-produced texts can challenge the commercial image of the city by focusing on 
the inhabited experiences of precariat inhabitants. While street art and graffiti communicate 
via transgression, textual representations perform a more subtle infiltration of the cultural 
imaginary surrounding the city by using narratives of inhabited experience to encourage 
readers to consider the variety of perspectives that comprise urban experience. Both Tanja 
Dücker in Spielzone (1999) and David Wagner in Mauer Park (2013) offer spatialized 
representations of the New Berlin as a subcultural playground where the city’s history and 
                                                
49 Speaking anecdotally, there is no shortage of independent Berlin bookstores that help disseminate these 
kinds of alternative texts. To provide one example, the Comicbibliothek (Comics Library) at Renate 91 on 
Tucholskystrasse in Mitte includes not only a library of comics from Berlin and elsewhere, but also sells a 
number of locally produced comics and art books created by Berlin artists. If memory serves, it was also 
originally founded by one of the Wende era artist’s squats and has remained in operation since, though I am 
admittedly relying on a conversation I had with a store clerk four years ago for that knowledge. 
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existing traditions combine with an influx of imaginative new approaches to space, allowing 
Berliners to creatively re-imagine and re-author their city in ways that better suit them. 
In “Play Zones: The Erotics of the New Berlin” (2003), Katharina Gerstenberger 
suggests that “despite its short history, the textual construction of unified Berlin can be 
divided into two phases: the fall of the wall and its immediate aftermath, and, toward the end 
of the 1990s, the search for the ‘New Berlin’” (260). She notes that “by the end of the 1990s 
Berlin’s longing to count among the great metropolises of the world has turned the city into 
its own Sehnsuchtsort,50 yielding narratives that celebrate Berlin as a utopian if problematic 
home to a diverse population of people and their desires” (260). Gerstenberger cites 
Dücker’s Spielzone as an example of a novel in which Berlin is explored as an “erotic 
topography” (260) wherein the (generally feminine) body becomes “the surface on which 
the contradictions and the tensions of the New Berlin become visible” (260). While erotic 
play permeates the novel, Dücker’s depiction of Berlin as a play zone (Spielzone) also hints 
at the way city spaces are appropriated and mutated through the playful explorations of the 
city’s youngest inhabitants along axes of identity, gender, and sexuality. In Spielzone, 
creative exploration of the self is mapped to inventive exploration of the city as space. For 
instance, 15-year-old Laura and her friends use the Thomasstrasse graveyard in Neukölln as 
a social hangout and place to smoke weed whereas one night, two of Laura’s neighbors use 
it as a place to have sex in public, neither of which are hegemonically intended uses of a 
graveyard. Creative reinvention of urban spaces extends to various characters’ material 
transformation of spaces, such as Laura’s 19-year-old cousin Ada’s artistic explorations of 
the squatted houses on Sonnenburger Strasse in Prenzlauer Berg. Dücker’s young 
                                                
50 This term is difficult to translate into English, but “dream destination” is a close approximation. 
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protagonists re-imagine and creatively alter the spaces of their everyday lives in Berlin as a 
way to break away from their parents, but also as a way to evolve past the east/west 
divisions of their parents’ generation. Consequently, this sense of east/west divisions 
appears more palpable with Dücker’s older protagaonists, such as the widow who spends her 
free time reading and picnicking at the foot of her husband’s grave because she cannot bring 
herself to change her routine. Interactions between older and younger protagonists in 
Spielzone read as a metaphorical examination of the myriad overlapping perspectives 
helping shape the New Berlin. 
Dücker mirrors the overlapping identities that comprise urban community at the Kiez 
level by constructing her novel as a series of overlapping and intersecting short stories that 
focus on one or two given characters at a time, all of whom live on the same Berlin street for 
which the novels two sections are named. The first section, “Die Thomasstrasse,” focuses on 
the residents of the titular street in West Berlin’s Neukölln neighborhood that faces the 
graveyard surrounding the St. Thomas Kirche. The second half, “Die Sonnenburger 
Strasse,” focuses on the residents of a street in East Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg neighborhood 
where new development, artist squats, and still-decaying older buildings coincide. The 
stories of Thomasstrasse are marked by the death and stagnancy of the graveyard at the 
center of their narratives, frequently evoking the graveyard wall as a stand-in for the wall 
that once divided the two parts of the city. As Gerstenberger observes, “Dücker’s Neukölln 
remains unchanged by the fall of the wall, its state of paralysis made painfully clear by the 
‘new’ districts and the lure they exert,” (261) such as Laura’s intense longing to move to 
Prenzlauer Berg like her cousin Ada. In “Kobaltblau,” an un-named protagonist laments that 
they can’t understand the new English-language graffiti on the Friedhofsmauer [graveyard 
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wall], noting “if it were something nice, I wouldn’t have anything against the fact that walls 
and underground stations are smeared”51 (13). In “Frühlingssalat,” an older character 
suggests that the commercial order of the food aisles at the department store Karstadt are the 
only place where she feels relief from the chaos of the world outside. (39) The older or 
wealthier residents of the neighborhood remain attached to the austerity of the pre-
unification world, seeing the city’s transformations as a threat to their sense of comfort and 
routine.  
By contrast, both the neighborhood’s youth and its most precarious residents engage 
in active transformation of the built environment in Neukölln. In “Laura,” when Laura’s 
parents express concern that their teen daughter spends her evenings hanging around a 
graveyard where she could be murdered, Laura retorts “I don’t think about death or stuff like 
that, it’s just a freaky party spot”52 (21). In “Walkman,” a homeless punk named Rainer with 
a rose tattooed onto his face and a dog named Yesterday transforms the graveyard into his 
open-air livingroom. For Rainer, the graveyard is part of a constellation of appropriated 
urban sites through which he continuously passes, including junkyards, playgrounds, 
construction sites, and parties, allowing him to “drift through life [and] through Neukölln”53 
(46). The contrast between Thomasstrasse’s older residents’ desire to maintain things as they 
are and Laura and Rainer’s inventive new uses of the neighborhood’s spaces reflects the role 
that artistic rebellion and precariat necessity alike play in creating the counter-images that 
drive the slow mutation of urban space. The role that spatial appropriation plays in 
                                                
51 “Wenn's was Schönes wäre, hätte ich ja gar nichts dagegen, dass Wände und U-Bahnhöfe beschmiert 
werden.” 
52 Ich denke überhaupt nicht an Tod oder solche Sachen, es ist einfach nur eine abgefahrene Party-Location. 
53 Beim Laufen geht es ihn immer gut, seit drei Monaten, seit Julia, läuft er ununterbrochen herum, hängt auf 
Schröttplatzen, Baustellen, Friedhöfen und Partys ab, sammelt Dinge und wirft sie weg, lässt sich treiben. 
Durch sein Leben, durch Neukölln. 
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reconstructing the city is heightened in the second half of the book, with Sonnenburger 
Strasse reflecting the idea that East Berlin’s ruinous old neighborhoods potentiated 
numerous forms of spatial intervention. The stories in this section highlight the 
transformative power of art, parties, and eroticism for creating spaces less beholden to the 
demands of labor and consumerism. Even the body becomes a space for experimentation on 
Sonnenburger Strasse, with Ada and her friends engaging in open relationships, gender 
experimentation, public sex, group sex, and all manner of drug experimentation as a way to 
explore the city and their identities outside the confines of hegemonic norms.  
Katharina, the 27 year-old student whose move from Thomasstrasse to Sonnenburger 
Strasse marks the transition from the first to the second half of the novel, sees Prenzlauer 
Berg as a Brachland [fallow land] and Grauzone [grey zone] where experimentation can 
help cultivate something new that is not quite west or east (107-108). By contrast, the 
neighborhood’s native East German residents, such as 18-year-old musician Benno, use 
experimentation within the neighborhood’s artistic spaces to look for ways to preserve the 
cultural memory of the East and protect it against the “unteachable Wessis” who see the East 
as “their new adventure playground”54 (165). Dücker’s portrait of Prenzlauer Berg 
emphasizes the duality of the rapidly gentrifying neighborhood, simultaneously glorifying 
the experimentation of the neighborhood’s countercultural residents and recognizing how 
their parties were appropriated as cultural capital to help sell the district. Dückers especially 
emphasizes the dynamic this created between East and West Berliners, since West Berliners 
often had more economic opportunity to move East than East Berliners did to move West, 
meaning that hip West Germans looking to make a break from their parent generation often 
                                                
54 Solche Höfe hat er sein Leben lang gesehen, da wächst kein Baum und nichts, nur ein paar unbelehrbare 
Wessis halten die für ihre neuen Abenteuerspielplatz. 
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displaced Prenzlauer Berg’s long-term residents. The effect of Dücker’s Sonnenburger 
Strasse stories is that Prenzlauer Berg’s gentrification seems inevitable, even as the city’s 
precariat continue to find subversive ways to carve spaces for themselves and resist the 
city’s commercial future form.  
Presaging the eventual real-life transformation of Neukölln into the new Prenzlauer 
Berg, Katharina compares the two neighborhoods after her move to Prenzlauer Berg, 
concluding that there isn’t much difference between the two. To her, the working class Kieze 
surrounding both Thomasstrasse and Sonnenburger Strasse are equally in flux because “both 
districts are like stomping grounds for hyped up and displaced existences...terms like East 
and West do not work anymore.”55 (156) Alongside this reflection, Katherina ponders how 
Tacheles has become a place where American tourists gather to marvel at the subculture. 
“Poor squatters, the Amis photograph you half to death,”56 she laments, joking that the 
Americans read the graffiti on the walls of the building “as if it were the inscription on 
Schinkel’s Alte Museum”57 (155). Towards the end of the book, Katharina sits with Ada and 
Laura, talking to them about how things were before the Wende. At this point, she parts 
ways with her former West German identity, saying “I am not even really a dyed-in-the-
wool Wessi bride, I’m just from Berlin, this is a country unto itself”58 (192). Neither Laura 
nor Ada retain memories of the Berlin Wall the way Katharina does, so she regales them 
with a story about going to a crazy party near a watch tower along the wall before falling 
asleep with a group of friends in some nearby apartment. While she is sleeping the 
apartment catches fire, setting her blouse and hair on fire as she tries to escape. The story 
                                                
55 “Beide Bezirke sind so etwas wie Tummelplätze für überdrehte und verschrobene Existenzen...Begriffe wie 
"Ost" und "West" greifen doch längst nicht mehr.” 
56 “Arme Hausbesetzer. Die Amis knipsen sich halbtot.” 
57 “...als sei es die Inschrift auf Schinkels Altem Museum.” 
58 “...bin naemlich keine wasch-echte Wessi-Braut, bin ja aus Berlin, das ist ein eigenes Land.” 
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reads as a metaphor for Berlin itself, punctuated by the conclusion in which Ada laments 
that Katharina must spend the rest of her life “charred” and Katharina coyly responds 
“Charred…Not really.”59 The story suggests that while the two older Berlins may have 
burned when the wall fell, unified Berlin has emerged from the flames in a new formation, 
none the worse for wear. Spielzone thus offers a portrait of a city still in transition, 
constantly influenced by the subcultural energies that help its residents re-negotiate their 
own identities as they re-author the cities spaces towards new creative capacities. 
While Spielzone exemplifies Gerstenberger’s assertion that Berlin literature of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s concerned the search for the reunified city’s identity, a new 
phase of literary inquiry gained momentum from the beginning of the twenty-first century 
onward, one which focused less on the search for the New Berlin and more on cataloguing 
the evolution of the city in real time. Berlin stories of this type use local and spatially-
bounded narratives to preserve particular “moments” of a given Berlin space and pose them 
as counter-images to the city’s current or future commercial transformation. What sets these 
more recent pieces of literature apart is how the city and its spaces become almost 
protagonists in the story, the central figure around which all other characters’ narratives turn. 
This allows authors to elucidate how everyday life is affected by the slow mutation of 
Berlin’s spaces and places. As with Dücker’s use of interlocking narratives to author a 
kaleidoscope of Berlin identities, much of this new literature utilizes the short story or essay 
form to present the city through a series of fragmented images that add up to a collective, 
mirroring the fragmented nature of contemporary urban precarity. By presenting a series of 
related stories together in one text, such texts offer a layered approach to urban narration 
                                                
59 “Verkohlt nun nicht.” 
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that reflects the way the city must be reconsidered as the product of a collective process of 
re-authoring. 
One text that exemplifies this trend is David Wagner’s 2013 essay collection Mauer 
Park. It is adapted from an earlier collection, In Berlin (2001), which represented Wagner’s 
attempts to make sense of the concept of the New Berlin at the turning point of the century 
in a way not dissimilar to Dückers’ use of literary short stories in Spielzone. In each essay, 
Wagner went to particular spaces and places in the city in order to write essays illustrating 
the mood produced by each given environment. Roughly ten years later, Wagner went back 
to the exact same places to see how they have changed in the interim. He then republished 
all of the stories from In Berlin in Mauer Park, with each of the new “update” essays tacked 
onto the ends of the earlier versions, adding a few new essays in the process. In Mauer Park, 
Wagner authors and re-authors the spaces of Berlin in a manner that forces the reader to 
acknowledge how the city has changed. His essays display an acute awareness of the 
ephemerality of the spaces he writes about, sensing how commercially imagined urban 
renewal in the New Berlin has attempted to stamp out many of the city’s most lively spaces 
and subcultures. In so doing, Wagner continues the Wende squatters’ goal of providing a 
means by which Berliners might author, re-imagine, and influence the city in order to assert 
their right to it. No surprise, then, that Wagner also wrote the introduction to BWL when it 
was published in 2014, where he also commented on the rapidity with which Mitte has 
changed and will continue to change. 
Wagner’s work preserves in literature that which cannot be preserved in the physical 
space of the rapidly developing metropolis. He offers his Berlin stories as a differential 
literary space for an alternative Berlin-that-was or a potential Berlin-that-could-have-been, 
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while nonetheless attempting to capture the specificity of the current moment. In the story 
“Schutzgebiet Nikolaiviertel,” Wagner criticizes the illusion of historical preservation in a 
city that has so often been demolished and reconstructed. Nikolaiviertel is considered the 
origin point for the entire city of Berlin and was the site of a massive GDR-backed historical 
reconstruction project in the 1980s (Brodauf 19). Wagner describes it as a tourist-oriented 
place where visitors “are pleased with the idea that Berlin could have been that way”60 (187) 
but which offers little more than an artificial history, lamenting “Disneyland is better, lots in 
Disneyland appears far more real than the Nikolaiviertel”61 (191). While the reconstruction 
of Nikolaiviertel was ostensibly an attempt to preserve the city’s historical memory, Wagner 
suggests that the commercial nature of the space renders it a mere simulation of an idea of 
old Berlin. In his update essay, he notes that these commercial tendencies have only 
intensified as Berlin became more tourist-centric. At the end he declares, “Berlin does not 
need an artificial old town [Altstadt], Berlin does not need a new Old-Berlin. Old-Berlin is 
very far away, Old-Berlin has burnt down”62 (192). Implicit in this declaration is Wagner’s 
criticism of both misguided reconstructionist urban renewal as well as of the anesthetized 
use of the city’s history as a tourist trap. In Nikolaiviertel, he sees the confluence of both 
commercial tendencies and rejects the vision it portends. 
This sentiment is reflected in many other essays in the series: in “Wo Die Kompassnadel 
Zitiert,” Wagner mourns the loss of beloved Berliner staples like Café Adler which have 
been replaced by Starbucks and McDonalds franchises; in “Die Netzspinne,” he bemoans 
the way U-Bahn and S-Bahn stations have been renamed to erase the memory of the GDR 
                                                
60 “Sie erfreuen sich an der Idee, dass Berlin so gewesen sein könnte.” 
61 “Disneyland ist besser, vieles in Disneyland wirkt sehr viel echter als das Nikolaiviertel.” 
62 “Berlin braucht keine künstliche Altstadt, Berlin braucht kein neues Alt-Berlin. Alt-Berlin ist sehr weit weg, 
Alt-Berlin ist abgebrannt.” 
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and disorient the city’s long-time inhabitants; in “Wagenburg”, he laments how the once 
extensive squatter scene has been reduced to a mere fraction of what it once was, jokingly 
saying that the occupied caravan camp Wagenburg has since become “Wagendorf.”63 While 
the 2001 version of his  “Fanta Mädchen küsst man nicht” offers a colorful portrait of the 
club scene in the city’s central districts, his far briefer update summarizes how much of that 
scene has since disappeared. He mentions how a restaurant has replaced the famous squat 
Eimer, then adds “henceforth, it will often be described, how Mitte was. I don’t actually 
know it anymore…”64 (123). The inclusion of the essays from In Berlin make it apparent 
that such changes took place more rapidly between 2000-2010 after gaining some steam 
than they did in the decade immediately following reunification. Wagner prefers to act as an 
observer of phenomena so he rarely outright criticizes these changes, but Mauer Park as a 
whole makes it nonetheless obvious how commercially imagined urban renewal has altered 
Berlin’s landscape and in turn, the social relations produced within the city. Reading 
Wagner’s stories together, his sense of loss for the potential social configurations cut off by 
commercial change is almost painfully palpable. 
It is fitting, then, that he ends the collection with the titular essay “Mauer Park.” One 
of only a few new essays in the collection, “Mauer Park” contains no updated addendum; 
instead, it is a snapshot of Berlin’s contemporary moment that offers a potential counter-
image for Berlin’s future. Mauer Park is located in Prenzlauer Berg on a former stretch of 
the Berlin Wall’s no-man’s-land and is named for the long stretch of Hinterlandmauer65 that 
still stands along the Eastern end of the park.  Every Sunday, when most stores in the city 
                                                
63 A “dorf” is generally a small village, in contrast with “burg” which is usually attached to towns/cities. 
64 Es wird nun oft beschrieben, wie Mitte war. Ich weiss es eigentlich nicht mehr…” 
65 The term Hinterlandmauer refers to the second wall behind the Berlin Wall. This is the part of the wall that 
would have been visible from the Eastern side, and was separate from the Berlin Wall proper by a well-
patrolled no-mans-land. 
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are closed, the Mauer Park features a flea market, food trucks, street musicians, artists, and a 
beloved grassroots-organized public karaoke gathering that has come to be one of the park’s 
most famous offerings. For a long time, none of the activities in Mauer Park were sanctioned 
by the city, and its use as a flea market more or less evolved from its spontaneous collective 
use in this way, similar to the way spontaneous citizen actions transformed Tempelhofer 
Feld. Mauer Park is a dirty, dusty, unpaved open space, and it is one of the most beloved 
destinations in contemporary Berlin. 
Wagner’s essay reads like a love letter to the park. Its content, as well as its location 
at the end of the series and its demarcation as the series’ titular essay, portrays Mauer Park 
as a counter-image for New Berlin in its current evolution. Coming at the end of the book, 
the essay reads as the afterthought addendum to the entire essay collection, in much the 
same way that Wagner’s update essays amended the works that came before them. In his 
introduction to the collection, Wagner says his aim has always been to answer the question 
“What does the New Berlin look like?” and by the end of the collection, it is clear that the 
titular essay is his answer. Using the Berliner dialect, he opens with “Oh, Mauerpark, I love 
you. Even though you’re often so ugly”66 (224), going on to describe how the park’s 
ugliness and utter lack of traditional commercial appeal is precisely its anti-bourgeois 
charm. Throughout, he mockingly borrows the rhetoric of the commercial image, describing 
the people who gather empty bottles to exchange for Pfand67 money “entrepreneurs” and the 
hula-hooping dancers who accompany street musicians “Promoters.” He suggests that Joe 
Hatchiban, who established the Mauer Park karaoke events, ought to be compensated by the 
                                                
66 “Ach, Mauerpark, ick liebe dir. Obwohl du oft so hässlich bist.” 
67 A pfand is a small tax charged when purchasing bottled drinks in Germany, and is given back when bottles 
are returned. The practice of collecting bottles discarded in public in order to exchange them for pfand is very 
common among the economically disadvantaged in Germany. 
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senate for his contributions to tourism in the city, because “one couldn’t think up a better 
Berlin promotional film”68 (227). 
Interestingly, Wagner’s counter-image is not overtly anti-tourist, so much as a 
rejection of the idea that Berlin ought to be reduced to a tourist attraction, as in the 
Nikolaiviertel. Unlike with other destinations in the city, Wagner suggests that tourists who 
come to Mauer Park experience Berlin as Berliners, as part of the community. “Yes, I like 
the teeming picture portrait [Wimmelbild] of Mauerpark und how Berlin plays out here, and 
it doesn’t matter that most who come to act out Berlin here perhaps don’t live in Berlin at 
all, no big deal, here they are also Berlin”69 (227). He portrays Mauer Park as a type of 
proto-differential space, since it challenges the social formations of the built environment 
surrounding the empty space of the park. Unlike the Huyssenian voids long since filled in by 
commercial urban renewal, Mauer Park retains the emptiness of no-mans-land by 
transforming it into an every-mans-land, a gathering space for the urban masses. Wagner 
explicitly praises the newly established “Welt-bürger-park” foundation for “fighting for a 
Mauerpark without development”70 (228) and makes a joke about hot-wiring a hydraulic 
shovel from a luxury loft construction site in order to “complete the years-overdue 
expansion of the park in a single night”71 (228). Symbolically extending his metaphor, 
Wagner argues for a citywide extension of Mauer Park that would steamroll the city’s 
luxury apartments (and the gentrification they represent) out of existence. 
                                                
68 “…ein Berlin-Werbefilm könnte sich kein besseres Bild ausdenken, Veranstalter Joe Hatchiban sollte vom 
Senat bezahlt werden.” 
69 “Ja, mir gefällt das Wimmelbild Mauerpark und wie hier Berlin gespielt wird, und es macht nichts, dass die 
meisten, die hier Berlin spielen, vielleicht gar nicht in Berlin wohnen, egal, hier sind auch sie Berlin.” 
70 “…für einen Mauerpark ohne Bebauung kämpft.” 
71 “…die seit Jahren überfällige Parkerweiterung in einer Nacht erledigen würde.” 
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Where BWL appropriated the representation of space through photographic texts that 
restore the memory of a historical urban counter-image prior to the commercial image’s 
transformation og the city, both Spielzone and Mauer Park author inhabited narratives of 
Berlin’s post-Wende spaces to illuminate how the commercial image has altered the 
landscape. Their works both present a portrait of the city that makes it possible to search for 
fissures and gaps in the commercial logic of the city as space, teasing out narrative threads 
that reflect the struggles of precariat urbanity. Both authors use their respective literary 
examinations of Berlin as space to investigate where resistance can still be articulated and 
which aspects of the city’s history and collective memory ought to be retained in the 
process. In both literary representations, the image of Berlin as sophisticated profit-driven 
metropolis is collapsed and replaced by inhabitant-centric collective re-imaginations of the 
city as a text awaiting re-authorship. 
 
Conclusion 
In December 2014, the graffiti artist Blu and his co-creators painted over two of their 
own well-known murals at Cuvry Brache in Kreuzberg, a long-occupied open space for tents 
and squatters that is frequented by the homeless. One mural depicted two figures unmasking 
one another, representing the city East and West, and the other featured a businessman 
whose gold watches had become his shackles. Both murals have become iconic Berlin 
images that are frequently employed as cultural capital to promote Berlin’s thriving artistic 
counterculture. After the night in December 2014 when the murals were covered by black 
paint, the widespread popular assumption was that some investment group had defaced them 
in preparation for new development. However, in the editorial that collaborator Lutz Henker 
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released to The Guardian explaining his group’s decision to paint over their murals, he 
writes: 
Unintentionally, we had created an ideal visual representation of the imaginary 
Berlin of the noughties and its promises: a city full of wasteland offering plenty of 
space for affordable living and creative experimentation among the ruins of its recent 
history… The murals took their involuntary place in this reality as a pilgrimage site 
of guided street art tours, as a photo opportunity for countless greeting cards, book 
covers and record sleeves. The city started to use the aesthetics of resistance for its 
marketing campaigns. (Henke) 
 Blu and collaborators had come to the same conclusion as the Wende squatters before them 
– even their resistance could be used against them. But it is telling that in 2014, they were no 
longer content to resign themselves to the fate of being fodder for cultural capital, opting 
instead to destroy their own art. Their act of defiance re-asserted their ownership over the 
space by un-creating that which capital had co-opted. Henke notes how Berlin’s policies in 
reunification “squandered much of the city’s rare spatial potential, and thereby also 
jeopardized the existence of its main attraction—the artists” who then unknowingly 
“[contributed] to their own displacement.” Painting over the murals was a bold declaration 
that the city’s inhabitants would no longer be compliant in their own displacement, and the 
collective response was to see the act as a rallying cry for future resistance. 
 The destruction of the murals at Cuvry Brache serves as an illustrative example of 
multiple concepts foregrounded throughout this chapter. As an expression of the right to the 
city, it rejects the dominance of the commercial image. As an act of counter-image making, 
it both refuses appropriation as cultural capital and asserts the artist’s power to retain control 
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over his or her own counter-images. It is an intervention on both a physical and a symbolic 
plane, indicative of a broader Gegenöffentlichkeit, which stimulates a critical public 
discourse about the city’s development. In short, the Cuvry Brache mural destruction is a 
mise en abyme of the state of spatial resistance in contemporary Berlin. It reflects how 
resistance in today’s Berlin builds upon both the failures and successes of resistant 
movements that came before, adapting to the cities shifting needs and, like the Wende 
squatters before, seeking out new avenues for discursive engagement with the city 
environment. Bolstered by the irruptive moment of reunification, resistant slow mutation of 
Berlin continues apace, continuously resisting the commercial image and the dominance of 
abstract space and forging in the process an alternative cultural memory for Berlin’s 
Gegenöffentlichkeit. It becomes clear in evaluating the resistant strategies presented here 
that in a neoliberal, globalized world, class struggle via the precariat must address and make 
use of the resistant potential offered by space itself. Today, revolution will only come by 
means of a transformation of the built environment. For all intents and purposes, the 
revolution can be and will be spatialized.
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Conclusion 
Towards a Differential Spatial Studies 
 
Lefebvre’s grand theory of differential space as potential space-that-could-be is a 
useful grounding concept for all manner of analysis that concerns itself with excavating the 
contours of contemporary culture in order to imagine a more equitable future. While most 
academic disciplines have undergone some version of the so-called spatial turn since the 
mid-twentieth century (or even earlier, depending on who you ask), shifts towards spatially-
minded inquiry have often remained entrenched within the confines of single fields of study. 
And while various disciplines have undergone their own unique spatial turns, their efforts at 
spatial inquiry have only sporadically resulted in a push for spatial studies as an 
interdisciplinary, cross-national and interartistic field to generate broader conversations 
about society as understood in and through space. The consequence of considering spatial 
issues in relative academic isolation has been a proliferation of recent research that dances 
around common cultural questions without ever managing to forge cross-disciplinary 
connections that might actually help address them—a tendency that even the current work 
fails at times to avoid. This effect is magnified by the fact that traditionally quantitative 
forms of analysis are rarely considered alongside traditionally qualitative forms of analysis, 
leaving blindspots for both, especially when the two confront similar topics.1 The work at 
                                                
1 Speaking anecdotally, I was recently reminded how absurd this seems by a conversation I had with my friend 
Dr. Stefan Berteau after he completed his dissertation in computational/theoretical neuroscience, wherein he 
lamented that it had been difficult if not impossible to integrate more qualitative forms of analysis into his 
work on the neural effects of “twist-endings” in narrative storytelling, even as doing so might have 
strengthened his findings. I was struck by the realization that the exact kind of analysis I was conducting in 
comparative literature on the assumptions about race and criminality that attend suburban narratives suffered 
from the inverse issue, in that it was proving difficult to substantiate my claims without quantitative support 
about the neural effects of consuming particular narrative tropes. While he and I immediately discussed finding 
a way to collaborate on exactly this type of research later, our conversation made it apparent how infrequent 
these types of cross-disciplinary approaches to cultural concerns remain, even as collaboration of this type 
would undoubtedly prove fruitful in helping address numerous cultural concerns that traditional academic 
inquiry have as of yet not been able to adequately confront. 
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hand proceeds from an intense desire to imagine how spatial studies might look within the 
context of a given existing academic discipline. It is a broad comparative analysis that 
extends from the traditional forms of literaryinquiry championed in comparative literature 
while also integrating threads from more far-flung disciplines (geography, sociology, 
political science, musicology, to name but a few) in an effort to render the research project 
itself a potential differential space. 
Yet if academia is considered as a type of social space produced towards certain ends 
to facilitate certain types of social interaction, and if each of the disciplines comprising 
academia are considered symbolic sub-spaces within it, then it stands to reason that both 
types of produced space can be subjected to the same strategies of spatial appropriation that 
Lefebvre, Morawski, and others have argued potentiate the emergence of a new type of 
differential space. It is my home that the preceding work demonstrates how the emerging 
field of spatial studies could become precisely this kind of differential academic discipline, 
since all human interaction is constituted in and through space, making it a lens through 
which to apprehend all manner of human behavior. Of course, some may argue that if nearly 
anything can be reduced to its spatial expression and thereby subjected to discursive analysis 
then the purpose of analysis would become too diluted or the specificities of individual 
disciplines would be erased, both of which unlikely in an academy increasingly pushing 
towards niche and nuance. One might counter such an argument by arguing that the non-
specificity of spatial studies is precisely its appeal—if all social formations can be 
considered through a spatial lens, then spatial studies would be an interdisciplinary field par 
excellence, a grand framework within which anomalous or disconnected analyses might be 
able to interact. A differential spatial studies could become a space of confluence for the 
 256 
intellectual pursuits of academics and non-academics alike, a space of connection between 
heretofore disparate approaches to addressing some of the most difficult social problems and 
–isms, a space of discursive re-imagination that undoes the traditional power structures of 
the proverbial ivory tower. Spatial studies could become the field that challenges academia 
to re-imagine its own contours and come up with something different, something that can be 
more equitably shared among all who aspire to knowledge. It could inaugurate an approach 
to knowledge acquisition grounded in a sort of right to the academy and to academic space 
that proceeds from the right to the city as a concept for allowing those who actually inhabit a 
space to access its resources and shape how its spaces are used. More practical than utopian 
an imperative, a push towards a differential spatial studies represents an attempt to 
reconceive the possibilities of academic research, particularly as relates to advancing 
progressive change in society. 
While these ideas may seem overly grand, they are the very ideas that grounded my 
approach to all of the research and analysis I have laid out in this work. It would have been 
very easy to choose to analyze canonically accepted pieces of literature and theory and 
produce a dissertation that more directly aligned with the traditional expectations of 
comparative literature as a discipline, but by integrating non-traditional texts and forms of 
inquiry, the present work attempts re-imagines the space of the doctoral dissertation in a new 
way. Moreover, it is precisely this same kind of push towards interdisciplinary, boundary-
transgressing modes of analysis that makes comparative literature attractive to begin with. 
The strength of comparative literature as a field lies in its tendency to see quite literally 
anything that can be read or analyzed as a text, rendering the entirety of the material world 
fodder for analysis. In this context, my passionate plea for a differential spatial studies does 
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not so much part ways with the traditional academic approach to literary research so much 
as push for more analytical experimentation of the kind championed in fields like 
comparative literature. It is a passionate plea that challenges the academy to re-imagine its 
contours in ways that make more room for the precariat voices and inhabited experiences 
that I have attempted to center in the work at hand. So long as the demographics of 
academia remain wedded to the same affluent white hegemony that governs the urban fabric 
and society more generally, and so long as access to academic knowledge is constrained by 
financial requirements that limit first and foremost those whose lives are already marked by 
precarity,2 it will never be possible to access new ways of apprehending, perceiving, and 
knowing the world around us.  
All manner of reading and analysis and careful, meticulous research about inhabited 
spaces can produce a given set of findings, but too often those findings reflect common 
sense understanding accessible to certain types of inhabited experience—to use the present 
work as an example, as a white academic who spent most of my life in suburban Colorado, I 
can analyze what Vince Staples says about how police brutality affects people living in 
ghettoized urban neighborhoods all I want, but I won’t be saying anything that the average 
inhabitant of a ghettoized urban neighborhood could not tell you based on their own 
everyday experiences. Though this work represents a concentrated effort to imagine how 
spatial theory and analysis of material culture can help one understand the effects of 
                                                
2 Given that this conclusion is a departure from tradition already, I suppose it is relevant enough to add that I 
myself grew up in quite severe poverty. Finishing this dissertation, I couldn’t stop thinking about how I 
represent a demographic that hegemony attempts to render impossible: the impoverished first generation 
doctoral candidate. Achieving academic success would not have been possible for most in my position and 
even in my own case has required me to go into a crippling amount of debt despite the numerous forms of 
outside support I received, many of which I might not have been able to receive without my relative privilege 
as a white person. A call to de-monetize academic knowledge must also include a call to make secondary 
education pursuable for even the most impoverished as well as a reduce the financial burden required of all 
students, especially students of color, the already impoverished, and those needing student loans. 
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hegemony in popular culture, especially as relates to racial and socioeconomic segregation, 
almost nothing I present here is shocking, novel, or even that useful for those whose 
everyday lives are marked by the kind of precarity that necessitates a broader push for the 
right to the city. Effectively, the work you hold in your hand is an attempt to lend academic 
credence to a type of common sense knowledge that is obvious to huge swaths of the 
population who may or may not ever get the chance to step foot on a college campus but 
whose knowledge of urban space is no less salient for it. Given these recognitions, how 
might those of us currently engaged in traditional academic inquiry use our work to create 
voids and chasms in the existing logic of academia that allow for slow mutation of academic 
spaces and potentiate the emergence of a differential space for producing differential forms 
of knowledge? How might the unique work conducted by academics be re-tooled as an 
instrument for potentiating the emergence of a world-wide counter-public, given the 
resistant necessity Morawski and others identity to mutate abstract space across all manner 
of points of entry and create a collective form of spatial appropriation? What might a 
differential academia look like and how can spatial studies help potentiate it? 
These are big questions, but they reflect increasingly important concerns within the 
current decade marked by seismic shifts in global power, increasing planetary precarity, 
unprecedented climate change, vast wealth inequality, and an array of dizzying backslides 
towards overt fascism, xenophobia, racism, and misogyny. The 2016 election of Donald J. 
Trump as President of the United States, to provide but one example of the changes that 
have taken place in the few years since I began this project, represents but one of numerous 
violent contemporary alterations in the spatial logic of American culture and by extension, 
given the power of the American presidency, in the spatial logic of world culture as well. 
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From the start, Trump’s presidency has been marked by numerous attempts to redefine the 
spatial logic of the United States in ways the reinforce American white hegemony, 
including, but in no way limited to: calls to erect a massive border wall separating the 
United States from Mexico; detention of immigrants, especially the forced spatial separation 
of children from their parents with little regard for the logistics of later reuniting families; 
attempts to institute travel restrictions on those from countries with large Muslim 
populations; the promotion of a nationalistic, “America first” rhetoric that threatens 
diplomatic relations; and, a general willingness to denigrate urban populations of color in a 
manner akin to the moral panic rhetoric I referenced in the second chapter. Approaching 
Trump’s violent attempts at state repression through a spatial lens cannot and should not be 
the only way these issues are approached, but an analysis of the spatial implications of such 
policies might prove useful in helping resistant actors of all stripes forge new forms of 
resistance that oppose the hegemonic power structures such changes are meant to bolster. 
Far more than an idealistic, kumbaya-esque call for greater cross-cultural and cross-
disciplinary understanding, a push for spatial studies as a possible point of entry to a 
differential academic space reflects a need to fundamentally alter the way we think about 
knowledge and power in ways that consider space as the raw material through which both 
are situated.  
Seen this way, space becomes a malleable conceptual playing field for imagining 
new resistant strategies, a concrete material form around which resistant knowledge can be 
expressed and counter-narratives can be articulated. Within the context of contemporary 
literature and culture, especially texts from popular culture, spatially-minded narratives and 
analysis reflect a postmodern tendency to re-value material culture in a world increasingly 
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apprehended through digital, non-tangible spaces and experiences. As a material component 
of everyday experience, urban space broadly conceived3 interacts with the mediated 
narratives that represent it in ways that, when analyzed, highlight the inequalities and 
imbalances of neoliberal late capitalist culture. If social revolution must proceed from a 
recognition that the right to the city (which is, in effect, the right to space) must be extended 
to all who inhabit, then it is high time that all manner of inhabitants and the spaces they 
inhabit become the center of cultural, literary, and scientific inquiries geared towards 
creating greater social equality. 
                                                
3 That is, as conceived to include the suburban and rural spaces folded into the larger urban fabric as described 
in Edward Soja’s concept of postmodern geography. 
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